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In recent decades, the growth of immigrant communities in Europe has prompted 
controversial political and discursive contexts. Due to a combination of factors, real or 
imagined boundaries between the majority group population and minority migrant groups 
have brought about or affected policy measures aimed at managing immigration and 
integration, as well as have fueled debate regarding the legitimacy of these migrant groups. In 
particular, European political, social and even academic rhetoric has often framed Muslims as 
‘the other,’ both in terms of migrant background, and in juxtaposition with Europe’s historic 
Christian tradition and today’s mainstream secularism. Muslim youth face discrimination in 
their European communities of residence that militates against a sense of belonging, 
compounding the disadvantages that children of migrant parents otherwise face.  Second 
generation Muslims negotiate pluralist realities and multiple attachments, and express 
complex identities. As citizens, they are entitled to comprehensive inclusion, and their rights 
and opportunities should be equal to that of peers with native-born parents. In reality, they 
can grapple with social or institutional discrimination and xenophobia. 
It becomes apparent that in fostering cohesive societies and in attempting to facilitate 
integration, recognizing agency and a two-way dialogue between the individual and 
community of residence is key. The impact of globalization and transnationalism challenges 
modern European actors to better understand and perhaps even reconsider the relationship 
between the state and the individual, the nature of citizenship, and the power networks and 
influences behind integration policymaking and agendas.  Adhering to a concept of static 
culture, where the individual bears the burden of adaptation, is no longer appropriate, if it 
ever was. New formulations of citizenship, synthesized with human rights norms and ideals, 
now embrace institutional and societal respect for individual rights and agency, and 




Within Europe, Spain provides a timely case study in exploring societal cohesion 
within a diverse community. Modern Spain has experienced relatively recent immigration in 
comparison with other European states, and the second generation is currently forming a 
significant part of the societal fabric as they finish their education and enter the labor market. 
Moreover, Spain’s unique historical and structural pluralism, as well as its decentralized 
governance in matters of integration, provides a novel space within which to observe and 
reform diversity management.  
As such, given the European and Spanish contexts, Spain’s second generation Muslims 
are a exceptionally salient population to study, both as a vulnerable minority group in the 
present climate, and as an important current and future citizenry. As the discussion regarding 
integration and diversity increasingly intensifies, a sense of belonging is thought to signify 
acculturation on the part of the second generation and of the receiving society. Sense of 
belonging can be measured through expression of self-identity; self-identification, whether 
with the society of residence or with religion, can facilitate support and engender a sense of 
belonging. Consequently, this work analyzed identity in pursuit of several objectives, via a 
qualitative study of second generation Muslim youth in Madrid, with participants drawing 
from the first and 1.5 generation for comparison. Madrid was chosen specifically in order to 
establish a reasonable framework for the research, as well as to demonstrate the multilevel 
governance of Spain and the sociological value of observing local communities. The 
investigation first sought to measure to what extent these youth expressed attachment to 
Spain, to Madrid or to their local community of residence, based on their own self-
identification. It then asked whether participants self-identified religiously, and measured 
religiosity based on self-assessment and questions as to religious practice. The study hoped 
to determine whether societal attachment and religious identity were correlated. Finally, it 
asked whether this group’s perceptions of Spanish societal and institutional reception 




The investigation was couched in theoretical grounding regarding migration and 
citizenship, and was conducted alongside analysis and comparison with past and current 
European studies. France and the United Kingdom provided earlier migration and integration 
learning curves and points of comparison. The empirical data then demonstrated positive 
trends in identification and social participation among the target population, all of which 
boded well for future individual trajectories, as well as for Spanish social cohesion. Most 
markedly, the participants manifested a hybrid identity when they engaged in identification. 
This multiple identity can serve as a way to measure integration, as exclusive attachment to 
Spain or the community of residence is not the only way to manifest belonging. Multiple 
attachment can in fact reflect adept adaptation and social navigation skills. It demonstrates 
how transnationalism and time-space compression allows for more complex identities, in a 
diverse contemporary reality.  
Moreover, religious identification formed a part of these hybrid identities, and did not 
preclude but was often expressed alongside social attachment. This religious identity was 
either individualized and less visible and public, or was leveraged as a claims-making tool in 
civic engagement. In both their expressions of attachment to the community or in their 
religious identification, the participants related experiences of discrimination and expressed 
expectations of rights recognitions and societal inclusion. Essentially, this work found that 
citizen engagement, as well as institutional responsibility to foster participation and prevent 
marginalization and discrimination, is necessary for societal coexistence and success in a 
globalized world. It addressed how Spanish society and institutions have approached the 
youth’s expectations for social inclusion so far, and how they could improve in supporting 
this collective in the future. With the consistent experiences of discrimination in this 
investigation providing a cautionary note, supporting these youth in their endeavors to 
participate in and contribute to Spanish society remains a priority: it not only affords this 






En las últimas décadas, el crecimiento de las comunidades de inmigrantes en Europa 
ha generado contextos políticos y discursivos controvertidos. Debido a una combinación de 
factores, las fronteras reales o imaginarias entre segmentos mayoritarios de la sociedad y 
miembros de minorías inmigrantes han afectado las políticas públicas dirigidas a gestionar la 
inmigración y la integración, y han alimentado debates sobre la legitimidad de estos grupos 
migrantes. En particular, una retórica política, social y a veces incluso académica en Europa 
ha señalado a los musulmanes como "el otro", tanto en términos de sus orígenes inmigrantes 
como en yuxtaposición con la tradición cristiana de Europa y el secularismo actual. Los 
jóvenes musulmanes son objeto de discriminación en sus comunidades de residencia 
europeas, lo que milita en contra de los sentimientos de pertenencia, agravando las 
desventajas a las que los hijos de padres migrantes se enfrentarían en todo caso. Los 
musulmanes de segunda generación negocian realidades pluralistas y apegos múltiples, y 
expresan identidades complejas. Como ciudadanos, tienen derecho a la inclusión integral, y 
sus derechos y oportunidades deben ser iguales a las de los jóvenes de padres nacidos en el 
país. Sin embargo, se enfrentan a la discriminación social o institucional y a la xenofobia. 
Para fomentar la cohesión social y facilitar la integración es crucial reconocer la 
agencia de los migrantes y promover un diálogo bidireccional entre el individuo y la 
comunidad. El impacto de la globalización y el transnacionalismo compelen a los actores 
europeos modernos a comprender mejor, y quizás incluso a reconsiderar, la relación entre el 
estado y el individuo, la ciudadanía y las redes de poder que subyacen a las políticas y 
agendas de integración. Adherirse a un concepto de estático de cultura, donde el individuo 
soporta la carga de la adaptación, ya no es aceptable, si alguna vez lo fue. Las actuales 
formulaciones de la ciudadanía, amalgamadas con normas e ideales de derechos humanos, 




hincapié en la participación como una vía para construir la solidaridad en sociedades 
diversas y pluralistas. 
Dentro de Europa, España puede dar lugar a un estudio de caso particularmente 
adecuado para explorar la cohesión social en una sociedad diversa. La España moderna ha 
recibido una inmigración relativamente reciente en comparación con otros estados europeos, 
y en ella la llamada segunda generación está empezando a suponer una parte significativa del 
tejido social a medida que los jóvenes que la protagonizan finalizan su educación y entran en 
el mercado laboral. Además, el pluralismo histórico y estructural de España, así como su 
gobernanza descentralizada en materia de integración, proporciona un espacio singular 
dentro del cual observar y quizás reformar la gestión de la diversidad.  
A la luz del contexto europeo y español, los musulmanes de segunda generación en 
España constituyen una población excepcionalmente significativa para su estudio, como un 
grupo minoritario vulnerable en el clima actual y a la vez como una importante parte de la 
ciudadanía actual y futura. A medida que se intensifica el debate sobre la integración y la 
diversidad, el desarrollo de sentimientos de pertenencia puede suponer aculturación por 
parte de la segunda generación y también de la sociedad receptora. El sentido de pertenencia 
se puede medir a través de la expresión de la propia identidad; la autoidentificación, ya sea 
con la sociedad de residencia o con la religión, puede proporcionar redes de apoyo y 
engendrar un sentimiento de pertenencia. En consecuencia, este trabajo analiza la identidad 
persiguiendo varios objetivos, a través de un estudio cualitativo de la juventud musulmana de 
segunda generación en Madrid, añadiendo miembros de la primera generación y la 
generación 1,5 a efectos de comparación. Madrid fue elegida específicamente para establecer 
un marco razonable para la investigación, así como para poner de manifiesto la gobernanza 
multinivel que existe en España y el valor sociológico de la observación de las comunidades 
locales. En una primera instancia, la investigación ha tratado de medir en qué medida estos 
jóvenes expresan apego a España, a Madrid o a su comunidad de residencia local, basándose 




sí mismos en términos religiosos, y midió la religiosidad basándose en la autoevaluación y en 
preguntas sobre la práctica religiosa. La investigación trataba de determinar si el apego social 
y la identidad religiosa estaban correlacionados. Finalmente, indagó acerca de si las 
percepciones de este grupo sobre la recepción social e institucional de la sociedad española 
afectaban a la forma en que se autoidentificaban. 
La investigación se ha basado en diversos fundamentos teóricos sobre la migración y 
la ciudadanía, y se ha desarrollado en paralelo con el análisis y la comparación con estudios 
europeos pasados y actuales. Francia y el Reino Unido han proporcionado curvas de 
aprendizaje y puntos de comparación con experiencias de inmigración e integración más 
antiguos. Los hallazgos empíricos han puesto de manifiesto tendencias positivas en la 
identificación y participación social de esta población, lo que supone un buen pronóstico para 
sus trayectorias individuales futuras, así como para la cohesión social española. De forma 
acusada, las identificaciones de los participantes han revelado una identidad híbrida. Esta 
identidad múltiple puede proporcionar una forma de medir la integración, ya que la 
pertenencia exclusiva a España o a la comunidad de residencia no es la única forma de 
expresar sentimientos de pertenencia. De hecho, las pertenencias múltiples pueden reflejar 
destrezas para la adaptación y habilidades para la navegación social. Esta tendencia hibrida 
demuestra que el transnacionalismo y la compresión del espacio-tiempo permiten la 
construcción de identidades más complejas, en una realidad contemporánea diversa. 
Más aún, la identificación religiosa formaba parte de estas identidades híbridas, y no 
excluía, sino que a veces se expresaba en paralelo a ella, la pertenencia social. Esta identidad 
religiosa era de carácter individual y poco visible y pública, o era utilizada como una 
herramienta para la reivindicación en la participación cívica. Tanto en sus expresiones de 
apego a la comunidad como en su identificación religiosa, los participantes relataron 
experiencias de discriminación y expresaran expectativas de reconocimiento de derechos e 
inclusión social. Esencialmente, esta investigación ha puesto de manifiesto que la 




participación y prevenir la marginación y la discriminación, son necesarias para la 
convivencia social y el buen funcionamiento en un mundo globalizado. El estudio ha 
abordado la cuestión de cómo la sociedad y las instituciones españolas han tratado las 
expectativas de los jóvenes respecto de su inclusión social hasta el momento, y examinado 
cómo podrían mejorar su apoyo a este colectivo en el futuro. Mientras las repetidas 
experiencias de discriminación observadas en esta investigación proporcionan una nota de 
advertencia, el apoyo a estos jóvenes en sus esfuerzos por participar en, y contribuir a, la 
sociedad española constituye una prioridad: no solo otorga a este grupo los derechos y la 
protección a los que son acreedores, sino que también promete beneficiar al conjunto de la 











Needless to say, this dissertation is the product of generous support and 
encouragement from many. To begin, I am very grateful for the kind assistance, patience and 
welcome from various Madrid communities and their members throughout the process of 
conducting my fieldwork. These included but were not limited to La Asociación de Chicas 
Musulmanas de España, Centro Cultural Islámico de Madrid, Asociación Tayba, Dawah 
Project, Comunidad Musulmana de Getafe Al Falah, Onda de Madrid and CCIF Al Umma De 
Fuenlabrada. All of the individuals that graciously took the time to participate in the study, or 
directed me to those who could, were both essential and very much appreciated. 
Abdelmounim El Gueddari, Inés Martín Fernández and Sara Tena Reiff deserve special thanks 
in this regard. Of course, this list is not as satisfactorily extensive as it could be.  
Those teachers who inspired and believed in me in very early stages, including Fr. 
Kurt Pritzl and Patti Riegert, played an indispensable role. The Semitics department at 
Catholic University of America (CUA) was a very special place to begin my graduate work, and 
I remain thankful to Shawqi Talia for all he has done for me as both professor and mentor. 
Michael Mack and Nick Kruckenberg from CUA deserve particular thanks as they first 
supported and challenged me in my graduate studies. John C. McCarthy of CUA, Corinna 
Mullin of SOAS and Kathryn Shaughnessy of St. Johns University, New York, were invaluable 
as I continued my trajectory. I remain indebted to my colleagues at SOAS for the intellectual 
challenge and personal development they offered.    
The CUA Honors Department fellowship made my initial graduate forays possible. 
Moreover, I very much appreciate the flexibility and assistance from Vicente Navarro and 
Rafael Heiber as they provided access to further academic experience and enabled me to 
participate in workshops and conferences that allowed me to gain insight, feedback and 




colleagues at the Pompeu Fabra University and Johns Hopkins University, including Mary 
Sheehan.  
My warmest and heartfelt thanks go to my thesis advisor Joaquin Arango, whose 
admirable guidance, wisdom, patience, time and extensive work in this process made this 
project possible. His unparalleled tutelage has provided the ideal academic experience.   
I should add that exceptional friends and scholars in their own right have helped me 
to grow and to articulate my ideas: Mary Kate Cunningham, Micaela O’Herron, Maureen Baro, 
Sarah Gaskell and Elizabeth Pritchard. 
And finally, I am indebted most to my family and their unconditional love. Thank you 
to my parents Ann and Joe for prioritizing and nurturing my intellectual growth, as well as for 
every opportunity so selflessly provided to me. My siblings John and Bridget continue to 
simultaneously challenge and support me. And lastly, in these past years, Daniel’s true 
partnership, editing assistance and constant encouragement have supplied the conclusive 
boost in accomplishing this final result, for which I owe everyone mentioned and 





Table of Contents  
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................ i 
Dedication ....................................................................................................................................................... xiii 
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................................... ix 
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................................... xi 
 
Chapter 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
Research questions and hypotheses ..................................................................................... 6 
Significance and Contribution ................................................................................................. 8 
Methodology ................................................................................................................................... 11 
Thesis outline ................................................................................................................................. 11 
II. Migration theory: The individual, the state and  
reconfigured notions of citizenship and belonging ................................................ 15 
Migration theory and the modern nation-state ................................................................ 16 
Citizenship ....................................................................................................................................... 18 
Belonging .......................................................................................................................................... 21 
Globalization ................................................................................................................................... 22 
Individuals and new formulations of citizenship and belonging .............................. 24 
Transnationalism and responses to multiculturalism .................................................. 25 
The cosmopolitan and the local .............................................................................................. 29 
Hybridity........................................................................................................................................... 31 
The individual, secularism and migration .......................................................................... 33 
III. Research design and methods .................................................................................................... 37 
Interview in relation to integration indicators ................................................................. 37 
Indicator of self-identity and sense of belonging  
on the part of the individual  .......................................................................................... 39 
Indicator of self-identity and sense of belonging  
as responsibility on the part of society ...................................................................... 40 
Religious identity as a variable ............................................................................................... 41 
Expectations as an indicator .................................................................................................... 42 
Interview structure and headings .......................................................................................... 43 
Data collection and participant pool ..................................................................................... 45 
A note about email interviews ................................................................................................. 47 
Limitations of study ..................................................................................................................... 49 
IV. Contexts and policies of immigration and integration: Europe and Spain ........ 53 
European immigration and integration ............................................................................... 54 
By comparison: the case of France ........................................................................................ 58 
By comparison: the case of the United Kingdom ............................................................. 61 
Spanish immigration and integration................................................................................... 65 
i. Public opinion in Spain regarding immigration and integration ................. 66 
ii. Background, legislation and policies ...................................................................... 67 
iii. Municipal Registry ........................................................................................................ 70 
iv. Integration policy .......................................................................................................... 71 
v. Institutional anti-discrimination measures ......................................................... 73 
Integration in Madrid .................................................................................................................. 74 
V. The second generation and integration .................................................................................. 78 
Defining the second generation .............................................................................................. 78 
Second generation theory ......................................................................................................... 81 
Second generation indicators of integration ..................................................................... 85 




The second generation in Spain .............................................................................................. 90 
VI. Europe, religion and Islam ............................................................................................................ 94 
Europe and its religious heritage ........................................................................................... 95 
Europe and secularism ............................................................................................................... 96 
Religious freedom in Europe .................................................................................................... 98 
Islam and Europe: an overview .............................................................................................. 99 
Islam: a brief outline of the faith............................................................................................. 101 
Theories regarding Islam in Europe ..................................................................................... 103 
General European state policies towards Islam ............................................................... 107 
The case of France ........................................................................................................................ 108 
The case of the United Kingdom ............................................................................................. 113 
Repercussions of extremism .................................................................................................... 117 
VII. Muslim European youth and self-identity .......................................................................... 120 
Identity: an overview .................................................................................................................. 120 
Self-identity ..................................................................................................................................... 122 
State versus society and identity ............................................................................................ 123 
Collective identity ......................................................................................................................... 125 
Religious identity .......................................................................................................................... 126 
Fluidity of identity ........................................................................................................................ 129 
Taxonomy of Muslim youth in the literature..................................................................... 130 
i. Religious individualism ................................................................................................. 131 
ii. Reactive identity ............................................................................................................. 134 
iii. European Islam .............................................................................................................. 136 
iv. Sense of belonging ........................................................................................................ 136 
Caveat: Risk of essentialism ..................................................................................................... 138 
Caveat: Qualifying determinants of integration ............................................................... 138 
VIII. Islam in Spain .................................................................................................................................... 142 
Spain’s religious history ............................................................................................................. 142 
Current Spanish institutional relationship with Islam .................................................. 143 
Estimate of Muslim population ............................................................................................... 146 
Rights protections......................................................................................................................... 146 
Education ......................................................................................................................................... 149 
The workplace ................................................................................................................................ 151 
Media .................................................................................................................................................. 151 
Islamophobia  ................................................................................................................................. 153 
Spanish public opinion regarding Islam .............................................................................. 155 
Islam in Madrid .............................................................................................................................. 158 
Muslim attitudes in Spain .......................................................................................................... 160 
Second generation integration and identity in Spain .................................................... 162 
IX. Empirical findings .............................................................................................................................. 167 
Initial observations ...................................................................................................................... 168 
Note on participants’ religiosity ............................................................................................. 171 
Self-identification and sense of belonging .......................................................................... 173 
Hybrid identities and emphasis on the individual and the collective ..................... 176 
Further expressions of hybrid identities ............................................................................ 177 
Hybridity in language use .......................................................................................................... 179 
Remaining in Spain in the future ............................................................................................ 181 
Religious identity as part of hybrid identity ...................................................................... 181 
Muslim identity, individualized practice and privatization of faith ......................... 183 
Visibility of Muslim identity ..................................................................................................... 185 
The veil as part of identity ........................................................................................................ 186 
Experiences of discrimination ................................................................................................. 189 




Perspectives on discrimination ............................................................................................... 190 
Discrimination in an educational setting ............................................................................ 190 
Discrimination: according to background? ........................................................................ 191 
Institutional discrimination ...................................................................................................... 194 
Attitudes towards discrimination .......................................................................................... 196 
Rights discourse and expectations of social participation and inclusion .............. 198 
Legal background to rights discourse .................................................................................. 200 
Frustration with democratic system and promise .......................................................... 204 
Expectations of equality and pluralism ............................................................................... 205 
Separation of church and state and safeguarding pluralism ...................................... 208 
X. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 212 
Key Findings .................................................................................................................................... 216 
Sense of belonging ........................................................................................................................ 218 
Religiosity......................................................................................................................................... 219 
Hybridity........................................................................................................................................... 221 
Rights claims and expectations of recognition ................................................................. 222 
Findings in the context of other European studies ......................................................... 223 
Theoretical takeaways: checks and balances  
and agency versus static values and culture ........................................................... 225 
Policy recommendations alongside civil advocacy and activism .............................. 226 
i. Improved awareness and reporting ........................................................................ 227 
ii. Creating accessible tool for Spanish Muslim youth ......................................... 227 
iii. Enforcing equality and non-discrimination safeguards ............................... 228 
iv. Correcting institutional biases  ............................................................................... 229 
v. Institutional protections during formative years ............................................. 230 
Future academic research ......................................................................................................... 231 
 
 
Appendix A ..................................................................................................................................................... 234 




Chapter I: Introduction 
Over the past few decades, Europe has experienced significant immigration, yet a 
boundary often remains between minority migrant groups and native European society. 
Member states consequently address immigration with integration policies in order to 
ameliorate differences. However, despite these efforts, and given the Christian tradition and 
secular paradigm of Europe, some are wary of the recent increase in Muslim immigration. It is 
argued that Islam is illegitimate in European society, and this suspicion is compounded with 
reservations society may have about immigration in general. Public debates present Islam as 
“the other,” separate from and incompatible with Western ideals. Yet, from the perspective of 
Muslim minorities, religious identity can facilitate social support, continuity of heritage and a 
guys’guiding worldview. There are contentions that secularization has assumed an exclusive 
and dominant ideology in Europe, and rather than seeking social cohesion and coexistence 
via diversity management, as international liberal democratic recommendations prescribe, 
European religious minorities face stigmatization and both institutional and societal 
obstacles to inclusion. 
The debate assumes an even more complex dimension when addressing second 
generation immigrants,1 or youth of migrant origin, self-identifying as Muslims. Studies to 
date suggest that the institutional arrangements of each country, including approaches to 
religious freedom (i.e. individual and collective rights), church state-relations, and immigrant 
incorporation, can influence a sense of belonging to respective member states or societies 
among these second generation Muslims. Indeed, how the second generation identifies with 
its society is a sensitive issue, because as citizens (in the majority of cases, to be elaborated 
                                                          
1 It is of note that the term “second generation immigrant” can be qualified as imprecise, as 
this second generation can refer to native-born individuals who have not migrated, rather than foreign 
born like their parents. In this sense, they are by definition not immigrants.  However, it is a term used 
in the field to identify this population set. It will be used interchangeably with “youth of migrant origin” 
to refer to the population studied. Further clarification, including as to the distinction between 1.5 and 
second generation and the parameters defining second generation, and why they are significant, is 




upon in further depth) they are entitled to comprehensive inclusion in their societies of 
residence. Their rights and opportunities should be equal to that of peers with native-born 
parents.  
As part of these rights, international norms and liberal democratic values entitle these 
second generation Muslim youth to maintain and express diverse identities, doing so without 
being subject to discrimination. Some of these identities have been investigated in recent 
years and presented as multi-layered and plural. Still other research has signaled reactive 
identities, a lack of a sense of belonging to the society of residence, and a marginalization of 
this population. Modern Europe, facing the impact of globalization and transnationalism, 
faces policymaking challenges in migration and agendas of integration. Integration is defined 
variously among different authors; generally, however, the notion of integration 
conceptualizes of everything that happens after an immigrant arrives to their new country 
(Cachón 2011). Zanfrini further offers that it could be conceived of as a process of 
socialization engaged in by the individual, where society and culture are united in values and 
behavior. In addition, she provides a definition of integration that incorporates the element of 
modernity, explaining that integration is often conceptualized as the problem presented 
when recently arrived immigrants must assimilate in an industrial and modern culture 
(2007). As such, integration is a contentious concept, in that it is arguably intended to create 
homogeneity in a reality that is increasingly diverse. Indeed, authors have questioned 
whether integration is even an ideological position, especially in the case of Spain, and have 
explored its degree of uniqueness to the European experience (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011; 
Brettell 2008). At the same time, it is of standard usage in the literature, and serves as an 
international reference, to indicate policy attempts at societal cohesion. It will be employed 
as necessary, for pragmatic purposes, throughout the argument of this work. 
A variety of indicators are essential in evaluating societal integration of any given 
group, and traditional indicators like social capital and education are often emphasized. 




provides a predictor of social mobility and perceived successful societal inclusion. Belonging, 
in its most basic sense, can be understood as an individual’s orientation towards, and 
interaction with, the environment of which they form a part. Sense of belonging can be 
evaluated via an understanding of how the subject self-identifies, both at the individual and 
collective level.  It is sometimes used interchangeably with the concept of identity, and can 
often be associated with citizenship themes in the literature. For example, within migration 
specifically, it can signify the relations that people and their descendants experience with 
varying locations and fluctuating social and political environments. As Western states pursue 
policies encouraging either inclusion or exclusion, in both immigration and integration 
legislation, attention is directed toward the individual and the sense of belonging that they 
construct and experience. Meanwhile, the “politics of belonging” is a phrase used to indicate 
political attempts to construct belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006).  
In the process of constructing belonging, these second generation youth negotiate two 
or more cultures and identities, as well as any disadvantages inherent to their individual 
situations. Responsibility is twofold, however; in addition to the efforts of these youth, society 
as a whole must balance an emphasis on integration and cohesion with respect for an 
increasingly diverse reality. This can be managed via protection of individual and collective 
autonomy and rights. In a both globalized and individualized modern European culture, 
second generation identity can be diversified even within a specific, local community, and 
accounts of super-diversity are increasingly prevalent (Vertovec 2007).  As recognized at the 
European normative level, integration and identity is based not only on the second 
generation’s individual choice, but is also shaped by their very own societies: society’s 
approach to nationalism and difference can significantly affect identity among second 
generation Muslims in Europe.  
The Spanish case is of particular interest, as a variety of factors make it unique. It has 
a distinct modern historical, political and societal context in comparison with other countries 




and political culture has been described as more welcoming and positively oriented towards 
immigration in comparison with the rest of Europe, even in the wake of economic crisis 
(Barrero 2009a; Cea D’Ancona and Valles 2012; Gallup 2007). Some studies have indicated 
that the second generation seems to be well-adjusted, more so in comparison with other 
countries in Europe (Aparicio 2006). There may be several reasons as to why Spanish society 
seems to view immigration more favorably than surrounding Europe, including the 
demographics, political culture and national identity that stem from Spain’s recent history.  
Present-day immigration began as recently as the 1980s and reached substantial flows in the 
new millennium. The majority of immigrants entered the country contributing to the 
workforce and GDP, thus representing a societal advantage (Arango 2012). Additionally, 
Spain’s political culture embraced democratic and universalistic values in its transition from 
dictatorship to democracy, facilitating positive attitudes toward immigration (Ibid.).  
In fact, regarding immigration from a diversity perspective, this singular post-
dictatorship era is the space wherein the Spanish example provides the most significant 
promise, as well as presents the most challenges. With the case of Islam in particular, cultural 
links can be traced to the historical legacy of Al-Andalus, or to the colonial relationship with 
Morocco and subsequent continued institutional engagement in immigration policy. 
Conversely, the Franco regime attempted to maintain a homogeneous, monolingual and 
monotheistic version (i.e. Christian) version of being Spanish (Zapata 2010). At this point, 
however, the recently constructed and developing modern democracy has taken a new 
direction. Despite the homogeneity pursued prior to this young democracy, the pluralistic 
makeup of Spain has consistently remained a reality, with its national-regional identifications 
(i.e. Basque, Catalan and Galician, among others) (Arango 2012). Spain has worked towards 
multi-level governance and providing local autonomy in attempts to respect this pluralism. 
Still, it could be argued that there have been failings in regard to diversity 
management, with issues related to religious, linguistic and regionalism or nationalism 




reevaluation of the relationship between church and state in the post-dictatorship democracy 
construction, Spain allowed for a concordatarian church-state structure. In this arrangement, 
the state recognizes and engages with religious bodies, including Islam. However, the 
country’s extensive Catholic history leaves traces of institutional Catholic privilege. This, in 
combination with more recent increasing secularist attitudes and views that religion is 
illegitimate in the public sphere (shared in other parts of Europe), can shape a society that is 
resistant to manifestations of Islam. Additionally, not unlike analyses regarding the rest of 
Europe, a rise in experiences of discrimination and Islamophobia has been recorded in some 
Spanish studies (D’Ancona and Valles 2012; Tellez 2011). Along with this trend in typifying 
Islam as the other, the slow recovery of the post-recession labor market and the variability of 
which party gains political power could affect overall positive attitudes to immigration 
(Arango 2012).  
In light of all this, Spain provides a particularly distinct and timely case study. As 
Zapata offers, “Spain is a laboratory of diversities” (2010). The second generation is gaining 
more visibility and is rooted more firmly in Spain’s demography. Maturing and developing 
Spanish society and institutions are positioned to approach diversity management and 
societal inclusion with the learning curves of other European countries as demonstrative of 
what to pursue or avoid. The inclusion of Muslim populations, and in particular the Muslim 
second generation or youth of migrant origin, is an important objective in liberal democratic 
societies that emphasize respecting individual and collective rights; there is a commitment to 
provide equality and opportunity within cohesive communities. In attempting to balance an 
inclusive society with respect for plurality and individual diversity, research in the field must 
necessarily examine individual contexts or networks at the local level. They provide 
exemplary microcosms from which to learn specific findings, as opposed to postulating less 
evidence-based, grand conjectures.   
For example, in Spain, native attitudes towards immigration may vary by region. 




immigrant sentiment among Basques, Catalans and Galicians (Escandell and Ceobanu 2010). 
For example, in regard to attitudes towards Muslim immigration, Astor points out that while 
there is a virtual lack of opposition to mosque building in Madrid, significant opposition 
exists in Barcelona (and, at the same time, the latter situation allows for dialogue) (2014). 
Indeed, integration policies in Spain are often decentralized and adapted to the regional and 
local level and context. Of course, the pluralism noted throughout Spain, as well as the 
varying levels of governments, means that the situation for Muslim youth can differ from 
region to region or city to city. 
Research questions and hypotheses 
For this reason, in addition to noting the importance of examining the case of Muslim 
youth in Europe, and how the Spanish context is particularly pertinent, this study will focus 
on second generation Muslim youth in Madrid. This provides a concrete local case, as well as 
sets a reasonable goal for a population study. In light of the debates discussed, the thesis 
question will first attempt to address how the second generation self-identifies, with special 
attention to sense of belonging to their community of residence, as well as their religious 
identity. Sense of belonging or attachment to the community of residence is understood as an 
indicator of integration. Demonstrating belonging or attachment on the part of these youth is 
one way of indicating their participation and inclusion in the societal fabric.  
This sense of belonging will also be explored in relation to religious identity to see if 
the two correlate, if at all. Religiosity is often cited as a barrier to integration, or at the very 
least as something that sets this group apart from others as they engage with European or 
Spanish society. This work will seek to illustrate how the population themselves believes 
their religiosity or “Muslimness” factors into their operation as members of the community, 
whether that of Madrid, Spain, or Europe. A 2003 study of the Moroccan population in Spain 
(not specifically youth or second generation) determined that Muslim identity was an active 




work will investigate Muslim youth of migrant origin in particular (beyond solely Moroccan 
origin), in understanding how and if Muslim identity serves as an active and influential 
component in identity. 
As so, primarily the dissertation is guided by an investigation into how these youth 
approach multiple identities and how they intermesh this individuality with their community 
and sense of place. There is a second component of the thesis question, however, that 
addresses the surrounding community’s responsibility of receptiveness, i.e., the inclusion that 
these youth are afforded. The dynamic that the participants perceive the community emits 
(and perhaps indeed objectively is) bears significant ramifications for state and society. As 
the second generation is perhaps striving to participate as full members of the body politic, 
they may feel marginalized or sidelined by institutional or societal forces, including via 
experiences of discrimination. Analyzing this group’s perceptions of how Spanish society or 
their community receives them is an important factor to take into account. Again, the study 
will focus on the second generation, given its relevance as previously described, but also 
engage with participants from generation 1.5 and the first generation to provide points of 
comparison. The 1.5 generation, not born in the country of residence but raised in their 
formative years in the very same, reflect societal processes in the receiving community and 
provide an important comparison in understanding societal attachment and perhaps even 
religious identity. 
As to the hypotheses regarding this two-part inquiry, firstly, it is projected that the 
majority of the youth will express attachment to the community of residence (either Madrid 
or Spain), given that the few studies available to date have demonstrated a relatively well-
adjusted Spanish second generation. Moreover, it is postulated that this attachment may not 
necessarily be exclusive, but can still demonstrate adaption and flourishing in the community. 
As youth of immigrant origin manage multiple bonds and differentiated social practices, 
partial attachment or “hybrid” identity may characteristic of these Spanish youth of migrant 




rather would reflect a promising ability to participate and cross-cut boundaries in an 
increasingly differentiated social sphere, exercising adept individual agency whether at the 
local, national or international level.  
Furthermore, it is supposed that religiosity can and will serve as a determinant in 
individual identity, it is not an obstacle in engaging with the receiving society, as polemically 
expressed in the public sphere, but rather just another variable in this engagement; 
moreover, it could be that the degree of religiosity may facilitate or support the degree of 
sense of belonging. Amongst a vulnerable population that can be marginalized for a variety of 
reasons, religious involvement can provide a shared sense of community, as well as aid in 
achieving social capital and societal mobilization.  For a minority group with less societal 
leverage, this identity and community can offer support that might otherwise be lacking.  
Finally, in examining the second part of the question, it is hypothesized that perceived 
reception by society, including some experience of discrimination, will have an effect on the 
targeted variables that formulate self-identification. It seems inevitable that the internal and 
external, reflexive nature of identity means that institutional and societal welcome will affect 
participants’ feelings of attachment to their community.  
Significance and contribution 
In line with the problematization outlined above, this work’s central inquiry is 
especially meaningful, as it finds its place in a growing body of literature addressing the 
changing nature of citizenship: the individual navigates belonging, and society attempts to 
manage a space, that is diverse, global and transnational, yet simultaneously local. This is 
manifested on several levels. To begin, at the European level, demographic shifts and 
migration debates regarding citizenship and belonging complicate the practical 
implementation of European liberal democratic values. This is evident in the case of the 
discourse surrounding Islam in Europe, as institutions and societies must consider to what 




collective rights. Within this context, Spain is working to address its recent and continued 
demographic shift, as well as its unique historical, social and cultural situation, in an evolving 
process of diversity management. It must balance a cohesive society on the one hand, 
avoiding the pitfalls experienced by fellow European countries at a more advanced stage of 
immigration. On the other hand, it must observe international recommendations for rights 
protections and respecting diverse individuals and collectives, on the other.  
Underpinning all of this is an observation regarding the process of societal change, 
and analyzing how it will impact future generations. Gebhardt, Zapata and Bria estimate that 
the 1.5 and second generation in Spain represent about 15-19% percent of youth under 25 
years old (2017). This is a substantial percentage of Spain’s future citizenry. Second 
generation Muslim youth are a particularly significant case study, as they remain a vulnerable 
minority group that may face multiple challenges, including those already documented 
among other Muslim European youth in Europe (briefly referenced above). Essentially, the 
investigation is relevant in that it hopes to treat of future strategy for reconciling both the 
individual as a complex and autonomous agent, and society as an inclusive community. As a 
result, the conclusions of this work propose anti-discrimination measures that seek such a 
reconciliation. Spanish Muslims are an important target group in this regard. They are 
citizens positioned to fully participate in Spanish society, and are growing in number, but 
may be more prone to disadvantages and discouraged from exercising autonomy and 
expressing differentiated identities. 
This last observation speaks to the one of the several contributions this work can 
offer. The investigation reflects a trend in qualitative migration literature, while 
simultaneously providing for gaps in the field in terms of youth study. Yalaz and Zapata 
analyzed articles published between 2000 and 2016 in two leading migration journals, the 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (JEMS) and Ethnic and Racial Studies (ERS), and found 
that the quantity of publication increased significantly, indicating that “such expansion is a 




cultural diversity” (2017). At the same time, they noted that among the topics of research, the 
category of youth was initially researched to a greater degree, but articles on the topic have 
declined. Again, given youth’s societal potential to contribute, and how they comprise a 
significant demographic, this decline in study should be rectified. 
Moreover, this project is significant in that it provides a local and concrete case study 
as a reference during a crucial time for Spanish diversity management and demographic 
fluctuation. There is a projection that local level policy may perhaps exercise the most 
influence, and in turn receives the greatest degree of feedback and reciprocal influence from 
the subjects it proposes to affect (Zapata 2009b). In Spain, integration is transitioning from 
the political spotlight to administrative realms, local government, NGOs, and private 
companies (Zincone, Penninx and Borkert, 2011). Rather than the sweeping national 
integration models of old, it becomes increasingly important to identify how to support 
individual groups. Common spaces and the coexistence within them operate in a significant 
way at a local level (Glick-Schiller, Darieva and Gruner-Domic 2011). For this reason, the 
focus on Madrid has been chosen; this, of course in addition to the practical need to 
containing the scope of the study.  
Finally, while some studies concentrate on the compatibility between attachment and 
religiosity, or others on the receptiveness on the receiving society, there is less available that 
can comprehensively approach these two considerations in tandem. Again, given the two-way 
nature of integration and citizenship, there is a need to canvass the challenges that this 
selected target group faces. However, in doing so, it is important to consider those factors 
that are both within and outside of their control. European youth of migrant origin are 
moving into the labor market, and more importantly are entering into the overall societal 
fabric in increasing numbers. Throughout this process, they are not only entitled to the same 
equality of opportunity as their peers of native origin, but also represent the societal future in 




perspective of population control, but also in terms of human rights and societal commitment 
to liberal democratic values (Cachon 2010, 1569). 
Methodology 
In proceeding to conduct the investigation as proposed, the work evidently 
necessitates empirical study. Given the specificity of the target population, the soft indicators 
explored and the limitations of a dissertation study, the methodology selected as most 
appropriate is a qualitative, inductive approach, and the research tecnique takes the form of a 
semi-structured, qualitative interview. Via a series of multiple-choice and open-ended 
questions, this qualitative method allows for the participant to self-report sense of belonging, 
religiosity and overall self-identification. As such, the study accounts for the perspective of 
the participants as best it can, by allowing them to set the definition of what is considered 
belonging or religious ascription. Of course, for context, the interview will evaluate other 
indicators of integration and information that could be quantified more objectively by the 
researcher, as well. The study sought out Muslim youth via the snowball method and through 
the collaboration of various Muslim youth associations. The interviews were conducted in a 
range of neighborhoods and cities throughout the community of Madrid, over the course of 
two years, from 2016 to 2018. The final sample size of 32 participants respondents 
(disregarding pilot interviews) was selected based on an estimate of saturation. There were a 
total of 19 second generation, eight 1.5 generation and 5 first generation, almost equally split 
between genders. 
Thesis outline  
In structuring this work, both a theoretical grounding and literature review 
indubitably provide essential framework for the empirical portion of the study. As previously 
alluded to, the theoretical foundation proceeds from an overview of migration theory based 
in the modern nation-state, to an exploration of reconfigured notions of citizenship. In light of 




community and formulate belonging have produced contemporary theories about how to 
manage diversity. These theories observe societal realities from the transnational to the local 
level, as well as arrive at a more nuanced understanding of identity in the modern era. Given 
the theoretical considerations, the study’s chosen methodology is outlined in more detail. 
There is an explanation of why the indicators in the qualitative research were selected and 
how they function, as well as a more exacting description of the interview, data collection, 
participant pool and limitations of the study.  
In addition to the theoretical framework and methodological rationale, further 
complementary analysis precedes the account of empirical results. An examination of second 
generation Muslims in Madrid and the how they identify both with the European, Spanish or 
Madrid community alongside their faith demands relevant literature examination in several 
areas of research.  To begin, a broad perspective on historical and sociopolitical realities that 
shape current European integration and immigration policy is useful, with a comparison 
between Spanish policy versus that of the United Kingdom and France. These countries 
provide contrast not only due to the volume of Muslim immigration each has, but in the 
distinctive ways in which these states approach integration; in some ways they diverge from 
Spain’s relatively recent immigration experience and integration measures. Moreover, in the 
vein of this migration focus, literature specifically addressing the second generation follows. 
The second generation review is not simply approached in relation to Europe, but as a whole, 
given it is a relatively specific and recent field that merits full contemplation in order to 
inform the examination of this population in Spain.  
Of course, the group selected for this study is singled out in public and academic 
discourse not solely due to their migrant origins. They are also targeted due to their faith and 
the accompanying presumptions or foreign connotations associated with it, mistaken or 
otherwise. For this reason, a transition to the distinguishing factor of religiosity on the part of 
this population, especially given its distinction as a variable, ensues. There is a long history of 




informing the European context. All of this is often pitted again the Muslim faith, migrants, or 
both. Thus, the work proceeds to describe both European religious history and current policy 
regarding secularism, as well as overviews the trajectory of Islam in Europe. It discusses 
factors that impact public policy and Islam, and explores literature on Muslim integration, 
including providing a comparative focus on second and third generations in France and 
Britain.  
The preceding steps are all important background: a general analysis of both 
migration theory and context, alongside an examination of how religion relates to systems of 
power, individual or collective rights and understandings of citizenship. It allows for further 
detail regarding the thesis question to follow. This detail includes a thorough explication of 
literature on identity, from its essential characteristics to a more specific account of how 
individual, collective and religious identity impact discussion of Muslim youth identity in 
Europe, and in what ways it relates to sense of belonging. Finally, the work continues to 
narrow the focus by providing an overview of Islam in Spain, addressing its history, the 
current institutional relationship, and research to date on today’s community both in Spain 
and Madrid.  
Couched in theory, the methodological strategy, as well as an account of sources and 
criteria treating of the migration and religious variables targeted in this study of identity, the 
work is positioned to finally provide the empirical results and analysis. Initial observations 
and patterns are identified as the data provided by the semi-structured interviews and 
interaction with key figures in the participants’ community is reported. This information is 
compared to original hypotheses and analysis earlier in the work. The findings include 
expectations of rights that were not originally addressed as part of the research question, but 
emerged as an important consideration in the data collection. In the conclusions, inferences 
are made and relationships drawn using the trends indicated in the empirical section. This 
leads to theoretical takeaways, implications for policy recommendations and proposals for 




Aside from the greater aspirations addressed in the conclusions, however, this work 
in the meantime hopes to provide a degree of clarity, albeit on the local scale, as to the value 
of understanding this unique cohort’s expressions of identity and their perspectives on 
societal inclusion. In the context of modernity and the individual’s relationship with 
surrounding networks, the project seeks to answer the sociological discipline’s call for a 
continuous reexamination of the individual in order to provide a more exacting science. 
These individual accounts, provided in a very specific context, facilitate a more 
comprehensive understanding of agency. They allow for addressing various questions, 
inspired by the problematization, in an especially concrete manner. The opportunity to hone 
in as such is complemented and reflected by broader themes regarding participation and 






Migration theory: The individual, the state 
and reconfigured notions of citizenship and belonging 
Second generation Muslim youth in Spain, how they identify, and their reciprocal 
relationship with Spanish society are questions that typify a broader trend in social science 
investigation: analyzing the changing political and societal landscape in light of perceived 
global transformations, and how to better accommodate the pluralism that results. Until 
recently, study of political and societal networks has been understood within the framework 
of the nation state model, where individual rights are bestowed on nationals belonging to 
relatively closed societies. However, present transnational flows, including that of people and 
information, have prompted reconfigured understandings of the rights of the individual and 
the role of institutions, as new space and networks supersede national boundaries. 
These reconsidered ideas are especially present in second generation studies. This 
group navigates multiple attachments, including the culture of their parents’ origin, Spanish 
society (in this case), and even new conceptions of global citizen. It could perhaps even be 
posited that youth in general, regardless of parental origin, are facing new understandings of 
attachment and belonging as they confront global networks and responsibilities as a local, 
national, or global member of society. At the same time, political and societal institutions are 
called upon to assume responsibility for the cohesiveness of their communities. An 
increasingly prevalent and accepted understanding is that this cohesiveness requires 
incorporating pluralism and respecting the unalienable rights of the individual, and that 
cohesiveness involves a two-way process.  The child of migrant origin in Spain, and in this 
case specifically, those with parents that identify as Muslim, reflects the significance of the 
relationship between the individual, or individual collectives, and state and societal 
networks. For example, some studies across Europe have reflected that this group faces 




As such, this chapter will proceed to explore how the individual has remained a 
consistent theme in the literature, and continues to remain relevant given these apparently 
global transformations. Throughout this exploration of the individual, it will highlight how a 
cohesive dynamic between individual and state or society can be reflected through sense of 
belonging, and the obligation to forge this relationship is both on the part of the individual 
and society. To begin, the trajectory of migration theory will be especially useful in 
demonstrating this continued investigation of the individual in relation to the state. The 
concept of citizenship and its reformulation will also be important to address, as it previously 
marked the formal relationship between the individual and state or society, but is currently 
being redefined or even superseded with new terms or concepts. In this vein, additionally 
clarifying the terms globalization and belonging will prove useful. Then, provided this sketch 
of the relevant theory to date, I will present more recent study of transnationalism, diversity 
and hybridity and how these concepts reflect reformulations of citizenship and the 
understanding of an individual’s place in society. Finally, given that the object of study is 
second generation Muslim youth, it will be useful to hold a brief discussion of how religion 
factors into these theories of the individual, belonging and societal transformation (to be 
followed by more in depth explanation in a later chapter). 
Migration theory and the modern nation-state 
To orient the discussion, theories of migration can be initially understood within the 
context of the modern nation-state trajectory. Migration theory grew into its own as a 
discipline in the 1960s, and the field continues to rapidly grow and evolve (Arango 2000; 
Yalaz and Zapata 2017). For the purposes of this work, especially in targeting the second 
generation and their unique individual identities, I will examine migration theory through the 
lens of the individual, or better put, through an evolving understanding of the state and its 
relationship with the individual. This will include an overview of theory grounded in the 




in the context of reformulated concepts of state and citizenship, all with a consequent 
emphasis on the individual (and their multiple or intersecting identities). 
As such, in beginning with the modern nation-state context of migration theory, it is 
perhaps obvious to note that the history of the modern state involves a shift in sovereignty 
from that of the ruler to the sovereignty of the people, with territorial state boundaries and 
national sovereignty (Sassen 1996). However, with the process of globalization, and in the 
postwar era of a challenged nation-state paradigm, migration and international flows 
progressively confront traditional state authority. This struggle for authority is both in 
physical terms, with loss of border control, as well as via electronic, legal and economic space 
that replaces territorial boundaries with the symbolic (Sassen 1996; Soysal 1997; Brettell 
2008). In migration studies, and in Western European dialectic, the state has transitioned 
from the traditional conception of nation-state, understood as owned by a certain nation or 
ethnic group to the exclusion of others, to a liberal state based on a commitment to individual 
rights that self-limit the state’s own authority, to be further explored in a discussion of 
citizenship and accompanying reconfigured notions (Joppke 2005). This new liberal state, 
while still linked to nation-state moorings as a collective with history, has proceeded to admit 
individuals into its membership, rather than dealing with admission on a group basis (Ibid.). 
This can be seen in the example of first generation migrants allowed pathways to citizenship 
in their receiving country, with full rights and participation. While the second generation are 
purportedly entitled to these rights de facto, having been born into the host society, they 
often still have to advocate for full recognition and participation. 
And so, when seeking an understanding of migration in the context of globalization, a 
new understanding of societal processes shifts from an emphasis on the nation-state 
framework to one on the individual. The relationship between the state and the individual 
can be conceived of either as a twofold linking of the individual to the state, through both the 
individual and the individual’s community, or simply recognizing that an individual must be 




Bloemraad 2000). In lieu of the nation-state, some have argued to a conception of the state 
that is embedded in a series of associations and networks of power (Castells 2000; Gupta 
1995; Mitchell 1991). This observation stems from Foucault’s observation that the 
complexity of power is visible at the individual level (1979). And while traditional 
institutions remain important, as Sassen puts it, “The space of traditional governance is 
shrinking, even though it remains the most strategically important and powerful” (2017, 8).  
Moreover, a discourse of rights emphasizes individual autonomy at the trans- and 
international level, beyond the nation-state. This rights discourse includes the right to 
immigrate and its significance for the community.  There are views that democracy is 
improved via recognition and support of migrants’ transnational ties or multiple identities 
(Vertovec 2001).  From this perspective, immigration as a social right is a reality that affects 
all of society, most especially public institutions, and not solely the immigrants it receives 
(Cahon 2011). This principle is reflected in those of several transnational legal frameworks 
and institutions. While migration policy remains a prerogative of the individual state, many 
states abide by certain international legal frameworks reflecting these principles of 
international unalienable rights.  
Citizenship 
While international and transnational realities propound, the state and citizenship 
and the evolving nature of the relationship between the two remains a key consideration. 
While migration and the protection of the rights of the individual constitutes a responsibility 
of public policy at various levels, it still often falls within the jurisdiction of a state to varying 
degrees. Traditional conceptions of citizenship often fall within the confines of the nation-
state, and the state has regulated migration via citizenship. As such, the state has held large 
responsibility for immigration and integration policies, both of which obviously affect societal 
incorporation of European Muslim youth, and a further detailing of immigration and 




will begin with an overall synopsis of traditional citizenship, before continuing on to new 
theories of citizenship and belonging that emphasize individual rights and autonomy, all of 
which has implications for the second generation.   
Citizenship has been traditionally understood in relation to the state, as citizenship 
historically signified membership and participation within a nation-state. Simply put, this 
traditional citizenship is defined as individual membership in a socio-political community 
(the state), with reference to “legal status rights, identity, and participation” (Bloemraad 
2000). Citizenship and nationality become confused at times. This is because at a conceptual 
level, citizenship is often used to denote a juridical idea including rights and obligations, 
whereas nationality is often used to refer to mutual recognition as a fellow member of the 
community; it implies a shared ethnicity or recognized cultural belonging. This confusion 
comes as no surprise, of course: state and nation, as well as citizenship and nationality, 
overlap and intertwine as a result of the nation-state membership model.  
However, in the international legal regime, nationality is the term used to indicate 
membership in a state, and this membership is prerequisite to obtaining full rights within 
that state, as a citizen. This nationality varies from state to state based on differing levels of 
recognition (Ibid.). Access to this national citizenship often takes the route of either jus 
sanguinis (citizenship by blood) or jus soli (citizenship by birth in a territory) depending on 
each state´s institutional framework. Moreover, one can obtain it via other routes, including 
marriage or naturalization.  
In short, citizenship and nationality can manifest distinctions in the legal field. 
However, the concepts, depending on their usage and by whom, can be merged or confused. 
For the purposes of this work, although there may be some technical distinction, any 
reference to an individual as a national or a citizen (including participants in the study) will 
be indicating national citizenship (unless clarified or specified otherwise). This national 
citizenship can be defined as “congruence between territorial state and the national 




their collective identity. Hence, what national citizenship denotes is a territorially bounded 
population with a specific set of rights and duties, excluding others on the ground of 
nationality” (Soysal 1996, 18). 
Anderson’s “imagined communities” of nations, where the citizen feels a sense of 
community with fellow nationals despite having no demonstrable attachments, comes to 
mind in these definitions of citizenship (2006, 6). And of course, these discussions of 
citizenship very clearly stem from the modern nation-state trajectory. However, new 
understandings of citizenship have developed beyond the bounds of the nation-state. The 
literature has pursued an exploration of a symbolic sense of belonging, and how it requires 
the conferral of more or different rights and understanding than it did before (Cachon 2011). 
In psychological terms, citizenship is understood as the identity and solidarity that a person 
experiences in the collective or public sphere. Thus, it is perhaps not tied to the traditional 
definition of the nation, and far less to a legal understanding (Zanfrini 2007). Here we see 
that the individual is not only important in relation to a nation, but also in terms of their own 
self-identification and participation in any community. 
It should be noted that while this work is moving towards an understanding of 
citizenship that encompasses solidarity, employing citizenship as a means to engender 
collective identity is a hotly debated topic in the literature (Bloemraad 2000; Yuval-Davis 
2006).  For example, Fraser hails from the camp that citizenship no longer remains relevant: 
“what turns a collection of people into fellow members of a public is not shared citizenship, 
but their co-imbrication in a common set of structures and/or institutions that affect their 
lives” (2007). This “common set of structures” that affects the public are a set of transnational 
powers held accountable by democratic, transnational collectives “of public opinion” (Ibid). 
This “co-imbrication” that Fraser refers to does not necessarily imply an inherent sense of 
belonging, and an individual may not feel compelled to buy into a membership model that 
prescribes this. A specific example of this qualified form of membership can be found in 




fairly cogently within the socio-political community (Brubaker 1989). Citizenship itself may 
be of less value to an individual than their position in the labor market or education system 
(Ibid.).  
Still, in keeping with the current drift in migration studies, the shift towards framing 
citizenship within the context of participatory membership and a communitarian nature is 
especially conducive to our approach to the individual identity. This approach to citizenship 
also includes an emphasis on the individual actor, rather than remaining solely within the 
framework of the state and bestowed rights, For the purposes this work, citizenship and an 
understanding of the individual’s role in society will encompass, as Rodriguez aptly puts it, 
“all of the rights and obligations—individual, universal, and at the level of the community and 
the state—that identify the participation or intervention in public matters of a member of 
society” (2017, 261). Further development of this definition proceeds in the following 
discussion of more recent theory that addresses an increasingly fluid and interconnected 
social reality. 
Belonging 
Discussing the communitarian aspect of citizenship merits an explanation of the term 
‘belonging,’ mentioned earlier. Consideration of a shared community carries with it an 
attempt to identify belonging and social cohesion, especially in relation to public policies of 
inclusion. ‘Belonging,’ in its most basic sense, can be understood as an individual’s orientation 
towards, and interaction with, the environment of which they form a part (Albiez 2011). 
Within migration specifically, it can signify the relations that people and their descendants 
experience in varying locations and fluctuating social and political environments (Cachon 
2011). As Western states pursue policies encouraging either inclusion or exclusion, in both 
legislating and implementing immigration and integration, attention is directed toward the 




One indicator of how the second generation is incorporated into society, to be 
examined in more depth in chapters treating of the second generation and integration 
indicators, is this very sense of belonging. According to a definition of citizenship that 
encompasses communal cohesion, it would be desirable that all individuals experience this 
belonging. Yet, the second generation, despite representing the societal future and forming 
part of the current citizenry, are more at risk of being marginalized and lacking such a sense 
of belonging. ‘Belonging’ can entail various aspects in its definition. For example, Yuval-Davis 
defines belonging in terms of social spaces and “constructions of individual and collective 
identities and attachments,” as well as the way in which these processes are “valued and 
judged” (2006, 203). So, belonging entails some form of identity construction, attachment, 
and value judgements or perceptions of these constructions and attachments. The aspect of 
agency can be important as well, as this “human togetherness” can only be achieved via the 
stranger’s “right to choose” their belonging rather than the surrounding community or state 
alone given the power to define the stranger (Bauman 997, 57). Finally, belonging can 
become complicated in the current reality, as the individual is called upon to navigate 
multiple groups, systems, and “bonds of belonging,” each with their own set of rules; the 
individual is obligated to continually adapt (Melucci 1997, 61). Both individual and collective 
identity surface in these examinations of belonging, and it is difficult to clarify whether new 
societal transformations impact individual and collective agency, or vice versa.  
Globalization 
Given the systems of power that individuals are forced to contend with in an age of 
globalization, individuals may seek collective identities and belonging based in ethnicities, 
religion and regionalism, beyond the traditional fault lines of the state (Castles and Davidson 
2000). A digression is useful at this point, in order to identify the frequently reoccurring term, 
‘globalization,’ before further examining thought development regarding the individual and 




study, and indeed has already been referenced here. Globalization is often popularly 
understood as integration of financial markets. However, it has been debated in the context of 
international networks, including networks of information, in which it purportedly marks a 
societal shift not only economically but culturally, socially and politically (Elliott and Lemert 
2006).  
In relation to social science, there are three founding theories regarding the concept. 
Firstly, Wallerstein explains globalization as a new term for the processes of capitalism 
(2004). A second theory identifies globalization as an institutional phenomenon, with world 
organizations uniformizing their practices (Lechner 2005; Meyer et al. 1997). However, in the 
context of this work, an understanding of globalization as Robertson first defined it makes 
sense, given a broader debate on migration and culture.  He treated globalization as a concept 
referring to the "compression of the world," and an intensified world consciousness as whole 
(Robertson 1992). Still, a more general definition from our approach could include, “the 
growing interconnectedness and interrelatedness of all aspects of society” (Jones 2006, 2). 
Giddens also offers a useful account of how modernity brought about the globalization of 
social activity, activity which is oriented towards worldwide connections. He also provides a 
more general, starting point definition: “Globalisation concerns the intersection of presence 
and absence, the interlacing of social events and social relations ‘at distance’ with local 
contextualities” (1991, 21). 
While these transnational trends are significant, there is a danger in using a vague 
terminology of “globalization” to refer to an uncontrolled, impetus of societal change. 
Friedman and Ekholm distinguish that globalization is not so much an analysis of a 
phenomenon in process, but rather a discourse. This discourse implies a critique and drive to 
establish a new intellectual configuration of the world that sheds tradition and imperialism. 
They argue the discourse is flawed in several aspects, and contend that historical processes 
are not as novel as depicted, and explains how historical transformation has taken place and 




not be completely novel phenomena, the need to study societal change remains, especially in 
light of what is considered to be recent change. And again, in conducting this study, it should 
be noted that the individual has always been present, even in the nation-state model; it 
continuously promised a protection of the rights of the individual, albeit increasingly 
simultaneously increasingly consolidating its own power. Now the focus turns to how the 
unalienable freedoms of individuals can be addressed in a post-nation state model, in light of 
the networks of power and new flows of both information and people mentioned (Bauman 
1997). 
Individuals and new formulations of citizenship and belonging  
Study of the individual, of course, has quite a lengthy history in a number of disciples, 
and is ever so germane in our area of research. There has been a substantial degree of recent 
consensus in the sociological field that the study of society calls for a close examination of the 
individual, and that it is at the level of individual experience that we are called to recreate the 
sociological imagination (Martuccelli 2013). Beck and Beck-Gernsheim present an account of 
individualization in a second modernity, citing many studies and trends in Western modern 
society. They emphasize the new generations’ call to an “ethic of self-fulfillment,” and “life of 
one's own,'” asserting that new demands are made on individuals to be responsible and held 
culpable for their own life trajectories, instead of the state or society (Beck 2002). 
Individualization represents an ongoing structural process, intrinsically connected to 
institutions, that engages individuals in both opportunities and risks, and reflects the 
relationship of the individual to society (Ibid.). Giddens similarly speaks of a reflexive project 
of self that feeds into a new “life politics” in society (1991).   
These claims of individualization in modernity are not only pertinent to reformulated 
understandings of power structures and the state, citizenship, immigration and integration; 
what is more, it interacts in an interesting way with the study of religion and religiosity. 




are reapplying Islam in a European context, breaking with some traditional Muslim sources 
and expressions and emphasizing the ethical and spiritual values, and individual spiritual 
relationship, instead (Martín 2003; Nielsen). Moreover, if indeed society has become much 
more individualist, this can even prompt individuals towards a solidarity found in religion 
(Castien 2012).  
And so, in the context of modernity and an emphasis on individual agency, this work 
explores the individual’s interaction with surrounding networks, including state, society and 
religion. Manifestations of racism, discrimination and xenophobia directed towards Muslims 
in Europe, as well as the growing Muslim youth demographic targeted in this study, engage 
the attention of political actors. This raises questions about society’s responsibility to 
accommodate and protect the individual. As alluded to earlier, personhood and individual 
rights have legitimatized individual claims to the extent that nation-state affiliation no longer 
automatically takes precedent (Soysal 1997). Given this shift towards an emphasis on the 
individual within the context of migration theory and societal cohesion, several schools of 
thought, concepts and new terminology have populated the literature. A particular focus on 
the visibility of diverse and transnational practices and identities underlie these new areas of 
research.  
Transnationalism and responses to multiculturalism  
In an effort to briefly outline this progression, it is useful to note that beginning in the 
1970s, both theoretical and practical attempts to approach migration and specifically 
integration were manifested in terms of multiculturalism (concrete examples with country 
case studies will follow in a later chapter). However, while attempts were made at policy 
implementation of multiculturalism, these attempts or inclusive vision did not translate 
smoothly to processes and practices of multiculturalism (Martiniello 2007). Indeed, the limits 
to and ambiguity of multiculturalism has remained a point of contention in both academic 




essentialized concept, and serves as a divide between migrants and the rest of society. 
However, some still advocate for multiculturalism’s viability. They argue for a 
reconfiguration, or better and more precise understanding, of the idea, admitting the need to 
recognize that there are indeed specific needs to be addressed, and discrimination to avoid 
(Modood 2013; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2006; Kymlicka 2003).  These proponents argue 
for an improved and more precise understanding of the concept. For example, Baumann 
conceives of a multiculturalism that operates via a relationship triangle between the state, 
ethnicity and religion. Rather than a system of multiplied groups, multiculturalism is a system 
of pluralistic practices applied to the self and others (1999). Again, how different approaches 
to integration and accommodation employing the multiculturalism approach were 
implemented in policy and practice will be explored in further detail in Chapter Four’s 
overview of integration policies in Europe and Spain.   
However, for the purposes of outlining continual progression in the theoretical 
literature, it must be noted there remained something of a consensus that a single approach 
to integration or accommodation is no longer a viable solution (Rodríguez 2010). On the 
heels of multiculturalism, transnationalism (already referenced earlier) became increasingly 
addressed in migration studies in the 1980s, principally in the field of anthropology 
(Waldinger 2013). Transnationalism, rather than an approach to immigration or integration, 
instead represents an area of study, and came to the forefront in the 1990s when Portes 
called for a new field of research (Waldinger 2013, Portes 1999). Of course, transnationalism 
would confront traditional notions of citizenship, as more space is created beyond the 
traditional nation-state (Bloemraad 2000). Until recent decades, at least the political aspect of 
migration theory has operated within the concept of a closed society (Bauböck 2003). For 
example, one can turn to the work of Rawls and his proposition that the individual chooses 
and demonstrates loyal exclusively to one state (Rawls 1971). 
When transnationalism first circled through political and economic theory, 




argument that transnationalism does not have to be understood as undermining traditional 
citizenship, but should rather be factored into a new understanding of the concept of 
citizenship. Transnational migration, in turn, can be defined as a phenomenon involving 
multiple "memberships, rights and practices that reflect a simultaneous belonging of 
migrants to two different political communities" (Bauböck 2003). In reminding emphasizing 
the relevance of the nation-state, Bauböck reminds that simplistically treating 
transnationalism as a threat to the nation-state, rather than viewing it as mutually influenced 
by national politics, could lead to mistaken understandings of how it truly works (2003). 
Of course, the concept or possibility of transnationalism is not particularly recent. 
Instead, the advance of technology and increasingly globalized space has catalyzed its 
continuous evolution. Transnational connections have been highlighted in the form of 
remittances that migrant communities send back to their countries of origin. However, 
especially in light of second generation transnationalism, the term has come to signify much 
more than economic connotations (Vertovec 2001). Now transnationalism occupies political, 
social and cultural spaces in addition to the economic space that had remained a focus. In 
discussing transnationalism, Vertovec enjoins to keep several points to mind: that perhaps 
the phenomenon itself is not as new, albeit the plethora of growing literature is; that 
technology should not be taken for granted as a cause but examined in a less deterministic 
manner; and that transnationalism should not be positioned in contra to other processes of 
integration and assimilation (2001). Again, this argues that transnationalism does not have to 
be understood as undermining traditional citizenship, but can rather be considered in a 
reformulation of the citizenship concept. 
Some argue that there is not yet enough data to support whether transnationalism is 
advantageous or disadvantageous for the migrant, the sending or the host society (Bloemraad 
2005). At the same time, transnationalism remains a practical reality that the migration 
literature and social science as a whole must and continues to address (Massey 1998). 




should also be considered in the continuous examination of second generation patterns. As 
seen in this work, second generation youth can still maintain transnational connections. But 
perhaps it is not as useful to speak in general about transnational phenomena, but rather to 
proceed on to the various terms and concepts applied in specific contexts within migration 
theory; as Waldinger puts it, a “disaggregated view” of transnationalism (2013). This may 
help to address the shift from the nation-state to transnational space. 
Again, and perhaps stemming from lack of success with integration policies, while 
earlier the discussion was couched in terms of multiculturalism and bounded ethnicities, the 
academic debate has turned to a conversation about fluidity, including the study of 
transnationalism. There is also  a discourse of diversity, which may even signify for migration 
scholarship what intersectionality signifies for feminist studies (Berg and Sigona 2013; Yuval-
Davis 2006). Indeed, multiple and intersecting identities have come to define migration 
literature and understanding of migrant groups. Bounded ethnicities no longer serve as a tool 
to analyze increasingly diverse urban spaces, and as we will see, this especially applies in the 
case of the second generation and layered identities. Diversity has also served as a useful 
approach in that it allows for investigation of differences at the local level. Proponents of 
“diversity management” at the policy level argue that full citizenship rights include the 
sociocultural in order to guarantee full societal participation, and thus societal cohesion via a 
comprehensive sense of belonging (Rodriguez 2017). A salient example includes second 
generation Muslim youth, who may express diverse or hybrid identities while still expecting 
full societal participation and representation, as they are promised in their liberal democratic 
rights. 
In reckoning with these complexities, and in studying the implications of 
transnationalism, Vertovec coined an additional term, “super-diversity,” to express a notion 
encompassing the interplay between a wide variety of variables (beyond ethnicity), and the 
outcomes that arise, as a result of patterns of migration. These variables include origin 




response of local institutions and society (Vertovec 2007). This “super-diversity” also reflects 
the general principle underlying the diversity approach: that citizenship can operate in 
multiple spaces apart from the national, including the local and transnational, and that 
bounded notions of culture are a false starting point in understanding identity. Indeed, in self-
identifying, the second generation may sometimes not be restricted to an ethnicity, like 
“Moroccan,” or “Spanish,” but rather may identify with their religion, their city, and so forth.   
Super-diversity has been used in studies emphasizing that in examining the factor of 
difference, inequalities accompany that difference. However, these studies have been 
somewhat limited in that they have not addressed “vertical” power influences, like national 
sentiment or formal institutions, and how the local community interaction is also embedded 
in these influences (Foner, Duyvendak & Kasinitz, 2017). Despite a changing demographic of 
super-diverse settings, including cities with mainstream minorities, formerly majority groups 
can still remain dominant (Ibid.). Still, super-diversity proponents continue to strive to 
address any shortcomings, and it certainly has arisen as a prominent and widely utilized 
alternative to the multiculturalism concept (Ibid.). In fact, diversity as a concept attempts to 
avoid the criticism levied at both multiculturalism and even hybridity (to be discussed 
further): that implying a mixing of essentialized, defined elements is unrepresentative of 
reality, and that it is unlikely that individual or collective identities are a combination of 
initially well-defined categories.  
The cosmopolitan and the local  
This interaction at the individual and local level continues to encourage various 
research angles and terminology. As such, ‘cosmopolitanism’ is another concept or term that 
has surfaced. One definition, per Robbins, includes:  “instead of an ideal of detachment, 
actually existing cosmopolitanism is a reality of (re) attachment, multiple attachment, or 
attachment at a distance” (1998, 3). Again, theories or propositions of cosmopolitanism or 




cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan politics as diametrically opposed to nationalist 
formulations, some assert that cosmopolitanism remains linked to the nation state. This 
connection lies in how liberal democracies supposedly provide a space to freely express this 
individualism and multiple attachments, while simultaneously the nation state attempts to 
accommodate power (Appiah 1997, Robbins 1998).  
And of course, there are those that place emphasis on operating within a local space of 
individual agency that Glick-Schiller, Darieva, and Gruner-Domic have identified as a 
‘cosmopolitan sociability.’ This term encompasses a “set of practices in which people are not 
passive consumers but active participants in the creation of common place” (2011). These 
processes are formulated via social and civic encounters as well as coexistence, and they take 
place at the local level with ‘micro-level practices.’ The authors stress the agency of 
individuals and small groups that mobilize and interact in their local spaces, and ho these 
local relations may align with larger collectives and transnational social spaces. Many studies 
touch upon the concept of cosmopolitan when investigating realities within the urban space. 
In Madrid case, for instance, Muslim youth associations include youth from various 
backgrounds, with second generation Muslims with parents of migrant origin from several 
different countries and cultures, alongside Muslim converts with Spanish native parents as 
well as. These associations seek to unite the community not only religiously, but to engage in 
cultural and educational activities, and to provide opportunity for the socioeconomic success 
of community members.  
Indeed, the local and the urban space have emerged as important contexts for 
ethnography, and for this study of the individual and its relation to networks, whether state 
institutions or other power structures. Massey’s ‘global sense of place’ is particularly useful 
as it encompasses a local plane that allows for migration diversity, as she explains, “Instead 
then, of thinking of places as areas with boundaries around, they can be imagined as 
articulated moments in networks of social relations and understandings, but where a larger 




scale … which integrates in a positive way the global and the local” (1994, 156). Of course, 
minorities and immigrants come to mind in considering the inner neighborhoods of grand 
metropolises throughout Europe. But the local space and the multicultural reality of 
quotidian life is being examined in the suburban areas and towns as well (Berg and Sigona 
2013). In this study, Madrid will be examined at a somewhat local level, not necessarily to 
such a finite degree as a specific neighborhood, but at the very least as a community rather 
than on a national scale.  
Hybridity 
Another alternative to more traditional approaches to citizen engagement, and in 
response to theories of multiculturalism, includes theories of cultural hybridity. It seeks to “to 
capture the complexity of lives and subjectivities,” and the creative combinations constructed 
by individuals, including second generation migrants, as they determine how they self-
identify (Modood 1997, 10). An obvious example: identifying with migrant origins alongside 
the current host society. Furthermore, hybridity “problematizes boundaries”; in short, it 
addresses the societal boundaries that these individuals confront and must negotiate 
(Pieterse 2001, 220). Of course, hybridity is represented in other areas of study too, including 
linguistic hybridity. In fact, linguist Bahktin’s distinction between language’s unconscious, 
organic hybridity and conscious, intentional hybridity can apply to cultural hybridity 
(Bahktin 1981). Hybridity can manifest as either unperceived, inevitable cultural change, like 
“routine cultural borrowing and appropriations” (unconscious hybridity) or as a “deliberate, 
provocative aesthetic challenge to an implicit social order and identity” (conscious hybridity) 
which can be alternatively considered a threat, or as revitalizing and welcome (Werbner 
1997, 5). 
Hybridity has been subject to debate over the past decades, and one criticism it 
receives is similar to that levied at multiculturalism: that any mixing implies a foundation in 




is the exception. Or, as Palmié argues, ““hybrids” and “hybridity” are always and everywhere 
the products of the operation of classificatory regimes” (Palmié 2013, 465). However, 
proponents of hybridity argue, in a similar way to defenders of multiculturalism, that this 
criticism does not account for the full depth of the theory, including layered histories of 
hybridity, the importance of fluidity, and the necessity of confronting boundary-making (even 
if it may simultaneously imply giving credence to the boundaries themselves). In short, a 
hybridity apologist would argue that hybridities are not based on the assumption of static, 
essentialist notions, because the theory itself argues for a continual, historical process of 
hybridities (Pieterse 2001).  
Still, one can argue that this still entails theorizing based on categorical 
understandings of “collective individuation” and “performances of individuality” (Palmié 
2013, 472). Perhaps then, in using hybridity as a theoretical approach, Palmié’s injunction to 
reframe the question as to not what is hybrid, but when, can facilitate a sounder study. In 
investigating hybrid identity among the second generation, for example, rather than asking 
what hybrid identity is, the question should be: in what social conditions does that hybrid 
identity emerge? It could be envisioned as a zone to examine, “where people can meet – 
themselves or each other” (Kuortti and Nyman 2007, 16). Individual or collective agency 
again resurfaces, as Wicker explains that collective or social political action or “the social 
power to define” should be examined when dealing in “complex wholes” (1997, 42).  
Hybridity as defined in this work will attempt to avoid limitations like that of 
multiculturalism in that it stresses individual choice and autonomy and the inalienable rights 
of individuals, regardless of nation or community, and avoids creating a definition of the 
“stranger” (Werbner 1997). While there are various disciplines treating of hybridity, for the 
purposes of this study and in light of the subject matter, cultural hybridity will serve as the 
implicit hybridity referenced. Such cultural hybridity can and will encompass the selection of 




attempt to address unique identity construction, to be further discussed in the chapter on 
second generation and identity. 
In navigating a series of national, transnational, and finally local networks, the 
literature has recently increasingly attempted to engage varied new approaches and 
concepts. These include the previously discussed notions of transnationalism, cosmopolitism 
and hybridity, throughout which individuals of migrant origin remain in particular focus. An 
individual’s relationship with society (including community and institutional authorities) in a 
pluralistic reality is all the more emphasized against the backdrop of migration. In the case of 
youth of migrant origin, and Muslim youth in particular, minority status and vulnerability 
make membership, and access to the same, all the more essential. Citizenship comes to the 
fore, less in the traditional definition of the word and more in the communitarian sense 
previously established, in that it encompasses the rights and responsibilities that a member 
of society exercises in public life, from the individual to the universal, at all levels of 
community life. 
The individual, secularism and migration 
Despite new understandings of citizenship and belonging that are oriented towards 
protecting the most vulnerable, the collective studied in this work can and has been targeted 
as “the other,” especially in the greater context of depicting a new Muslim frontier in Western 
Europe that threatens traditional citizenship. Migrants and their progeny are perceived as 
unable to properly acculturate as a result of their religious beliefs. Then there are those that 
assert the phenomenon of Euro-Islam is in development: a process by which Islam’s 
adherents adapt their religious identity to European society, and a claim to be discussed 
further in this work (AlSayyad 2003). In either case, what causes these perceived boundaries 
will be explored later in a more thorough examination of secularism in Europe. However, 




literature explaining the relationship between religious identity and the state falls within this 
theoretical foundation, and merits a brief overview. 
In discussing religious identity, the modern nation-state remains pertinent, as it 
engages in a contentious relationship with religion in laying claim to the individual. As 
Baumann points out, “If nation-state and ethnicity are two conflicting ideologies because of 
the romantic heritage of the state, then nation-state and religion conflict because of the 
rationalist heritage of the state. The more the modernizing state had to justify its 
unprecedented concentration of power and wealth, the more it had to push religion out of the 
public sphere” (1999, 52). Essentially, there are tendencies in modern society to relegate 
religion to the private sphere, and moreover treat it as simply a preference. These trends can 
be viewed as a reproduction of capitalism or a discourse of homogenization, thus 
jeopardizing attempts to accommodate individualization and not allowing for cultural 
evolution (Van der Veer 1997).  As such preferences should be differentiated from what 
Taylor and Maclure categorize as, “Core beliefs and commitments, which we will also call 
“convictions of conscience,” [and] include both deeply held religious and secular beliefs” 
(Taylor and Maclure 2010, 13). 
They argue that current liberal democracies and the democratic state (for example, 
European states), live under a “regime of secularism, albeit the state is meant to be neutral” 
(2010, 9, 13). As such, the relationship between religion and the state clearly affects the 
individual and citizenship, to the extent that religious membership may even weaken 
citizenship status.  For example, if the state or a political system such as democracy is 
inevitably based in a set of ethics or convictions, the political system may adopt a secular 
philosophy that can leave the religious in the category of a “second class citizen,” as they do 
not embrace the values of secularist antireligious moral philosophy, i.e, secularism (Ibid.).  
Of course, secularism is a contested and complex concept, and, again, will be 
addressed in detail later. It is pertinent to this discussion given the European context. 




demonstrated that it perhaps does not share the same proclivity for pluralism or religious 
belief as other regions, including the United States; this Christian element and 
institutionalization will certainly be discussed further as well (Papademetriou 2016). As such, 
the extent to which secularism has become a competing ideology exclusive of personal 
religious beliefs is to be borne in mind as we approach young individuals in Europe ascribing 
to Islam. Indeed, increased secularization and lessened religiosity is often a benchmark by 
which Europe views successful immigrant integration (in contrast with the American 
approach) and this in itself should elicit pause (Fleischmann and Phalet 2011).   
In summary 
As migration theory has blossomed, so too has a reconstitution of notions of the state 
and citizenship. Throughout these reconstituted notions, considerations of how the 
individual operates in new networks of power and information surface. Consequently, social 
systems in light of new global, transnational or super-diverse contexts come under scrutiny. 
Amidst this ever-changing social fabric, a call to protect the rights of the individual 
throughout these transformations in the public sphere permeates both the public discourse 
and scientific literature. Considering factors from the cultural and religious, hand in hand 
with the more obvious socio-economic and political, is important in understanding the 
individual experience, especially in relation to migration. Belonging and societal cohesion 
remain a public policy issue: whether within the nation-state jurisdiction, or at local and 
global levels, networks and institutions are responsible for both the protection and inclusion 
of the individual. Of course, the individual as an agent of change is also responsible for self-
selecting belongings and attachments while navigating these networks.  
At the same time, while individual autonomy remains salient, collective autonomy is 
also significant. Group identity and action can confront the state or social order in order to 
reformulate discourses and practices, and thus effect societal change. Naturally, in addressing 




individual or collective experience, and the responsibility that comes with it, is a key 
consideration.  
In light of this theoretical framework, and before proceeding to the literature analysis 
and empirical observations, it is helpful to explain the methodological process behind this 
work. Research methods, the logic behind the integration indicators chosen as part of the 
study, and the study limitations shed light on the overall logic behind this investigation. As 
the reasoning and criteria behind the empirical process and the study’s design is inherently 
linked to the theoretical foundation of this project, it is important to follow with this 






Research design and methods 
An overview of the study’s design and methods now prefaces the analysis and 
empirical portion of this work. Beginning with an outline of the integration indicators and the 
logic behind their selection, this section will also attempt to address the research methods 
and the reasoning behind those methods. It will analyze the relationship between researcher 
and participant, as well as describe the general parameters, nature and format of the 
interviews that took place. Finally, it will indicate the limitations of the study, in order to 
provide a context for the subsequent analysis and results. This overview of the strategy 
informing the format of the study’s design and methods, in conjunction with qualifications 
regarding the study’s limitations, will provide context and perspective for the study’s results. 
As such, it will clarify the research landscape and offer a self-critique of the weaknesses and 
strengths of the investigation. 
Interview in relation to integration indicators 
The empirical study is based in a qualitative, semi-structured interview administered 
to individuals falling within the demographic of Muslim youth of migrant origin living in 
Madrid.  In light of the societal impact of the youth experience, the interview can provide 
measures of integration, from both the standpoint of the individual and the rest of society. 
These integration measures are used to evaluate the current reality, in order to draw 
conclusions and propose solutions.  
The choice of integration indicators in this study formulates the essence of the study’s 
design and the objective that it is intended to achieve. As such, the philosophy behind 
integration integrators, and an explanation of those chosen, is merited. Later analysis with 
concrete examples in France, the United Kingdom and Spain will demonstrate how 
integration indicators are highly relevant in the second generation discussion, and especially 




Moreover, additional integration indicators used by other second generation studies will 
provide a point of comparison in Chapter Four.  
The second generation literature, as a subset of the larger migration field, has its own 
set of integration integrators (of course, a varied range, depending upon the sociological 
theory or approach), tailored and sometimes distinct from indicators used to study the first 
generation. However, in providing a comprehensive perspective of how these indicators 
function in social science, it must be understood that indicators are chosen by scientists to 
measure levels of integration among all immigrants. Just as there are diverse approaches to 
integration in varying levels of government, the integration indicators chosen at the 
supranational, national and regional level are selected based on policy interests and context. 
Stemming from the theoretical conceptions of integration, there are several resources at the 
European level that provide a framework of integration indicators, enabling governments to 
monitor at the practical and policy level. The Zaragoza Declaration, promulgated in 2010, 
delineates indicators in the areas of employment, education, social inclusion, and active 
citizenship (Godenau, Rinken, Martinez and Moreno, 2015). A 2013 report from the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Home Affairs expands upon the Zaragoza Declaration 
and groups these factors impacting integration into three categories: the characteristics of 
the immigrant population, the general policies and context of the immigrant’s receiving 
country, and finally and more precisely, the immigration and integration policies of the 
receiving country (Huddleston, Tjaden and Niessen, 2013).  
Delving into more detail, within those categories lie more specific factors: the 
immigrants’ time of residence in the country, gender, origin country, socio-economic 
background, and qualifications. In turn, factors such as the receiving country’s levels of 
discrimination, social context, access to education and employment, and social inclusion are 
considered. Finally, the factor of active citizenship is presented, with the explanation that 




(Huddleston, Tjaden and Niessen, 2013). This emphasis on civic activity surfaces later in our 
presentation of this study’s findings.  
These factors, of course, must be evaluated in context. The European Commission’s 
report on indicators of integration points out that factors like socioeconomic contexts and 
demographics can vary regionally within a nation, as indeed they do in the Spanish case 
(Huddleston, Tjaden and Niessen, 2013). Indeed, in Spain, these differing factors can range 
from the political to the cultural, with more accentuated cases including Catalonia and the 
Basque country. Of course, the European Commission developed these indicators in light of 
the context of Europe and its member-states. At the same time, it provides a fairly thorough 
overview of the factors that need to be taken into account when evaluating the process of 
integration.  
Indicator of self-identity and sense of belonging on the part of the individual 
With the full scope of potential indicators in mind, it is incumbent in this case to turn 
to the second generation indicators overviewed later in Chapter Three. Portes and Rumbaut 
found that among second generation youth in the United States, integration indicators could 
be grouped into three broad categories: individual features, the receiving country’s social 
environment, and family structure (2001). This investigation hones in on self-identity, which 
can fit into all three indicator categories, depending on the ways in which it is shaped. Self-
identity is a soft indicator, less easily defined, but garnering significant interest throughout 
the literature as globalization advances (Portes, Aparicio and Haller, 2016). It can be used to 
measure sense of belonging. In assessing to what extent participants identify with the host 
country, be it as a Spaniard, as a Madrileño, and so forth, the greater degree of attachment or 
belonging can determine a greater degree of integration into the receiving society.   
Of course, the study adopts a cautious approach in using identification with a 
nationality to serve as an exclusive indicator of integration. For example, to be demonstrated 




than one culture or society and still demonstrate a high level of integration or strong sense of 
belonging to the host society. The reality of hybrid identities that these youth are 
hypothesized to manifest presents the possibility that they may balance multiple, situational 
identities that vary over the course of time. In societies that accommodate diversity while 
simultaneously seeking syncretism, these complex self-identities can still serve as an 
indicator of how and whether the young citizen feels engaged or connected with society.  
Indicator of self-identity and sense of belonging as responsibility on the part of society 
In tandem with studying self-identity as an individual feature, the indicator of self-
identity can fall into the category of the country’s social environment (for example, whether 
or not the society discriminates against the individual) rather than into the category of 
individual feature (i.e., the student’s level of education, integration into the workforce, 
language ability). Self-identity and its manifestation of sense of belonging begs the question 
of to what extent society is responsible for the level of engagement or attachment on the part 
of the individual. So, in addition to inquiring about self-identification with Spain or the 
community, sense of belonging in this case will be evaluated with an inquiry as to 
discrimination (which would indicate that society is treating the youth as “other”). There will 
be a more profound explication of self-identity later in the analysis, but at this point it is 
sufficient to note that self-identity serves as a complex concept, given how it is a reflective 
exercise and a result of autonomous choice alongside external influences. Perceived 
discrimination can be understood as an integration indicator and will be measured in this 
study. It falls into the Portes and Rumbaut indicator category of receiving countries’ social 
environment (2001). As the interview attempts to collect data about societal and institutional 
roles in self-identification, the series of questions about discrimination may elucidate how 
societal and institutional influences have been affecting participants’ sense of belonging and 




whether national or local institutional arrangements, or instead local community societal 
interaction, play a greater role in this identity formation. 
Religious identity as a variable  
Moreover, in addition to an examination of perceived discrimination and 
identification, religious attachment has been selected as a variable. Self-identity can be 
developed “in relation to one’s nation, religion, gender, class, language and daily life 
practices” (Toğuşlu et al. 2014, 11). As part of a complex self-identity, the investigation seeks 
to study self-identified religiosity and whether there is any relationship between this and 
other factors, including perceived discrimination.  In regard to second generation 
immigration, religion is sometimes viewed as a bright boundary, although recent studies 
indicate that there is not necessarily a correlation between religious identification and a 
sense of belonging to the host society (Fleischmann 2012). Alba describes how varying levels 
of integration can be analyzed in terms of “bright” versus “blurred” boundaries, and contrasts 
US and European examples in order to explain his premise that some boundaries, including 
religion, are “brighter.” The bright boundary of religion can explain challenges for second 
generation Turks in Germany or Maghrebis in France, while a blurred racial boundary could 
explain why fairer-skinned second generation Mexicans with European features may meet 
with a less disadvantaged situation in the US than fellow second generation Mexicans that do 
not share these features and confront a brighter racial boundary (Alba 2005). 
While level of religious attachment or practice can be viewed as an indicator of 
integration in Europe, in this work, self-reported level of religious attachment or practice will 
not simply be viewed as an indicator that the participant is more or less integrated (Crul, 
Schneider and Lelie, 2012). For example, if a participant reports more religious practice or 
belief than another, it will not be assumed this serves as evidence that they have not 
integrated properly, simply because they are less secular or do not draw from the majority 




combination with perceived discrimination to analyze the possibility that this has caused 
resistance on the part of the receiving society. Simply put, the questions on discrimination, in 
addition to measuring the participants’ perception of societal welcome, will also seek to 
discover any connection or relationship between religiosity and the response of the receiving 
society. This may help determine whether perceived discrimination can be better traced to 
cultural or ethnic factors. 
Expectations as an indicator  
Finally, while this was not specifically sought out in the interview as it was designed, 
another indicator that emerged over the course of the study includes expectations. 
Occupational aspirations and expectations have been identified by Portes, Aparicio and Haller 
as an indicator of integration because they correlate to social mobility and attainment (2016). 
The indicator that emerged over the course of this study was not so much occupational 
aspirations and expectations, as much as expectations for representation in society. 
Participants expressed a desire to exercise full rights, both cultural and civic, in quotidian life 
in their community or country. This can also serve as a positive indicator for integration, in 
addition to sense of belonging expressed through self-identity, as it denotes that these youth 
are expressing desire to access their full citizenship rights and thus full inclusion in society. In 
other words, they are seeking active participation and inclusion rather than shrinking from it.  
As such, the study was initially designed to study self-identity as an indicator of 
integration, including the variable component of religiosity and any significance this might 
carry. It also sought to measure perceived discrimination, as this indicates how self-identity 
and societal response may be interrelated. Expectations for societal participation and 
inclusion surfaced without intentional design. Moreover, apart from these focal points, the 
interview includes several other considerations. These headings and questions (addressing 
education level and labor market insertion, for example) are used to gather data that could 




this case. In this smaller qualitative sampling the personal accounts of self-identity, perceived 
discrimination and sense of belonging are more useful. If it seems that self-identity and sense 
of belonging are not directly addressed by a majority of questions, this is because some of the 
inquiries were designed to gain insight into these factors without bringing them to the 
conscious attention of the participant. Moreover, the further context provided by the 
questions gathering background information about each of the individuals was also 
considered imperative, especially to provide profiles and a richer narrative of the 
participants; more specific details about the questions and structure of the interview follows.  
Interview structure and headings 
In the intreview, the parameters for definitions of belonging or ascription are set 
according to the participant, both in terms of self-identity and self-reported religiosity; i.e, the 
participant identifies the group(s) or label(s) they ascribe to (Spanish, Muslim, etc.) and 
reports their own level of religious, social or cultural practice of Islam. In the form of a semi-
structured interview, the questions proceed in various groupings, seeking a sense of the 
participant’s background, current trajectory, and future plans, in order to present the most 
comprehensive picture possible. While there are some multiple choice or structured 
questions, various open-ended questions pervade the interview in order to allow the 
participant to best relate their perspective. Moreover, if the participant opted to continue in a 
certain direction beyond the stricter narrative of the conversation, they were permitted and 
encouraged to do so.  
Initially, the interview collects participant data, including name, age, sex, current 
place of residence, birthplace, legal status, and length of residence in Spain. Inquiry as to 
parental origins identifies the participant as either first, 1.5 or second generation. After this 
primary data, the interview begins by asking the participant if they identify with a religion. If 
they identify with Islam, it proceeds with a series of questions regarding context to this 




For example, questions inquire as to how frequently the participant engages in 
traditional religious practice or rules, like undertaking daily prayer or following Islamic 
dietary laws. At the same time, it asks about their views on how religion should or should not 
be practiced; for instance, a participant may believe in God or identify religiously, but perhaps 
does not engage very visibly in traditional practice, or observe very many rules. Examples of 
this questioning include whether or not they agree or disagree with the statement “I do not 
necessarily believe in all of the principles of Islam, but I would still say I’m Muslim,” or 
“religion should be a private matter between an individual and God.”  
This part of the inquiry also administers questions about gender and politics, 
primarily in relation to religion, to gather a sense of either more conservative or more liberal 
views. These questions are present throughout several European questionnaires directed 
towards Muslims (among others), presumably based on the hypothesis that due to their 
religious beliefs, the second generation has more conservative views than their peers with 
native parents. Examples include queries as to whether men and women should obtain equal 
access and treatment in both education and the workplace. At this point, it should be noted 
that even if the participants expressed more traditional views, this may not be a fair 
benchmark, given that several demographic groups in Spanish society may express more 
conservative views, but would still not be labelled as failing to integrate.  
Moreover, the questions on democratic regimes and the separation of church and 
state clearly strive to identify whether these youth embrace liberal democratic principles and 
values, given that many of their parents originate from countries with purportedly 
authoritarian regimes or theocratic structures. Despite the possible bias and presuppositions 
of the questions, however, the answers were quite instructive in demonstrating that perhaps 
these types of presuppositions about the second generation, and specifically second 
generation Muslims, are misplaced. 
In continuation, further questions regarding family and friends, socioeconomic status 




about the socioeconomic status and occupations of their parents, in what language they 
usually speak with family or friends, and how many of their friends also have parents of 
migrant origin. Participants are also invited to explain their own educational or professional 
status, and whether or not they are comfortable with what they have attained. They are 
questioned as to what extent they faced any discrimination in these areas. For instance, in the 
professional section they are asked, “Is this the job you would like to have?” and in education, 
“Are you happy with the level of education you have received?” 
The portion regarding participant identification not only asks the participant to self-
identify, but also to estimate how they believe their family, friends and society view them. 
They are questioned if they are satisfied with life in Spain, and about their plans for the 
future. The interview finishes with the bulk of the questions about discriminations and 
perceptions of societal welcoming. It asks the participant to relate how often they face 
discrimination, if it is more institutional or societal, and for which reasons they believe 
institutional or societal discrimination exists or not. These questions include, “What do you 
think was the principle reason for the discrimination?” or inquire as to whether the 
participants agree or disagree with statements like “Spanish society welcomes different 
beliefs.” In sum, a large part of the research focuses on self-identification, and with it religious 
identification and experience of discrimination. At the same time, further questions, like 
those of a socioeconomic or familial nature, attempt to achieve the most comprehensive 
account possible, given the size and resources of the project.  
Data collection and participant pool 
At the outset of the empirical data gathering, I conducted several “pilot interviews” in 
order to familiarize myself with the process of this particular qualitative investigation (Valles 
2014). As discussed earlier, the population under study is not uniformly accounted for at the 
institutional level, as government demography censuses do not identify children of 




further detail later in this work, that was conducted by Metroscopia in 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009 and 2011. It surveyed a sample of 2000 participants each time, drawing from the 
Muslim community of immigrant origin in Spain. Surveys aimed at a similar population have 
been conducted on a lesser scale by individuals and research groups, as outlined previously. 
As this is a smaller study, and analysis of a larger dataset was unavailable, the qualitative 
route was a natural choice.  
The population was accessed through various methods, including through a friend, 
acquaintances, social networks and associations, using the general concept underlying the 
“snowball method” (Valles 2014). The “snowball method” proved useful as I was largely an 
outsider to the targeted population, and it provided a way to canvas a greater range of 
participants. The size and limited resources of this study did not allow for sampling from 
each neighborhood of Madrid, although participants hailed from a wide range of towns or 
municipalities in the Community of Madrid, including Alcalá de Henares, Alcobendas, Collada 
Vilalba, Fuenlabrada, Getafe, Guadarrama, Humanes and Parla, as well as districts and/or 
neighborhoods within Madrid city, including Carabanchel, Embajadores, Lavapiés, Puerta de 
Toledo, San Blas, Tetuán and Villaverde Alto.  In order to locate participants, I also worked 
with the organizations La Asociación de Chicas Musulmanas de España (The Muslim Girls 
Association of Spain), Centro Cultural Islámico de Madrid (The Islamic Cultural Center of 
Madrid, a large mosque in Central Madrid), Asociación Tayba (a central Madrid Muslim youth 
association), Dawah Project (a Madrid Muslim youth association) and CCIF Al Umma De 
Fuenlabrada (a Muslim community in the Fuelabrada municipality of the Community of 
Madrid). All communities were very helpful and collaborative as I explained my work and 
sought assistance.  
The sample size of 32 participants was settled upon to an extent organically, and also 
given the general estimate of saturation. As Mason explains, saturation constitutes “when the 
collection of new data does not shed any further light on the issue under investigation” and 




qualitative interview studies (Mason 2010).  Of the 32 participants, 19 were second 
generation and eight were 1.5 generation respondents, with a comparative sample of five first 
generation youth. Most participants had parents that originated from Morocco, while a few 
had Palestinian, Egyptian or Syrian origins. Two had parents from Ceuta with Maghrebi 
origins.2 Of the first generation group, one hailed from Tunisia, another from Senegal, and the 
remaining three from Morocco.  Overall, ages grouped into ranges include twelve participants 
from ages 16-20, nine from ages 21-25 and six from ages 26-30, with additional outliers 
including two 13-year-olds and a 32, 33 and 35-year-old. The older participants were 
included because of their continued participation in youth organizations and the added value 
of their perspectives.  
The entire group broke down into 53% female and 47% male. All interviews took 
place in Castellano Spanish, with the exception of one in English. They were conducted during 
a time frame spanning from March 2016 to February 2018, over the course of two years. The 
majority of interviews were conducted in person with the author (22), by a second 
academically and professionally qualified interviewer (2), and a portion of the interviews 
were self-administered via email (8). Most interviews had a duration of between 20 and 30 
minutes. Out of those self-administered by email, several had in-person contact to the author 
prior to completing the interview itself. At this point, I would like to briefly address the 
implications of conducting an interview electronically, as it becomes an increasingly 
discussed topic in the field. 
A note about email interviews 
                                                          
2 Ceuta is a Spanish territory, and as of 1995 an autonomous city, located in a peninsula 
bordered by the northeast of Morocco on the African continent, across from the Spanish Iberian 
Peninsula along the Atlantic Mediterranean divide (White 2003). It is a territory that underwent 
various conquests for centuries, and Morocco has repeatedly contested Spanish sovereignty; a large 
portion of the population include Muslims of Maghrebi origin. As of 1986, 83.6% of the Muslim 
population of Ceuta were foreigners without Spanish nationality (Planet 2004). The two participants 
with parents from Ceuta (parents most likely born around that decade or a bit before), are included in 
the group of young Muslims to add additional perspective. However, this is done so with the 
qualification that they descend from arguably native parents, or that they are not second generation, 




While electronic communication is a relatively new phenomenon, it is increasingly 
standardized in the literature as a new form of data collection, and its usage is exponentially 
growing (Meho 2006). The advantages of internet research include how it allows for access to 
otherwise inaccessible groups, amplifying the participant pool, as well as can remove cues or 
field status differences between the researcher and the participant (Ibid.). This was 
particularly important for this study, as I represented not only a different nationality, but at 
times came from a different social demographic than some of the population studied. 
Moreover, while familiar with some neighborhoods, Madrid is a very large metropolis and 
region, and I certainly could not claim authentic access to some neighborhoods. The fact that I 
was a foreigner to Spanish society or did not originate from the community might have made 
it difficult for me to connect with some participants. In addition to these considerations, an 
added advantage of virtual research includes that the participant has a chance to reflect on 
questions, make more effort if they wish, and choose the time that they engage in the 
interview (Gibson 2010). Furthermore, email correspondence was chosen over Skype 
interviews, in these particular cases, because the interviewees expressed more willingness 
and confidence in participating if they could do so on their own time in this manner. 
However, as Cea D’Ancona points out, this method can have several drawbacks, 
including that it may jeopardize the validity of the data. For example, it might be impossible 
to verify whether the participant had help from others, or whether they were interrupted 
throughout the interview. Moreover, the participant could read through all of the questions 
beforehand, thus compromising the effectiveness of the control questions (2014). Other 
disadvantages include that some contextual richness might be lost, i.e. the senses that are 
employed in face-to-face interviews will be in absence. Yet another potential risk includes 
that the participant might not express themselves as well in the written form as they could in 
speech (Meho 2006). Given the discussion of this potential drawback, it seems appropriate to 




Limitations of study 
In analyzing and testing the methodology of this study, several other limitations and 
qualifications surfaced, many of which stem from the nature of its size and limited scope. For 
example, this study cannot claim uniform representation, as it gathered participants via 
“snowball method.” Of course, as outlined earlier, even given greater resources and remit, 
studies in Spain are limited to this methodology when attempting to reach the Muslim 
population. While attempts were made (and realized) to locate individuals going about their 
daily lives, some participants were contacted via associations. This could perhaps skew the 
sample in that it targets a group with a more civically active profile and visible Muslim 
identity. However, the small size of the study and the ability to encounter people in quotidian 
routines, in districts like Tetuan, for example, has provided a fresh and alternative 
perspective.  
A second limit is the study’s lack of longitudinal data. It only examines the 
participants’ views at one point in time, and lacks the insight of an evolution of identity that 
could presumably take place. For example, the longitudinal study by Portes and Aparicio 
found that a sense of belonging to Spain increased in second generation immigrants over time 
(2013). It also found that over the time period, second generation immigrants had not yet 
created a pan-ethnic identity. By contrast, this study can only evaluate this sense of belonging 
and identity in the present, without previous reference points, apart from any offered by the 
participant. 
Yet another consideration includes how the data was gathered. The benefits and 
drawbacks of interview via email have already been outlined earlier, but a brief review of the 
problematic elements of transcription after an in-person interview is warranted. There are 
possible threats to data integrity, from technical errors like mishearing a word, or the 
researcher being linguistically limited, to the fact that the data is not as much produced as is 
given by the recording device, and thus leaves the researcher without comprehensive control 




transcription, it is essential to remember that the primary document is the audio, while the 
written transcription is secondary (2014). In order to achieve the most precision and 
complete account of the original source during the transcription process, it is recommended 
to take notes while recording the interview, followed by writing up memos and analysis the 
first time the audio is played (Ibid.). 
A final criterion, the relationship between researcher and participant, and vice versa, 
is another important consideration when analyzing the study. As Carling, Erdal and Ezzati 
succinctly define it, “Positionality in qualitative research refers to the fact that a researcher’s 
characteristics affect both substantive and practical aspects of the research process—from 
the nature of questions that are asked, through data collection, analysis and writing, to how 
findings are received” (2014, 37). The ideal qualitative researcher would have education in 
the area of study both formally and via experience, skill in improvisation, the quality of 
intuition and story-telling ability; the last quality would enable them to both identify and 
assist in relating or narrating (Valles 2014.). Moreover, in the semi-structured interview 
utilized, a passive, receptive approach is favored in lieu of an active, aggressive questioning 
(Ibid.). I attempted to apply this receptive approach in my interviewing, allowing participants 
to take their chosen directions when they were so inspired.  
More specifically, a migration researcher relates to the population of study in a way 
that generally falls into “outsider” or “insider” categories. An outsider belongs to the majority 
population, whereas the insider may belong to the minority immigrant or immigrants’ 
progeny groups, researching his or her own population (Carling, Erdal and Ezzati 2014).  
Apart from this boiled down construction, a relationship can be created based on the 
researcher’s characteristics, including cultural awareness, experiences, and commitment to 
the research (i.e., returning to the field of research) (Ibid.). Several elements may help to 
ameliorate the divide somewhat, including shared beliefs or migration experience. As a non-
Spanish expatriate, I can identify somewhat with an immigrant background, and the 




participants, creating an “insider by proxy effect” (Ibid., 47,48,50). At the same time, my 
family connections to native Spaniards, that I am not a Muslim, and my relationship even as a 
researcher creates an outsider effect. 
As Rossman and Rallis enjoin, there is a necessity to remain critical of “complex 
interplay of our own personal biography, power and status, interactions with participants, 
and the written word” (Rossman and Rallis 2003, 93). It was key to focus on presenting the 
understanding of the participants’, rather than my own understanding of what they 
presented. Of course, I am responsible for remaining cognizant of my own personal ethics and 
politics that in fact led me to this area of study in the first place, as well (Marshall and 
Rosmann 2016). I had to distinguish between personal vocation to advocacy and my role as 
an objective investigator. Moreover, my tendency to empathize with and affirm the 
participants’ experiences remained a constant challenge.   
In sum, given the demographic and the thesis question, individual qualitative 
interviews seem the most appropriate way to proceed for the empirical portion of the 
investigation. The indicator of self-identity and how it communicates sense of belonging, as 
well as how perceived discrimination and the receiving society influence this indicator, 
underlies the principal objectives of the study. Moreover, the variable of religiosity in this 
self-identity remains key to the investigation. The project includes further inquiries that can 
also serve as indicators, and they help to provide a more comprehensive narrative of each 
individual and their perspective. The size, resources, and nature of the investigation presents 
study limitations, but still provided some valuable data for analysis, as provided in the next 
chapter. 
Given the preliminary theoretical and methodological grounding, this work can 
continue on to the analytical portion of the investigation, exploring previous studies and 
providing a literature analysis to preface the empirical data and observations. As outlined 
earlier, this analysis will include a broader sketch of integration regimes in Europe, followed 




Finally, the analysis proceeds to a more specific and tailored review of literature that relates 
to the target cohort, especially as a religious minority (in addition to their status as a minority 
population of migrant origin). As a result, this narrowed focus will entail: an overview of 
work to date on Islam in Europe and its relevance in current migration literature; an 
exploration of second generation Muslims in Europe and identity studies; and finally, a 
canvassing of relevant studies on Spain’s institutional relationship with Islam, including any 
investigation to date on the minority Muslim population. All of this information can provide a 
point of comparison for the ensuring empirical data in the study. And so, the following 
chapter will more concretely address immigration and integration models and policies in 
Europe to date, specifically focusing on Spain in comparison with the United Kingdom and 






Contexts and policies of immigration and integration: Europe and Spain 
Second generation immigrants, while perhaps not impacted as directly by 
immigration policies as their first generation parents, still can be subject to and affected by a 
country’s integration policies. In this selected case of Muslim youth of migrant origin, their 
faith may act as an additional variable in discussions of integration. Religion, discussed in 
further depth at a later stage in this work, can form part of either an insider or outsider 
identity, depending on the context. Immigration scholars consider religion as part of group 
and individual identity, and thus key in determining cohesion and integration within a 
society. Furthermore, religion can harken back to the idea of a two-way process of 
integration: the relationship between church and state in each country can impact religious 
identity and processes of identity formation. 
In that integration strives towards a cohesive society, it reflects a reality that 
immigrants, and in this case, those ascribing to the Muslim faith, are viewed as “the other.” 
Particularly in the European context, Tecim and Yardin succinctly identify the situation: 
“Today in Europe, being "immigrant" and especially being Muslim still identified as 
immigrant means being the "other" in Europe” (2016, 14). Glick and Çağlar point out that 
these groups facing “racialisation, discrimination and differentiation” can still find common 
ground in society, despite ethno-religious differences. An expedient way to approach the 
issue is through consideration of the “multiscalar” and structural inequalities that exist in 
modern communities (Ibid., 18). In order to fully illustrate the circumstances Muslim youth of 
migrant origin face, this chapter will first endeavor to provide a general context for European, 
Spanish state, and Spanish regional level policies of immigration and integration. A more 
comprehensive account of the second generation follows in the next chapter, before further 
investigation as to the context of Islam and Muslim identity in Europe and Spain.  
In beginning with immigration and integration at the European level, the EU has 




movement, and human rights. However, it struggles to provide policy that complies with 
international rights standards, and EU dictates may contravene individual Member states’ 
concerns about their own internal security and migration policy as autonomous nations. 
Additionally, while the EU has becoming increasingly involved in matters of integration by 
issuing recommendations, integration policies stretching beyond migration control clearly 
remain the jurisdiction of the different Member states. For this reason, the states’ integration 
processes can vary substantially. In a very general sense, however, the European concept of 
integration has evolved from one encompassing immigrant access to social and economic 
rights and inclusion, to a paradigm that seeks a cohesive society in a more comprehensive 
way. This includes encouraging immigrant political participation and a sense of belonging to 
the host country (Zincone, Penninx and Borkert 2011). 
Spain serves as a unique study for many reasons, including in that it only recently 
became a receiving country with substantial immigration. Spain’s number of foreign 
residents has multiplied by 8 between the years 1990 and 2010 (Cebolla and González 2013). 
Public opinion in the country is characterized by a majority tolerant or ambivalent approach 
to immigration, with attitudes that are fairly positive in comparison to fellow European 
Member states (Ibid.). Spanish societal attitudes will come into play later when investigating 
the Muslim second generation’s identity and sense of belonging.  
European immigration and integration 
European immigration and integration policy can provide context for, albeit exercises 
little influence upon, the policies of France, the United Kingdom,3 and Spain compared in this 
study. The multilevel governance of the EU and a very broad definition of what constitutes 
migration, from regular to irregular, to refugee and asylum, leaves ample room for debate as 
                                                          
3 This project was conducted over the course of three and a half years, and began before the 
referendum of 23 June 2016, when the people of the United Kingdom voted via a majority to begin the 
process of exiting the European Union. The United Kingdom is still provided as a point of comparison, 
given its status up until now as a member state, and given that the exit process will not be complete 




to what extent European governance can prevail over national autonomy.  Precisely due to 
free movement principles amongst member states within EU borders, migration can be 
posited as a security issue and a matter of external, or foreign, policy. Member states can also 
be tied to international norms as a result of their membership. There has been a 
supranational legal codification of human rights that has indeed transferred sovereignty to 
supranational entities like the EU (Koenig 2007). While there is some consensus on 
preventing irregular migration control, there is less on policies regulating regular migration 
(Cardwell 2013). 
Currently, the European conversation on migrant claims is formally directed by the 
Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the European Commission (Danese 1998). 
However, as Cardwell points out, while regulating both regular and irregular migration 
remains on the EU agenda, firm or binding directives and regulations have been challenging 
to administer (2013). Policy towards third-party nationals materialized as a communitarian 
issue under the newly christened European Union with the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. The 
Treaty identified asylum and immigration control as a competency under the third of three 
“pillars,” or groups of powers, that defined European governance system at the time. The 
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 advanced the project further, as it set a deadline (within five 
years) to address issues of asylum, refugee, entry and residence, with the understanding that 
a communitarian space within the EU required stricter policing of the shared external 
borders (Cardwell 2013). The Tampere Summit of 1999 marked even more progress: 
Member states formally expressed the need for policy-making on legal migration, in addition 
to the clear understanding that illegal migration was a communitarian issue. It also 
highlighted the need for third-party nationals to maintain basic rights, just as EU natives 
enjoyed (Roos 2013). In November 2004, the Hague program reiterated the Amsterdam 
Treaty’s aim to achieve a comprehensive European asylum policy, though there was mixed 





In the wake of postwar migration, European member states’ policies of integration 
have traditionally been attributed to three models:  multicultural or plural, assimilation, and 
exclusionary. The model of multiculturalism, pursued in the past by countries including the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, is rooted in respecting and protecting the cultural 
identity of the migrant community. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, multiculturalism faced 
criticism as integration policies failed; critiques included that it encourages ethnic separation 
in a cultural and even physical sense (Vertovec 2010). In light of these criticisms of 
multiculturalism, interculturalism has been presented as a refined version that encourages 
intercultural dialogue in order to prevent segregation within multiculturalism. Both 
multiculturalism and interculturalism can be understood under the umbrella of a pluralism 
approach (Godenau et al. 2015). Of course, the limits of the multiculturalism model were 
discussed in the theoretical framework and will manifest in the following practical examples. 
In continuation, the assimilation or republican model, with France frequently cited as 
an example, only grants equality under the law to those that correspond to the category of 
citizen or national, calling for the immigrant to assimilate completely with the national 
identity. In other words, integration is conceived of as a one directional process, whereby the 
minority immigrants adopt the customs of the host country. Finally, the model of exclusion 
treats immigration as a temporary phenomenon, and denies civic and political participation 
by the immigrant community (Carrera 2006). Significantly, Spanish integration approaches to 
date have reflected a blended model. Between more restrictive citizenship policies and more 
liberal economic policy as a welfare state, Spain’s model for managing diversity is neither 
assimilation nor multiculturalism, but rather incorporates elements from the two in a way 
that is also comparable to the approaches of Portugal and Greece (Godenau et al. 2015). 
However, these paradigms have become increasingly blurry, especially as states 
change direction in integration policy over time, and as Europe considers a more dynamic 
approach to immigration and integration; as discussed in earlier, this approach seeks to 




to a reorientation of integration policy at the European level. Previously, at least in the case of 
some European member states, there had been heavier emphasis on recognizing the cultural 
integrity of migrants (Joppke 2006). Recently, the repeated emphasis in Europe on a two-way 
process of integration clearly places a burden on the immigrant that had been less marked 
before. As a result, many authors concur that public discourse and the political climate 
encourages the responsibility of the immigrant to integrate (Godenau et al. 2015; Vertovec 
2010).   
In turn, while member states remain autonomous in matters of integration, the EU 
still addresses integration with a series of nonbinding initiatives and instruments. The EU 
approach finds its grounding in the Common Basic Principles of 2004, a measure seeking to 
harmonize European integration by stressing a two-way integration and inclusion process. 
This nonbinding agreement reflects a commitment to maintaining uniform policies of 
immigration and integration at the supranational level, and promises that: “Member states 
reap many benefits. These include stronger economies, greater social cohesion, an increased 
feeling of security, and cultural diversity. Taken together and across all Member states, these 
benefits advance the European process and strengthen the Union's position in the world” 
(European Commission 2004, 15). Joppke surmises that integration attempts are shaped by 
the socioeconomic conditions, including unemployment and welfare dependency (often 
characteristic of migrant populations), inspiring European policy attempts to reverse this 
situation (2006). Subsequent EU initiatives include a European Agenda for Integration (2005-
2010) and a Common Agenda for Integration (2011), as well as a reaffirmation of the original 
Principles in 2014, and an EC 2016 Integration Action Plan of Third-Country Nationals. The 
Ministerial Conferences on Integration, National Contact Points on Integration (2002), 
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (2014-2020), European Migration Forum (2015), 





Again, however, Europeanisation has had a very limited influence on public policies at 
the national level. While the European supranational bureaucracy commends certain 
strategies, including the multicultural approach to integration schemes, these 
recommendations remain distanced from practical implementation (Koenig 2007). For this 
reason, perhaps, European policy acknowledges, apart from obvious national autonomy, that 
the regional and local level is an essential part of the integration project. This is especially 
highlighted in the “European agenda for the integration of non-EU migrants” promulgated by 
the Commission in 2011. It emphasizes in its prescriptions for action that “Local authorities 
are responsible for a wide range of services and activities and they play an important role in 
shaping the interaction between migrants and the receiving society” and indicates that the 
use of EU funding should be directed towards this area (European Commission 2011, 8).  
By comparison: the case of France 
France and the United Kingdom have been selected to juxtapose with Spain given 
their respective demographics of Muslim youth of migrant origin, and as such, their further 
comparative value at a later stage in this study; the basic approaches and policies of these 
countries are also useful in demonstrating the various contexts of European member state 
histories and practices. In fact, they provide particularly apt case studies when discussing 
Islam in Europe, in light of their approaches to ethnicity and diversity. The French state 
approach emphasizes that all of its citizens are equal and French, and as such there is less 
emphasis on integration, because there is no diversity or minority against which to 
discriminate. By contrast, the United Kingdom is very sensitive to race and ethnicity, based on 
its recent history, and has emphasized it in its public policies. In expounding upon these two 
separate approaches to diversity, it is useful to bear in mind how their separate structures 
and policies would affect a Muslim minority drawing largely from immigrants, and their 




For example, the French political model and understanding of civil society is rooted in 
its identity as a republican state. The central state administers a public sphere that treats 
individuals as unified and equal under the law, and any sort of particularistic identities are 
relegated to the private sphere. As a result, assimilation is de facto produced: as a French 
citizen, one is a homologized, in the tradition of the nation-building that occurred during the 
Third Republic (Favell 1998). The laicism principle is also inherent to France’s republican 
model, and has served as a key feature in French historical memory since the Revolution. The 
anti-aristocratic and anti-clerical nature of the revolutionary movement has prompted, as 
Noiriel puts it, “violent rejection of all privileges... based on origin” (1995, 371). A particularly 
stark image, the guillotine of Revolutionary France, can serve as a reminder of why France 
seeks to avoid discrimination based on origin or religion. As a result, while France is a 
regionally, linguistically and culturally diverse country, recent court decisions have 
interpreted the Constitution as recognizing only one French nation, devoid of distinctions in 
origin, race or religion. A strong emphasis is placed on equality before the law, while 
stressing diversity is seen as an impediment in the integration process (Joly 2005). 
The evolution of France’s nationality law is helpful in expounding upon the idea of 
French citizenship and thus in giving context to French models of integration. Beginning in 
the seventeenth century, France’s access to nationality was a blended jus sanguinis and jus 
soli model. The civil code of 1805, however, granted a more influential role to jus sanguinis, an 
exceptional phenomenon in comparison to the rest of Europe, and signifying a rejection of the 
feudal or monarchical system that had previously held sway (Weil 2001). Nonetheless, over 
the years, French legislation expanded the preference for jus soli, through legislation in 1889, 
1927, 1945 and 1973 (Ibid.). This jus soli approach did not signify a return to feudal or 
monarchical ideals, but rather stemmed from a republican conception of citizenship based on 
French socialization. In 1993, legislators passed a reform wherein the second generation 
born in France no longer acquired automatic French nationality, and instead introduced the 




and period of five years continuous residence (Ibid.). Again, this development in the law 
reflected the concept of a shared social contract as understood through French republican 
principles. It also represented public opinion that assimilation was not taking place as it had 
in the past (a point of contestation in scholarly research). Subject to criticism and logistical 
difficulties, this policy of requesting citizenship was modified in 1998, with a law that granted 
the second generation (born in France) automatic citizenship at the legal age of 18 (Ibid.).   
In regard to the first generation of immigrants, naturalization can take place after five 
years of residence. Indeed, French nationality law illustrates how the country has accepted its 
role as a receiving country, a progression that can be witnessed in other European states as 
well (Ibid.). Nationality law and its evolution also demonstrates the French emphasis on 
citizenship by French socialization, a clear dedication to republican and jacobinist ideals, all 
of which informs France’s integration policy. 
Currently, French immigration and integration is managed by several state ministries. 
There has been continuous heated debate between the French left and right-wing 
government regarding immigration. Immigration to France began in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century with labor recruitment. In the 1970s and 1980s, a politicization of 
immigration along with a recruitment ban ensued, with a ricochet between alternating 
policies and various attempts at regularization; in 1984, the government finally introduced 
laws facilitating French residency (Wihtol de Wenden 2011.). As with other European states 
in the 1990s, EU directives shaped asylum policy. The Sarkozy government later lifted the 
recruitment ban in 2006, promoting a model of ‘selected immigration’ and integration (Ibid.).  
As part of the republican identity of the French state, ethnicity goes unaccounted for 
in French statistics, with sole recognition of foreigner versus national status (Ibid.). There is 
little acknowledgement of inequalities drawing from ethnic and religious discrimination, and 
if so, it is relegated to the private sphere. Instead, public initiatives in this regard are dressed 
in the guise of socioeconomic aid (Joly 2005). The substantial presence of Islam, the greatest 




Muslim demographic is largely composed of Maghrebis and their descendants (a result of 
French colonial history); Muslims as a collective began asserting claims in the 1980s, and 
public opinion has reflected influences of Islamophobia (Wihtol de Wenden 2011).  
Public expression of Islam in France has garnered an international profile in the 
headscarf debate, which dates back to 1989, and ultimately resulted in the banning of girls 
wearing headscarves in public school in 2004; in 2010 the French Senate also banned face 
coverings, and therefore the Muslim burqa, in public (Ramírez 2014).4 Ramírez indicates that 
the media was fundamental in driving public opinion towards this prohibitionist stance 
(Ibid.). Even if those with Maghrebin ancestry do not practice Islam, as Beaman points out, 
“Regardless of the degree to which they personally identify as Muslim, Maghrébin-origin 
individuals are often categorized as Muslim in media and popular culture at least partially 
because Islam is the major religion of the Maghreb” (2016, 42). As a result of the complexities 
that arise from emphasizing French homogeneity and ignoring diversity issues or conflicts, 
pressure to recognize ethnic groups and implement anti-discrimination programs has 
emanated from civil society and the EU (Joly 2005).  
By comparison: the case of the United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom, by contrast, has been recognized for a public policy that 
acknowledges multiculturalism, a phenomenon shaped by the historical contexts and 
trajectory of their immigration flows and regulation (Joly 2005). This multiculturalist model 
succeeded assimilationist and race relations paradigms; to an extent, the multiculturalist 
policies that eventually prevailed were shaped at the local level via initiatives of the 
immigrants themselves (Joly 2012). During post-World War II immigration, British colonial 
citizens drawing from the Commonwealth states were granted British citizenship and 
unrestricted access to the United Kingdom through the 1948 Nationality Act. This act 
                                                          
4 The French law banning covering the face in public, or the Interdisant la dissimulation du 
visage dansl'espace public, bans various facial coverings, though critics claim it especially targeted 
female Muslim dress. The law in full is found at:  Interdisant la dissimulation du visage dansl'espace 




distinguished between citizenship of the United Kingdom and its colonies, and citizenship of 
the independent Commonwealth countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc.). At the 
same time, it granted equal legal status to all. The Act also held to the jus soli principle in that 
it granted citizenship to all born in the United Kingdom or the empire (Hansen 2001). This 
was later restricted through a law promulgated in 1962, which mitigated the relationship 
between nationality and citizenship rights for members of the Commonwealth (in an attempt 
to slow immigration to the United Kingdom). Joly remarks that this move was clearly 
discriminatory towards New Commonwealth subjects; it implemented the principle of 
‘patriality,’ where those who did not have a parent or grandparent born in the United 
Kingdom were subject to immigration regulation (2011). From the years 1962 to 1981, a U.K. 
passport did not necessarily indicate citizenship (Hansen 2001).  
In 1958, race riots initiated by white extremists against black populations in London 
and Nottingham raised concerns regarding immigration and integration (Favell 1998). There 
were calls for social action in response to the discrimination and rioting against immigrants. 
Mobilization of the largely disadvantaged immigrant populations in the 1960s and 1970s 
brought about policies that aimed to ameliorate social disadvantages (Joly 2011). The Race 
Relations Act of 1976, the Commission for Racial Equality and its local network of Community 
Race Council and Race Equality Councils managed racial and ethnic inequality at the local 
level (Samad 1998). However, the policies of the Thatcher regime constricted this local level 
governance, and the 1981 Nationality Act under Thatcher abolished jus soli nationality. It 
divided citizenship into categories of British Citizenship, British Dependent Territory 
Citizenship, and British Overseas Citizenship (Hansen 2001). Nationality law today, Hansen 
argues, bears little resemblance to the law that previously included all imperial subjects. 
Instead, it categorizes citizenship into British citizens, European citizens, and aliens, and 
those from independent Commonwealth countries and British dependent territories now 




Immigration still increased, however, throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Government immigration policies have encouraged managed migration, beginning with 
legislation in the 1990s that restricted asylum-seeking migrants and illegal immigration. This 
was followed by openness to high-skilled labor migration and student immigration (Cerna 
and Wietholtz 2011). U.K. public opinion in the decades leading up to the 2000s had 
prioritized race and immigration issues very little; however, beginning in 1999, immigration 
became a politicized and high-profile issue (Ibid.). Critics argue that public concern is 
directed by politics and government rather than vice versa.  The United Kingdom emphasizes 
border control, and did not participate in some of the provisions for an EU common policy on 
free movement in the Treaty of Amsterdam, and are not parties to the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement (though can partially ‘opt in’). The Home Office 
remained the key institution responsible for formulating immigration policies, and access to 
citizenship was largely in line with similar Northern European countries; five continuous 
years of residence, language proficiency and good conduct were requisites in order to begin 
the application process (Hansen 2001, 86).  
Of course, there has been a great deal of rhetoric regarding immigration in the build 
up to and aftermath of the June 2016 referendum, where a majority of the population voted 
to exit the European Union. Nine months later, U.K. Prime Minister Teresa May invoked 
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, a clause that allows members to voluntarily leave the Union, 
and the process has a time limit of two years (until March 2019) for the United Kingdom and 
the EU to come to an agreement (barring an extension as agreed by members of the EU). As 
such, the 2018 process of Brexit is currently under negotiation. In the meantime, there has 
been much speculation as to why the referendum was successful in voting to leave the Union, 
and whether xenophobia and resistance to immigration was a great contributing factor. 
There is general consensus that parliamentary scandal and austerity politics following the 
2008 financial crisis contributed to distrust of the establishment and political institutions. 




foreigners were taking British jobs, there is still no clear immigration policy plan for when 
the United Kingdom finally does withdraw from the EU (Menon 2018). 
On the other hand, U.K. integration can be analyzed somewhat separately from 
migration debate, as anti-discrimination policies within the United Kingdom have 
progressively strengthened, and often are not necessarily associated with migration. The race 
riots that began in the late 1950s led to a model of integration that defined ethnic groups and 
institutionalized anti-discrimination laws (Cerna and Wietholtz 2011). Then, the New Labour 
party’s diversity and inclusion agenda in 1997 led to especially pronounced multiculturalism 
policies (Ibid.). Still, riots in 2001 encouraged a turn toward policies of social cohesion; the 
2005 bombings brought about the 2006 Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CiC). 
While various national institutions had dealt with matters of integration, the Department for 
Communities and Local Government was charged with implementing cohesion, and 
integration remains a fraction of this agenda (Ibid.). However, a commitment to ethnic 
identities, and thus a multiculturalism approach, still remains. As Parekh describes it, the 
United Kingdom can be conceptualized as a community of individuals and peoples; they are 
united by their diversity and commitment to their unique cultures, as well as by a common 
institutional authority (2001). Often times the label of “ethnic minority” is used in place of 
“immigrant,” especially if referring to individuals of migration origin (Joly 2005). 
British ethnic and racial studies have been critical of discrimination in the United 
Kingdom, yet at the same time the British political rhetoric has maintained that Europe fares 
far worse in this regard. This rhetoric claims a British “exceptionalism,” as an island, distinct 
from the continent; it also argues that the United Kingdom is ahead in terms of 
multiculturalism policies by comparison with the rest of Europe, as anti-discrimination 
policies date back to the 1970s (Favell 2001). It is worthwhile to note that within race 
relations and multicultural education policies, a number of groups have begun to assert their 




versus white distinction, Muslim groups, Jewish groups and Irish groups began to lobby for 
recognition as well (Ibid.).  
One marked advance in U.K. rights and anti-discrimination measures includes their 
equality body. Established in 2007, the Equality and Human Rights Commission of Britain 
acts as a non-departmental (i.e., autonomous) public body that not only is responsible for 
providing resources, monitoring and consultancy to both citizens and organizations seeking 
to promote and ensure equality and human rights, they also have a remit of implementation 
(Equality and Human Rights Commission of Britain 2017). Given the trajectory of British 
diversity management, beginning with race relations legislation in 1976, it seems as if they 
have been especially thorough in exploring all avenues to equality and human rights 
guarantees. At the same time, the very existence of the body meets what is still a consistent 
demand for its efforts.  
While the United Kingdom and France share similar colonial backgrounds, 
demographics, and social challenges, the British policies of immigration and integration are 
clearly distinctive from the French in their emphasis on race relations, ethnicity and 
multicultural tolerance (Favell 1998). The French approach, Favell argues, would criticize 
this U.K. policy as one that is promoting inequality between the majority and ethnic 
minorities; it would be viewed as alienating and marginalizing these minorities based on 
race, and would violate equality with claims for special treatment. In turn, the British 
perspective might label French policies as intolerant and prone to cultural exclusion (1998). 
Indubitably, the policy framework for each nation is constituted differently, as U.K. policy 
separates matters of migration versus integration policies, whereas France’s nationality law 
is designed to incorporate and provide for integration (Ibid.).   
Spanish immigration and integration 
Just as France and the United Kingdom are distinct examples, Spain’s unique context, 
situation and approach to immigration and integration can be juxtaposed with fellow 




level and diverse policies and societal frameworks can be informed by a multitude of 
variables. Spanish immigration and integration is conducted at both the federal, regional and 
local levels.5 While the central government is responsible for controlling migration flows and 
matters of citizenship (i.e., entry and residence), policies and processes of integration are 
predominantly carried out by the regions and local governments. An overview of the 
country’s immigration history and legal and political framework follows, before further 
exploring the implications of multi-level governance for Spanish integration.  
i. Public opinion in Spain regarding immigration and integration 
Public opinion is a key in considering integration processes, as the attitudes of the 
receiving country can influence the immigration and integration policies of the country as 
well. Government leaders may look to their electorate’s views in order to make policy 
decisions. Moreover, as discussed earlier, integration itself is a two-way process, requiring 
effort on the part of both the receiving society and the immigrant. On a national scale, a 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS)6 report from February 2000 found highly 
positive attitudes towards immigration. Results included that 96% of Spaniards believed that 
everyone has a right to work in any country, regardless of nationality, and 55% thought that 
were few, or several but not too many, immigrants residing in Spain (Pérez-Díaz, Álvarez-
Miranda and González-Enríquez 2001, 140). Seventy-one percent of participants were in 
favor of the immigrants’ right to vote, and 92% believed that unemployment benefits should 
be offered (Pérez-Díaz, Álvarez-Miranda and González-Enríquez 2001, 140).  
Compared to other European countries, Spain has been identified as more tolerant 
towards and positive about immigration (Ayerdi and Vidal 2008). In more recent years, 
despite the financial crisis, Arango explains, there has not been any major social outcry 
                                                          
5Comunidad autónoma or “autonomous communities,” abbreviated as CCAA, of which there 
are 17, will be referred to in this work as regions. 
6 The Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, or Center for Sociological Investigation, referred 
to hereinafter as CIS, is a public organization linked to the Spanish state administration. It conducts 
continual surveys among Spanish society, providing an archive of the data, as well as manages a 




against immigration, and according to continuous CIS surveys, public concern about 
immigration has maintained at the same levels (2012). Zapata notes that is it important to 
distinguish how Spanish citizens often separate issues of border control from those related to 
immigrant integration (2009). If anything, the crisis has increased concern about border 
control, but perceptions of immigrants already residing in Spain has remained the same 
(Cebolla and González 2013). In 2014, when asked to select from a variety of indicators the 
three principal problems existing in Spain, only 1.9 to 5.9% respondents, varying by month, 
indicated immigration (CIS 2014). Public opinion regarding Islam, and claims that cultural 
racism and Islamaphobia has increased, are a separate consideration that will be explored in 
a later chapter (Cebolla and González 2013). 
ii. Background, legislation and policies 
In the past, Spain was a country of emigration rather than immigration, with millions 
of migrant workers first leaving for Latin America in the late 19th and early 20th century, and 
in the post-World War II era, moving to Northern Europe. However, after the transition to 
democracy and ratification of the Spanish Constitution in 1978, and joining the European 
Community in 1986, Spain experienced the return of its emigrants, and also transformed into 
a receiving country. Immigration flows began around the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
reaching significant numbers at the turn of the century (Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio 
2011). Since the mid-1980s, the incoming immigrants supplied labor and services that 
provided necessary support to the Spanish economy (Arango 2012). These immigrants could 
either be qualified professionals, or from less developed countries; they assumed non-skilled 
labor roles that Spanish workers at the time were unwilling to accept (Moreno 2001). The 
incoming populations have drawn from Morocco, Latin America, Eastern Europe and, to a 
lesser degree, Asia (Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio 2011). Unsurprisingly, immigration began 
to surface as a key public policy initiative, and academia also began to take notice of the 




counted approximately 5.3 million foreigners, representing 11.2% of the population; foreign 
populations can be more concentrated in certain areas, composing up to 15% of the 
population in regions like Baleares, Murcia, Valencia and Cataluna (Godenau et al. 2015).  
In regards to the judicial and legislative framework of Spanish immigration policy, 
recent history begins with the Spanish Constitution of 1978. Article 13.1 established that 
foreigners are guaranteed liberties as dictated by treaties and the law (Constitución Española 
1978 [CE 1978]). A court decision, 107/1984, then instituted certain rights for all persons, 
regardless of their legal status, including judicial guarantees; at the same time, it excluded 
foreigners from most political rights.  The first law addressing foreign nationals, La Ley de 
Extranjería (Foreigners Law), came into force in 1985, as Spain joined the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 and Europe sought to monitor immigration policy (Aja 
2006). This law could not be conceived of as immigration legislation in terms of providing for 
incorporation and nationality, as it simply offered the conditions under which foreigners 
could stay in Spain, as well as indicated some restrictions to entry (Arango 2000). In other 
words, it treated immigration from outside of the European community as a temporary 
phenomenon. It was complemented by implementation regulation via a Royal Decree in 1986 
(Relaño 2004). A Supreme Court ruling, 115/1987, deemed some parts of the 1985 
Foreigners Law unconstitutional, especially those that restricted judicial liberties (Aja 2006).   
In the 1990s, Spanish immigration legislation was marked by a move towards 
integration policies, albeit in tandem with control measures as well. A 1991 resolution in 
Parliament called for a regularization process and for more integration measures. This 
resulted in 120,000 irregular immigrants submitting applications for legalization, and most 
were granted (Relaño 2004).  In 1993, a quota system was introduced to promote 
immigration management. Danese points out that European influences could be attributed to 
the relatively young Spanish government’s attempt to promote civil society movements 
(1998). The first “Plan para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes” (“Plan for the Social 




issued by the Council of Europe, “Intercommunity and Interethnic Relations in Europe” (Ibid). 
The Plan was established alongside two accompanying instruments, el Foro para la 
Integración Social de los Inmigrantes (The Forum for Immigrants’ Social Integration), and the 
Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración.7 It was be followed by three more integration 
plans issued in 2001, 2007, and 2011.8 
A further key stage in Spain’s immigration policy came about with a 1999 Foreigners 
Law, which reformulated quotas in a way that was more oriented towards labor market 
policies, and less geared towards regularization. This law also conferred several immigrant 
rights, and granted access to education, public health and other benefits to all immigrants; 
additional rights were allowed to those with legal status (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). In 
2000, the Ley de Extranjería 4/2000 introduced a “Foreigner’s Law” more sensitive to 
integration processes and oriented towards policies of incorporation; however, Spain’s 
conservative party, the Partido Popular (PP) took power in 2000 and modified the law with 
Ley Organica 8/2000 to make it more restrictive. Some of these modifications included 
limiting rights granted to immigrants without legal status, and facilitating disciplinary 
measures directed towards this group (Relaño 2004). This ushered in critique from 
organizations including NGOs, unions and the Catholic Church, as well as faced condemnation 
from the regional governments, including the Basque Country, Anadalucia, Extramedura and 
Castilla-La Mancha (Relaño2004, 114). Apart from the modification by Ley Organica 8/2000, 
the Ley de Extranjería 4/2000, still in force today, has undergone several modifications in the 
past years (LO 4/2000, de 11 de enero). The implementation of these multiple reforms, and 
the corresponding amplification or restriction of immigrant rights, reflect varying 
governments in power, social contexts or changes at the time, or European agreements. 
                                                          
7 The Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, or Permanent Observatory for Immigration, 
is the government office responsible for analyzing and publishing migration data. 
8 There have not been subsequent plans since 2011; however, the most recent change in 
government as of June 1, 2018, with the PSOE or Socialist party leading the ruling coalition, may signify 




While the central government clearly regulates flows of immigration, the regional and 
local governments often take on other responsibilities, resulting in a mélange of integration 
policy throughout Spain. Indeed, Spanish immigration and integration policy is marked by its 
“patchwork integration;” there are different integration plans in each region (Godenau et al. 
2015, 36). The Spanish Constitution describes the governance and capacities at the state 
level, the regional level and at the level of the provinces within a region (CE 1978).  It grants 
exclusive competencies to the central government in several areas; the regions are granted a 
legal personality and the right to self-govern, based on their historical legal framework. In 
certain cases, they are also ceded jurisdiction over infrastructure, as well as in matters like 
social welfare and health. However, the Constitution does not specify the extent of the 
competencies of the regions, and for this reason the different regions have varying levels of 
autonomy, with some challenging the state more than others in this regard (Finotelli 2013). 
Initially, there was a de facto distribution of integration responsibilities to regional and local 
governments, which would include provisions for health care, education, benefits, 
employment and housing (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). This distribution is now codified in 
national plans for integration.  In practice, the central government works to regulate and 
restrict migrant entry, while the regions and local governments strive to bring visibility to the 
immigrant situation and improve their quality of life; regions can pursue this to varying 
degrees, ranging from a proactive to a “laissez-faire” approach (Moreno 2007). 
iii. Municipal Registry 
In an examination of Spanish integration policy and its decentralized nature, the 
mandated local registry or census record, “empadronamiento,” is a remarkable phenomenon. 
All residents of a community in Spain must register in the “Padrón Municipal de Habitantes,” 
or Municipal Resident Registry. It is useful to the Spanish authorities and those studying 
migration flows because it provides an important source of statistics regarding foreigners in 




residence, nationality, place and date of birth, national identification or other identification if 
foreigner status (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2018). Moreover, it offers more frequent 
demographic detail than larger national censuses provide, as the information is updated 
annually when the National Statistics Registry collects information from the various 
municipalities that gather the data in an ongoing basis (Ibid). This allows for a continuous 
record on foreign populations in the country. On the other hand, in addition to its use to 
investigators and local and national administration and institutions, it confers rights and 
advantages upon the individuals who register as well. The Padrón was made obligatory and 
accessible to all residents, regardless of citizenship or legal status, via reform law Law 
4/1996 of January 10, which modified an earlier 1985 law that provided instruction for local 
administrative procedures (Ley 4/1996; Ortega et al. 2013). As a result of this, the Padrón 
legislation provides access to public health care, school for minors and allows for family 
reunification, to list some of its advantages (Domingo 2010). This type of municipal resident 
registry, independent of citizenship or a foreigner’s legal status at the national level, is unique 
to Spain. 
As such, there are studies indicating that not only does the Padrón have direct effects 
at the administrative and legal levels, it also impacts migration and integration. It is 
considered one of the ways in which an individual first establishes themselves in the 
community, and for that reason is important in studies of societal cohesion (Pérez and Rinken 
2005). Indeed, this work will later analyse whether the Padrón might have any effect on the 
target population’s sense of belonging, given that it provides access to rights like education to 
1.5 generation migrants who may not yet exercise their full citizenship rights, but have 
already established residence in their communities. 
iv. Integration policy 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, a 2015 study on Spanish integration conducted by Godenau 




similar contexts, resulted in different levels of integration factors and outcomes (2015). 
Zapata insists that especially in Spain, regional identity remains important (2009). Of course, 
the central government has a responsibility to administer consistent policy that guarantees 
efficient public administration and multi-level cooperation; at the same time, decentralization 
is especially imperative when regional differences go so far as to include linguistic difference 
as well. Again, the cases of regions where Catalonian and Basque are spoken surface as an 
example (Zapata 2009). At the same time, there is evidence that the various regional policies 
have become a bit more homogeneous in the wake of the crisis and lack of funding (Godenau 
et al. 2015).  
The 2015 Spanish integration study further notes that there is a regulatory and 
legislative framework that provides homogeneity at the state level and also uniformly 
impacts integration indicators. At the same time, it stresses (with reference to the report’s 
own results, as grouped by regions) that the pace of the integration process and its results 
can vary substantially by regional grouping. By way of example, several observations on the 
varied results by regional grouping (as defined in this study) include: the Northwest, 
Northeast and Madrid performed most poorly in the indicators having to do with 
Employment and Welfare, but best in Social Relations; the Northwest and Madrid also 
performed well in Citizenship; and the South, East and Central regional groupings had poorer 
results in all areas than the average in the rest of Spain, with especially poor outcomes in the 
South in Social Relations (Godenau et al. 2015).  In light of this clear variance throughout the 
Spanish state, Zapata argues that going forward, Spain is presented with three alternatives in 
governance and monitoring: a centralist approach, a collaborative approach, and an 
asymmetric approach to immigration and integration. He holds that the most recent 
legislation regulating immigration, Ley Orgánica 4/2000, combines all three approaches 
(Zapata 2011). 
In speaking about integration, approaches to diversity necessarily follow. Again, the 




reference, Zapata outlines an intricate diagram of the Spanish framework regarding diversity, 
and within that explains a trajectory of religious preference: that the Reconquista initiated a 
history of Islamophobia; that Franco’s reign reinforced a “Hispanidad” preferential to Spanish 
language speakers; and that the ensuing transition period led to agreements with the Catholic 
Church that were inherently biased against other religions, including the “concertado” school 
system (2010). However, he argues that Spanish diversity policy espouses a “practical 
philosophy,” i.e., it is informed not by old models, like multiculturalism, but rather learns 
from other European states with earlier immigration flows, and crafts policy accordingly 
(Ibid.).  
v. Institutional anti-discrimination measures 
As part of institutional steps towards diversity protection, in the form of rights and 
anti-discrimination safeguards, there are a few organizations operating under the umbrellas 
of respective government ministries. The two most notable include the Council for the 
Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination, under the Ministry of Health Social Services 
and Equality, and The Spanish Observatory for Racism and Xenophobia (el Observatorio 
Español del Racismo y Xenophobia, or OBERAXE), under the Spanish Ministry of Employment 
and Social Security. In a 2018 report, the Council of Europe criticized the Council’s lack of 
activity, among other critiques of rights protection in Spain, to be further addressed in 
Chapter Seven (2018). However, OBERAXE has demonstrated more promise in recent 
projects. It was established in 2000 in order to identify racism and xenophobia, promote 
equality and non-discrimination and to collaborate with other institutions and entities in 
working towards these goals (D’Ancona and Valles 2012).  
An example of an OBERAXE initiative includes the FRIR project, translated as 
“Training for the Identification and Recording of Racist Incidents” (“Formación para la 
Identificación y Registro de Incidentes Racistas”). This Spanish multilateral effort engaged the 




Security Forces, and various NGOs to train the Spanish armed and security forces in equal and 
non-discriminatory treatment. It also provided tools by which to detect and record incidents 
of such behavior, behavior sanctioned in Spain’s criminal code. Special prosecutors for hate 
crimes were subsequently created in 50 provinces, along with a special unit for these crimes 
in the Ministry of the Interior.9 Apart from a manual and training for the armed and security 
forces, the improvement of information systems recording hate crimes resulted in a 
progressive increase in reported crimes in 2013, 2014, and 2015, with a 4.5% decrease in 
2016 (OBERAXE; Ministerio de Interior, OSCE10).  OBERAXE has also carried out several other 
projects in recent years, including a project with the media from 2008-2009, and the most 
recent in conjunction with the Ministry of Health, still in progress in 2018.   
In brief, there is room for improvement in Spanish equality and plurality 
commitments, to be further explained in Chapter Seven in a discussion of Islam in Spain and 
how this minority is particularly affected. However, the need for rights protections and anti-
discrimination measures has been recognized and is understood as part of a wholistic 
integration agenda. 
Integration in Madrid 
Given that the participant pool draws from Madrid, as well as the reality of multilevel 
governance and integration policy in Spain, it is useful to briefly address integration in this 
region. Madrid was the first region in Spain to create a Council for Immigration and 
Cooperation, in 2005 (Comunidad de Madrid 2009, 7, 54). Its third and most recent plan for 
integration, “Plan de Integración 2009-2012,” emphasized the importance of addressing 
                                                          
9 Nicolás Marugán, 2018. E-mail message to author, April 28. Nicolás Marugán was Director of 
OBERAXE from May 2009 to November 2014. He helpfully directed me to and explained some of the 
information provided above, all of which can be corrected via the OBERAXE website and resources 
from the Ministry of the Interior.  
10 For further information, the Organization for Security and Cooperation and Europe’s Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights provides data from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior 





problems of language, education, work and social welfare, encouraging a sense of belonging, 
developing the community, and familiarizing with immigrant communities and networks 
(2009, 13). It lists its guiding principles as equality under the law, coexistence without 
discrimination, equality of opportunity, social cohesion and the need for coordination 
between the regional government and state and local governments, as well as private entities 
(2009, 18-19). Madrid integration policy recognizes the diverse cultures of origin of its 
immigrants, thus creating policy that not only treats of social benefits but also adds a cultural 
dimension (Morales et al. 2009, 118). The Community of Madrid on a more basic level also 
offers a “Know your laws” course, to non-Spanish speaking immigrants, generally who have 
received a basic level of Spanish via free language classes in the community’s immigration 
centers (La Spina 2015). While there appears to be no Integration plan in place post-2012, 
currently, the city of Madrid has outlined objectives in their 2015-2019 government plan. It 
states that there should be improved neighborhood coexistence, especially in neighborhoods 
with cultural diversity, and that victims of discrimination, hate and xenophobia should 
receive proper attention from city police (Ayuntamiento de Madrid). 
The Community of Madrid is characterized by its dense and large population 
(6,421,874 inhabitants in 2011) and an economy drawing heavily on the service industries. It 
has a substantial percentage of immigrant population, with greater numbers of nationals 
from Latin America, Romania and Bulgaria, and Africa (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
2011; Godenau et al. 2015, 44). In a comparison between the communities of Barcelona, 
Madrid and Murcia, authors Morales, Amparo and Jorba argue that Madrid does the most to 
recognize the multicultural elements of its immigrant population, as well as to pursue 
integration measures (2009).  It has created a series of Centros de Atencion Social al 
Inmigrante (Centers of Social Attention for Immigrants), the majority of which are found in 
the city of Madrid. These centers address issues of first arrival, employment, social welfare, 
law, housing, and leisure (Comunidad de Madrid 2009). Migrant associations and non-




promote integration policies; public funds are directed towards this purpose, granted under 
the same stipulations that public funds would be granted to any other organization (Morales, 
Amparo and Jorba 2009). Further exploration is to come of how the Community of Madrid 
accommodates not solely first generation immigration, but also reaches out to culturally 
diverse communities and youth of migrant origin.  
In summary 
Clearly, there is a wealth of historical, political, economic and sociocultural context 
that informs immigration and integration policy and in turn affects community members of 
migrant origin, even at the local level. When beginning to examine these relationships at the 
European level, one notes that European integration policies have evolved even over a short 
period of time in the post-war period. While member states originally adopted models of 
assimilation and multiculturalism, reality on the ground has prompted a reexamination and 
reformulation of approaches. EU initiatives remain fairly noncommittal, and largely do not 
bind member states to policy. The cases of France and the United Kingdom are especially 
useful in demonstrating how policy can develop over time in relation to various political and 
social contexts. The French example manifests how political history can shape attitudes 
towards immigration, as France emphasizes the responsibility of the immigrant in its (albeit 
somewhat mitigated) republican integration model that largely avoids ethnic distinctions. 
The United Kingdom’s initial multiculturalism approach to social “cohesion” and emphasis on 
anti-discrimination can be attributed to its colonial past and public demands, though border 
control and the restriction of immigration flows have become increasingly prioritized, most 
especially in recent years and in light of the political climate and social events.  
Spanish immigration is also shaped by economic and political contexts, as significant 
flows began after the transition to democracy.  Integration policies reflect Spanish public 
attitudes at the regional level. Indeed, Spain’s integration structures and practices reflect a 




local level by the state, though issues of border control and flows remain regulated at the 
national level. For this reason, studies that use integration indicators in Spain attempt to take 
into account and distinguish between regional contexts as well. Madrid provides an example 
of how policies can embrace integration and provide either more or less social inclusion at 
the regional level. While there may have been some initial influences on integration policy 
from EU policy and directives, Spain’s policy reflects its diverse regional makeup and its post-
dictatorship democratic commitment, just as France and the United Kingdom’s current 
immigration and integration policy and attitudes demonstrate the context and evolution of 
their societies. These considerations will also be useful in exploring the nuances of second 






The second generation and integration 
Integration policies and processes take on more specific implications when 
considering the integration of second generation immigrants. Again, study of the second 
generation is a useful approach in examining the impact of immigration on a society’s future. 
Of course, second generation analysis merits a distinctive integration or assimilation theory, 
in order to accommodate this generation’s unique situation: indeed, they are not technically 
immigrants, but they still face distinct challenges and circumstances as compared to children 
of native born populations. This can be particularly frustrating, as they should technically be 
entitled to equal rights as their fellow citizens. This frustration will come into play in a later 
discussion of Islam in Europe, and in the empirical observations. Meanwhile, this chapter 
seeks to provide an overview of integration theory and indicators that are tailored to the 
second generation. Literature on the second generation in Spain will provide the necessary 
context to the question posed in this project. And, again, increasing literature on second 
generation Muslims in Europe, and the call for a theoretical framework that addresses this 
phenomenon, point toward the relevance of the thesis questions.   
Defining the second generation 
At this point, the term “second generation” merits clarification; it is often defined 
differently, depending on the context of the study. For example, in a 2006 study by Aparicio 
and Tornos, the second generation was defined as those children born in Spain to foreign 
parents, between the ages of 14 and 25 years old, or those that had arrived to Spain with their 
parents before turning 9 years old. The latter group is referred to in the literature as 
generation 1.5, but is then included under the umbrella of the second generation immigrant 
label. By contrast, the first part of a long-term study conducted by Portes, Vickstrom, and 
Aparicio in Madrid and Barcelona in 2008 defines the second generation as a child with at 




of 12 (2011). In North American literature, a range of definitions for generation 1.5 similarly 
exists. For example, in one of his studies, Rumbaut defines it as pre-adolescent children from 
six to twelve; at the same time, he recommends that it may be more precise to define 
generations in terms of parental birthplace and the age the individual arrives to the receiving 
country, rather than including generations 1.5 and 2.0 together as “generational segments” 
(2002, 57, 92).  
As can be deduced through these examples, the “second generation” can include a 
diverse data set of both native-born and foreign-born children. The difference between the 
native born and the “generation 1.5” is marked by the native-born children’s lack of migration 
experience, and their supposed social inclusion as a member of society from day one (Crul, 
Schneider and Lelie 2012). As briefly mentioned in the introduction to this work, it should 
again be noted that the term “second generation immigrant” remains imprecise, as this 
second generation can refer to those children born natives rather than foreign born like their 
parents; as such, they are indeed not properly immigrants. Indeed, as Crul, Schneider and 
Lelie point out, “In theory, the second generation should have the same life chances as 
children of native-born parents” (2012, 12). Oftentimes, however, this does not translate into 
reality.   
Second generation immigrants in the majority of EU countries, including France, the 
United Kingdom and Spain, enjoy access to national citizenship (Hansen and Weil 2001). In 
Spain, nationality will come into play when determining the population set in this study, and 
whether they qualify as “second generation” or “generation 1.5.” The majority of laws 
regarding nationality can be found in the Civil Code of Spain. Nationality is often assigned 
based on a jus sanguinis model rather than jus soli model, though there are various avenues to 
nationality through jus soli (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). For example, the Civil Code grants 
Spanish nationality to those born in Spain, regardless of the nationality of their parents, 
although the nationality must be requested for the child after they have been in the country 




The children of foreign parents are also granted Spanish nationality if the parents’ country of 
origin would not automatically grant the child nationality, or if neither parent has a 
nationality (OPI 2006).  
Carmen González argues that comparatively, Spain allows for the easiest access to 
citizenship (by non-EU immigrants) of all of the EU countries; at the same time, she admits 
that the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) gives Spain a low score in this regard 
because it only takes into account the 10-year residency requirement (González 2014). 
However, this residency requirement can be reduced in several cases and for many 
nationalities. Refugees have a reduced residency requirement of five years; Sephardic Jews 
are similarly offered a reduced requirement. Only two years of residency is required of 
foreigners from Latin America, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and Portugal 
(Álvarez 2010).   
For the purposes of this project (in that the majority of Moroccan immigrants and 
their progeny profess the Muslim faith), it is worthwhile to note that the children of 
Moroccan-born parents are granted Spanish nationality if the parents’ marriage is not 
recognized under Moroccan law (Castien 2009; OPI 2006). Otherwise, they face the option of 
nationality by residence (mentioned earlier), after one year. On the other hand, a first or 1.5 
generation Moroccan would have to wait 10 years for citizenship, rather than the two years 
that many Latin American immigrants enjoy. This is notable because, as Gabrielli points out in 
a comparative study between Ecuadorian and Moroccan immigrants, not only does the latter 
population have to wait longer for citizenship, this wait can translate into an impediment 
structurally, as it slows labor market insertion (2015). Obviously, this would be a great 
obstacle for our population, young Muslims in Madrid. 
Given these observations, while the study will target a majority of second generation 
participants (19 total), born in Spain, a comparative sample of generation 1.5 (8 participants) 
and first generation youth (5 participants) will be included as well. This will help to 




faces. For example, assuming a welcoming society of residence, a longer time and exposure to 
that society should correlate to greater attachment. In terms of age, given the patterns of 
immigration to Spain in the past decades, the participant pool in the empirical section falls 
within the expected range. The majority of the youth participants are either completing 
university or entering into society as young professionals. This makes sense in that studies 
from previous years put the participants more in the high school age range, and at this point 
the Spanish second generation will have matured into those of workforce age. This phrase in 
life is especially pertinent in the study of second generation integration as it investigates how 
this particular population integrates as societal contributors. The identity they have shaped 
to date is key in this stage of their life. 
Second generation theory 
With the term “second generation” more clearly defined, as relates to this study, and 
as is defined in general (whether in terms of their period of time in the host country, birth in 
the host country, or access to citizenship), an overview of second generation literature, or 
theory, follows. Second generation studies are dated somewhat earlier in the United States, 
and have formed the vast majority of the literature on the subject to date. However, the 
European context has more recently emerged as a priority in the study of second generation 
integration.  As Crul, Schneider and Lelie note in their study of the second generation in 
Europe, “Older children born to Europe’s first labour migrants are now finishing their 
educational careers and beginning to enter the labour market in considerable numbers. The 
time is ripe for a first real assessment of second-generation integration” (2012, 12). Others 
similarly conclude that study of the second generation is especially timely in Spain (Diez 
2006). Up until recently, the second generation in Spain was either a very negligible 
percentage of the population, or still in school and not yet facing the questions of civic 





The second generation literature that has been conducted in the United States bears 
significance in that it has influenced and provided a framework for subsequent European 
studies. There are several theoretical approaches to second generation adaptation11, 
reflecting an evolution of the concept of assimilation that marked the study of earlier waves 
of American immigration (Alba and Nee 1997). Studies have investigated the second 
generation populations and communities that have taken root in the United States in recent 
history, with theoretical perspectives that Portes, Aparicio and Haller claim can be either 
classified as “culturalist” or “structuralist” (2016). Alba and Nee present a culturalist 
assimilation theory that advocates for a general mainstream idea of society. The immigrant, 
or child of the immigrant, both conforms to and influences the mainstream, as a result of 
economic drivers (1997). Moreover, in light of supranational institutions and globalization, 
there is an assumed interaction between the different cultures that produces this mutually-
influential assimilation, rather than a one-sided melding to a core host society culture (Esser 
2004). There are also those infamous commentators that would claim that no assimilation 
takes place; for example, Huntington claims that assimilation has not taken place, citing the 
example of Hispanics in the United States, with European adherents to this philosophy 
claiming a similar failure amongst Muslims in Europe (2006). Critics of this viewpoint cite the 
lack of empirical evidence to this effect, and the prejudicial nature of these observations.  
In terms of structuralist viewpoints, an exclusionary theory is proposed by Telles and 
Ortiz. They explain, based on their research on Mexican-American communities in Southern 
California, that descendants of Mexican immigrants largely did not experience socioeconomic 
gains from one generation to the next. Due to their ethnicity or race and the subsequent 
                                                          
11 Some shy from the term of “assimilation,” as it can carry negative associations with older or 
“classical” assimilation theories (from early American immigration waves at the beginning of the 20th 
century). However, for the purposes of this paper, “assimilation” will be referred to in non-restricted 
sense, without any ties to past definitions. A past definition it would seek to avoid includes that of 
Warner and Srole, which holds that assimilation can be understood as the inferior immigrant being 
enjoined to utterly conform to a superior mainstream society (Alba and Nee 1997). “Adaptation,” an 




discrimination they faced, they were unable to flourish. This consistent discrimination, Telles 
and Ortiz posit, can manifest itself many ways that lead to the disadvantaged position of this 
group. Some include poor access to education, harsh immigration policies, and how 
components of the American economy become structured around cheap and racially or 
ethnically categorized labor (2008). Testing this thesis are the other communities in various 
regions across the US, including Cubans in Miami, who maintain separate identifications or 
communities but achieve political or economic success (Portes, Aparicio and Haller 2016). 
Similarly, another structuralist approach promises a positive outcome, as a 2009 study 
conducted among youth in New York, describes how there is a “second generation advantage” 
in drawing on the resources of two cultures, despite any disadvantages (Kasinitz et al. 2009). 
A further structuralist perspective includes the “segmented assimilation,” theory, 
originally posited by Portes and Zhou, which has been used in the description of integration 
and mobility trends and processes amongst both relevant US populations and the European 
second generation (Portes and Zhou 1993; Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). Within this 
theory, two “modes of incorporation” prevail: either “downward assimilation,” or an “upward 
mobility” that is facilitated by ethnic communities (Portes and Zhou 1993; Crul et al. 2012). 
Downward assimilation is marked by second generation immigrants’ vulnerabilities to ethnic 
and racial discrimination and their descent into the urban “underclass”; this class can become 
entrapped in a cycle of poverty in a society experiencing increasing economic disparity 
(Portes and Zhou 1993). By contrast, the incorporation via “upward mobility” involves the 
children of immigrants finding themselves able to draw upon the resources of their ethnic 
communities. With this capital, they propel themselves upwards in society, as well as 
preserve some of the values of these communities. Finally, Portes and Zhou acknowledge the 
traditionally understood method of assimilation, that of parallel assimilation, into the white 
middle class. Proponents of the “segmented assimilation” theory argue that its strengths lie in 
providing for a variety of outcomes, both positive and negative, dependent on the conditions 




generation to varying degrees, can affect these trajectories of segmented assimilation. They 
argue that a “transnational lens” is imperative to understanding the second generation’s 
experience (2002, 16). 
Crul, Schneider and Lelie point out that weaknesses of utilizing the American 
conceptions of second generation integration processes when analyzing phenomena in 
Europe. They argue for a number of shortcomings: the difference in the demographics and 
context of populations studied; the distinctive American ideology, which may differ from 
European understandings and approaches to integration; and sometimes, certain theory is 
not applicable to the European situation (2012). For example, the theory of downward 
assimilation, they argue, does not hold. While ethnic minorities can often reside in poorer 
neighborhoods in Europe, these neighborhoods are incomparable to the ghettos of the United 
States (2012).   
In this burgeoning field, scholars have begun to try and adapt theory to take into 
account the varying considerations of both US and European assimilation or integration 
theory. As referenced earlier, Alba uses his schema regarding “bright” versus “blurred” 
boundaries to indicate how religion in Europe may be interpreted as a bright boundary, 
whereas ethnicity in the United States would be less marked and considered a blurred 
boundary (2005). However, in straddling the perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic, 
Aparacio and Tornos emphasize a key difference in the approach to second generation 
integration in American versus European literature, or indeed in approaching integration in 
general. They hold that the European methodology gives more precedence to the social 
environment of the receiving country, namely to the policies and attitudes of the society. 
They highlight the necessity of the receiving country providing equal civic and social rights to 
the immigrant population, explaining it is taken for granted as a key foundation for successful 
integration in Europe. In fact, they insist, in the cases where poor integration is identified, the 




While more recent literature regarding European integration has observed that the 
pendulum has swung back towards the responsibility of the migrant, there is clearly a 
recurring emphasis in the literature that integration is a two-way process, a mutual give-and-
take between the immigrant and the receiving society. By contrast, Aparacio and Tornos 
point out, the American literature focuses less on social services and the responsibility of the 
state. However, both sides of the Atlantic agree that the educational and labor systems are 
objective tools that should be configured so as to fairly incorporate immigrants into society 
(2006). A 2012 comparative European study looks to measure second generation 
immigration by progress in factors including “education, labour market, social relations, 
religion and identity formation,” emphasizing how the structures and policies of receiving 
societies interact with and shape these factors (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012, 12). 
Second generation indicators of integration 
While integration indicators for immigrant integration were outlined earlier, the 
science studying the second generation clearly emphasizes a more specific set of indicators, 
especially given the unique nature and position of this population set. The second generation 
contends with two cultures and languages that can result in varying integration outcomes. 
Furthermore, difficulties in integration and feelings of exclusion in society are especially 
challenging for the second generation. Again, given their status as members of society, they 
should feel that they are facing unjust, unequal treatment. Nonetheless, reality demonstrates 
there are many factors that clearly place the second generation in a different position than 
their counterparts with native-born parents.  
Portes and Zhou provide a framework, indicating that within the theory of segmented 
assimilation, a typology of acculturation emerges wherein the child can either: adapt with 
their parents to the new language and culture at the same pace; the child can outperform 
their parents in ability to adapt to the receiving culture and simultaneously reject the former 




of that of their parents’  (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio 2011). The 
pattern of “selective acculturation,” when the student draws from both the culture of the host 
country and their co-ethnic community (if available) can provide an advantage; for example, 
bilingual ability (Portes 2009).  
In terms of measuring the second generation’s integration, Portes and Rumbaut group 
indicators of second generation integration the three categories: individual features 
(including age, education, skills), the social environment of the receiving country 
(government policy, native population attitudes, and existing ethnic communities and their 
support) and family structure (2001). Certainly, social capital, an aspect contained within the 
general category of individual features, is very significant, as family status and language 
knowledge can clearly influence the level and direction of integration. However, different 
studies emphasize different indicators as particularly telling, especially in light of the 
population set and the question at hand. In another study by Rumbaut, he focuses specifically 
on educational attainment, incarceration, and early childbearing in a study of second 
generation Americans, with parents from Mexico, the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia, among others (2005). Again, with classifications like this, the European 
environment should be considered. For example, given that the welfare state is stronger in 
Europe, perhaps educational skills would fall under social environment of receiving country 
more so than individual features. Education would be less dependent on the individual or 
individual’s family than of the state. 
For our purposes, a key measure of second generation integration, that of self-identity 
and if it manifests sense of belonging to the parents’ host country, has been presented in the 
literature as a soft, rather than objective, indicator. This indicator is correlated to future of 
these youth, their upward mobility in society and thus a perceived successful integration and 
inclusion (Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio 2011; Portes, Aparicio, Haller and Vickstrom 2010; 
Portes and Aparicio 2013). As briefly referenced earlier, and as highlighted in the title of this 




society does not always necessarily determine positive adaptation outcomes, including in 
relation to aspirations, and selective acculturation has proved to offer positive outcomes 
(Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio 2011).  
For such a hybrid identity to indicate successful outcomes, the identity includes 
attachment to the community of residence, of course. A certain degree of belonging to the 
receiving society is an important indicator, as it demonstrates an individual’s “relatedness to 
a place or community,” and therefore, in considering the transnational politics of 
immigration, provides a key component in processes of integration (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 
2012). While a self-identity indicating a sense of belonging itself may be a determinant of 
integration, there are several factors influencing self-identity in turn that require 
examination. Some of these include social class and education, attitudes of the receiving 
society, and level of contact with the parents’ home country, among others (Portes, Vickstrom 
and Aparicio 2011). As cited in some studies, education can provide a nuanced determinant, 
because rather than determining whether the second generation rejects or accepts the host 
society, it may encourage the individual to adopt both the receiving culture and their parents’ 
culture as their own (Ibid.).  In this study in particular, the attitude of the receiving society, 
measured through questions about the participants’ perceptions of self-discrimination, will 
be emphasized. 
In concentrating on the second generation’s self-identity and sense of belonging to the 
host country (Spain) or community (city of Madrid), this project will also explore any 
relationship with religious identity, including how youth perceive societal discrimination in 
regards to their religious affiliation. The research conducted among second generation 
Muslim immigrants in Madrid would first seek to measure their religious self-identification, 
in order to define the population set; i.e., the participants would identify themselves on a set 
scale of religious attachment. It would then concentrate on the indicator of self-identification 
with Spain or the city of Madrid, and the relationship between this and religious attachment, 




receptiveness of the host society) will also be essential in determining the influence that the 
host society has on self-identity, including national identity, religious identity or perhaps 
other components including ethnic or cultural. A further overview of considerations of the 
theory behind identity, self-identity and collective identity, including religious identity versus 
ethnic identity and so on, will follow in a later chapter.   
Second generation integration and Islam in Europe: its current relevance 
The integration of the second generation, and the Muslim youth within this 
population, is a social and policy concern for Europe, and scientists, for several reasons. To 
begin, inequalities are frequently encountered among this specific population; while some 
immigrant youth experience success, many hail from socioeconomically oppressed 
neighborhoods, and do not experience the same societal prosperity as fellow native children. 
Spain’s relative positive performance in this regard is reflected in a 2013 long-term study by 
Portes and Aparicio of the second generation in Spain; they indicate that while there are some 
instances of teen pregnancy or juvenile detention, the second generation in Spain is 
integrating fairly successfully and the gap is closing between them and their native 
population counterparts, although a difference still remains (2013).  
An additional impetus for examination of the second generation of Muslim Europeans, 
specifically, includes the current sentiment towards immigrants and their children, in the 
wake of the economic crisis of the late 2000s. Compounding this sentiment is negative 
attention directed towards Islam, by both the media and nativist political parties. This 
attention could even be conceived of as a “political market that marginalizes and scapegoats 
Muslims” (Soper 2007, 942). An “anti-Muslim discourse” to be further expounded upon in the 
next chapter, has emerged via a compendium of forces including xenophobic political parties, 
feminist critiques of a perceived Islamic patriarchy, and secular anti-religious sentiment and 
terrorism fears (Casanova 2006).  Cesari points out how a 2011 survey carried out in the 27 




populations (2013). Significant numbers of second generation youth in Europe certainly are 
faced with the “bright” boundary of religion, albeit perhaps not due to any responsibility on 
their part (Alba 2005). Because of the “high secularization” in Europe, where mainstream 
society is secular, religious practices can often be perceived as “illegitimate” (Foner 2008, 
378).  
A third reason why second generation integration is a European-wide policy priority 
includes that the discrimination that the second generation may face, or the perception of 
discrimination, can impact their self-identity. Moreover, it may even encourage an 
“oppositional” identity, and identifying with Islam can create a sense of belonging when these 
populations are marginalized (Foner 2008, 373). The second generation’s negotiation of an 
Islam that adapts their parents’ host country culture into new forms of practice has led some 
authors to refer to a new “European Islam” (Vertovec 1998, 14). In contrast, there are studies 
indicating that some second generation groups react with a more traditional or conservative 
approach to Islam than that of their parents,’ due to a combination of factors including but 
not limited to a sense of exclusion from mainstream society (Güngör, Fleischmann, Phalet, 
and Maliepaard 2013). 
Finally, second generation youth or youth of migrant origin are tasked with balancing 
at least two cultures as they navigate society, and with the escalation of globalization, fluidity 
of transnational communication and challenges to the archetype of the nation-state, they face 
an unprecedented grappling with identity.   
The debates surrounding the sociology of religion and what constitutes religious 
identity, key to fully exploring Muslim youth of migrant origin in Europe, and specifically in 
Spain, will be explored in a later chapter. Yet, in considering the discussion up until this point, 
it is clear that the second generation can embark on different trajectories, as well as contend 
with a different set of factors than the first generation. These considerations are important 
when contemplating the future of migration in host societies, and indeed when anticipating 




The second generation in Spain 
In a 2016 report on youth in Spain, the authors estimated that 18% of youth in Spain 
were either migrants themselves or had parents of migrant origin (Benedicto et al. 2016). In 
another projection based on a 2015 Spanish housing census (Encuesta Continua de Hogares), 
Gebhardt, Zapata and Bria et al. estimated that between 15 and 19% of the youth between 
ages 0 and 24 in Spain were either second or 1.5 generation, with the breakdown between 
the two being fairly even (2017). 
Several studies have already been undertaken in respect to this population, and in 
order to provide background and comparison, it is useful to highlight in further detail three 
recent studies on the second generation in Spain.  The first is a 2006 report surveying second 
generation Moroccans, Dominicans, and Peruvians. The study provided several observations. 
As to education, they noted that the youth generally obtained a higher level of education than 
their parents; however, there was a trend of dropping out of school after the obligatory 
period, more so than their other fellow classmates (Portes and Aparicio 2006). The authors 
explained this early drop-out rate could be accounted for by socioeconomic status and the 
family situation, which could encourage them to enter the workforce as soon as possible, as 
these youth did enter the workforce earlier than their colleagues (Ibid.). At the same time, 
they clarified that apart from socioeconomic considerations, factors including precarious 
legal status and discrimination in the education system could also be responsible for 
terminating studies after obligatory schooling was completed. Furthermore, in addition to the 
fact that the participants generally entered the workforce earlier, it was also noted that they 
tended to find lower quality jobs with less education requirements and poorer salaries, and 
were not for the most part more successful than their parents in the workforce (Ibid.). At the 
same time, second generation had higher levels of employment than their colleagues, perhaps 
due to a perspective that obtaining any employment was of more value than good conditions 




In regard to religious attachments, the study found that while the majority of 
participants shared the same opinions and views as other Spaniards of the same generation, 
the Moroccan children differed in certain aspects along religious lines; this included their 
preferences for couples sharing the same religion, and their linking household tasks to a 
female responsibility (Ibid.). They also noted that while males placed priority on the 
attendance of religious services, women were more likely to follow guidelines for religious 
practices, including dietary restrictions, indicating that religious identity could develop a 
more cultural rather than religious dimension (Ibid.). Another key finding included that 
Moroccan and Dominican children tended to identify more with the former culture of their 
parents, while still maintaining normal relationships with Spanish society (Ibid.). The authors 
argued that integration of the second generation was still in process.  
Another study, termed the “Investigacion Longitundinal de la Segunda Generacion 
(ILSEG)” (a long-term study of the second generation), surveyed over 6,000 children of 
immigrants from 2007-2008 and over 5,000 of the same participants from the previous 
survey over the years 2011-2012, in the cities of Madrid and Barcelona (Portes and Aparicio 
2013). Clearly, this study had a more extensive pool to draw from, and included a range of 
nationalities that expanded beyond those targeted in the 2006 study previously cited. For this 
reason, perhaps, the survey found that fourth fifths of the participants did not drop out of 
school after completing the obligatory period. The ILSEG did find that integration challenges 
included experiences and perceptions of discrimination, unemployment, inequality, teen 
pregnancy, arrests and imprisonment (Ibid.). However, the survey had the benefit of its long-
term data capture to observe that while the percentage of the participants born in Spain self-
identified as Spanish remained the same for both surveys, the participants identified as 
“generation 1.5” or those who immigrated with their parents, increased their self-
identification as Spanish from 30% to 50% over the course of both surveys. This indicated 
advances in the process of integration (Ibid.). The authors noted that unlike in America, 




hyphenated identity, types of national identity in Spain broke down into simply Spanish 
identification or identification with the parents´ host country (Ibid.).  
Finally, “The Integration of the European Second Generation” or TIES Project, a study 
of the children of Turkish, Ex-Yugoslavian and Moroccan immigrants in eight European 
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland) is presented in an IMISCOE Research Series report edited by Crul, Schneider and 
Lelie (2012). They defined the second generation as those children of immigrants born in the 
receiving country, who completed their entire education in the same country. They 
interviewed 250 children of Moroccan immigrants from Madrid and Barcelona each, and 250 
participants from a comparison group in each city, as well. The “snowball method” was 
employed to identify participants, as sampling frames like municipal records were not a 
possibility, because they do not identify the second generation. Instead, they used what data 
was available from the Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE), they identified 
neighborhoods with high percentages of Moroccan immigration, and looked to Moroccan 
immigrant organizations (Ibid.).  The majority of the participants only had Spanish 
citizenship. They found that in Spain, the Moroccan generation had the highest percentage of 
‘strong’ feelings of national belonging (in this case, Spanish) compared to the rest of the 
second-generation groups from other European countries (Ibid). The study also found that 
the Moroccans in Spain had the least percentage of religious belief of all groups in the survey; 
at this time, this religious belief was not equated with religious identity, as those who 
reported no religious belief could also strongly identify as Muslim (Ibid). 
In summary 
Examining the second generation literature in the context of Spain and Europe 
highlights the importance of social, political, historical and cultural contexts in considering 
how children of immigrants negotiate their place and identity in host societies. Given 




second generation integration; these theoretical approaches to the study of the second 
generation and those subsequent can prove helpful to understanding the distinction between 
studying first versus second generation integration. Along with processes of migration and 
assimilation, practices of transnationalism can be inherent in the second generation 
experience. While a more recent undertaking, European approaches to second integration are 
contributing to a growing body of literature that presents theoretical frameworks more 
tailored to the European context. In fact, a great deal of European literature has identified the 
uniqueness of the European situation, including that second generation integration is still 
very much in progress and that social structures in the receiving society are an important 
component in facilitating it, an observation confirmed in Spanish studies. Moreover, in 
considering second generation literature, the new demographics also entail that generation 
1.5 (in Spain), as well as third and fourth generations (in other countries with relevant 
populations) should be analyzed as well, in order to fully account for the experience of youth 
of migrant origin. 
While Spain shares a few characteristics with other European member states and 
their second generations, it differs from them in several ways as well, including in that its 
modern immigration flows are a more recent phenomenon.  Spain demonstrates some 
variance in both the approaches to the inclusion of the second generation, as well as in the 
results of its integration outcomes studies. Research seems to find high levels of Spanish 
identification among the second generation; one study even found that among self-identified 
Muslims within the second generation throughout several countries, the Spanish participants 
identified more with the host country. Again, further exploration of Europe and Spain’s 
relationship with Islam, as well as how self-identity, collective identity and Muslim identity 






Europe, religion and Islam 
Charting the scope of identities among second generation European Muslim youth 
merits a preliminary explanation of the social ambit and historical framework informing their 
current context. To some extent, the history of church-state relations and secularism in 
Europe shapes the current debate on Islam in Europe. Simultaneously, a human rights 
discourse, including the right to religious freedom, impacts the discussion. Finally, the 
variance within the religion of Islam itself affects the dialogue on Islam in Europe as well. 
Islam can be defined in terms of “the other,” foreign in its origins and values to that of secular 
and Christian Europe, as well as can be linked with recent immigration, thus compounding 
the conception of Islam as foreign. The right to religious freedom that this Christian Europe 
espouses, and the diversity within Islam that defies a categorical definition in either 
opposition to or in congruence with a supposed European value set, complicates the 
discussion of Islam in Europe. 
Beyond the rhetoric, these historical factors also influence institutional arrangements 
that affect the integration, incorporation and belonging among a population that should be 
entitled to a comprehensive inclusion in society. The contexts of settlement societies, 
whether at the institutional level in church-state relations, or at the societal level in how the 
general population receives these Muslim minorities, are instrumental components in the 
incorporation of this minority population. At the same time, the diversity of Muslim identities, 
which can be divided among ethnic, religious, kinship, or sociocultural lines, to name a few, 
simultaneously affects the give-and-take of the two-way integration process.  
This study singles out religious identity given the premise that the Muslim children of 
immigrants in Europe face added complexity: they operate both as a group of migrant origin 
that must navigate the uncharted territory of balancing the old culture and the new, as well as 




Europe and its religious heritage 
Western European values and norms are informed by tradition, including religious 
tradition. The relationship between religion and the state harkens back to our previous 
discussion on the relationship between the state and citizenship. Individuals are incorporated 
into a state both through formal membership and individual rights, as well as symbolically in 
the way they identify with the nation (Koenig 2005). This model of incorporation, both 
organizationally through the state and symbolically via the nation, is coupled with the 
traditional nation-state model. Recent literature on citizenship claims that this traditional 
model, in light of how transnationalism has expanded the political realm, is being 
reconstituted and is undergoing change; at the same time, the vestiges of national identity 
remain embedded in legal, political and societal frameworks (Brubaker 1989; Joppke 2005; 
Soysal 1997; Koenig 2005).  
Church-state relations in Europe can be distinguished by certain features, including 
an emphasis on religious liberty (to be further elaborated upon), the demarcation of religion 
as a competence belonging to religious groups rather than the state, and the idea that states 
and religious groups can cooperate selectively (Ferrari 2002). Ferrari classifies a series of 
three models for church-state relations in Europe. Concordatarian states have relationships 
with religious groups either based on “concordats” (with the Catholic Church) or 
“agreements,” for all other religions. In this case, Spain features as an example, with the 1992 
Agreement between the Spanish State and Muslim Community meriting further discussion in 
the next chapter. The second model, that of a state or national Church system, is represented 
by Northern European countries including England and its Anglican Church.12 
Separatist or secular countries, the third paradigm, group the remaining models that 
do not fit into the first two categories. France with its constitutional declaration of “laïcité” 
                                                          
12 It should be noted that while the case of the United Kingdom will be used as a comparative 
example in this study, the church-state relationship throughout it varies. While there is separation of 
state in Wales and Northern Ireland, albeit close cooperation between the two in education, England 




serves as an example, though Northern Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands are included in 
this pool. Nielsen’s typology of church-state configurations relatively corresponds to 
Ferrari’s; he includes the concordat model, but then proceeds to define the national church 
system model as an “establishment” model instead; this model represents when the state 
recognizes or incorporates the church. Finally, Nielsen highlights the “laicist” model as well, 
noting that it is inexistent in practice, but deals with total separation; again, France serves as 
a theoretical example (1999). Nielsen’s classification is useful because he indicates that while 
Spain is currently concordat, it is slowly moving towards an “establishment by recognition” 
model.  
Europe and secularism 
Both secular and Christian identities can be encountered, through rarely consciously 
identified, in the cultural or national identities of many European states (Casanova 2006; 
Nexon 2006). This identity presents a unique and perhaps even adverse environment into 
which Muslim immigrants must enter (Nexon 2006). While some authors emphasize the 
Christian tradition of Europe, others insist that Western Europe is a collective of increasingly 
secular societies. In the most basic sense, secularism can be defined as the separation of 
politics and religion, relegating religion to the private sphere (Cesari 2005; Cesari 2013). 
Moreover, in Europe, there is an increasing push for the “privatization” of religion with 
secularization viewed as essential to a modern society (Casanova 2006). Secularism can be 
traced to the evolution of Christianity and the birth of Protestant Europe and with its 
emphasis on God’s relationship with the individual in a cognitive and private way (Asad 
1993). 
Secularism can also be understood in terms of the decline of religion. In the West, 
influential 19th century leaders in social thought hinted at a progressive decline in religion 




“secularization” (Swatos 1999; Weber 1930). Beck and Ulrich-Beck refer to the process of this 
evolving society that the sociologists identified and predicted as individualization (2002). 
Some insist that in their projection of this secularization, implicated in the onset of 
modernity, these thinkers worked out of the context of a Western, Christian tradition. 
However, Mahmood argues that secularism should be understood outside of the solely 
Western context. Rather than defining it as the separation of politics and religion, Mahmood 
contends that secularism can be conceived of “as a formation that exceeds this rather limited 
understanding and focuses on transformations wrought in the domain of ethics, aesthetics, 
and epistemology” (2010). This understanding of secularism can certainly have a relationship 
with politics, but would not be defined by its relationship with religion, or owe its existence 
to such religion, like Christianity, for example.  
Nonetheless, for the most part, this work will be defining secularism in the sense of 
the removal or gradual decline of religious influence on society, and the relegating of religion 
to the private sphere (Cesari 2005). This definition is often utilized in explaining the 
secularization of Europe. For example, the literature often compares more public religious 
practices, visible in the United States, with private beliefs and less visible practice in Western 
Europe (Casanova 2006). Again, there is a general consensus that the US places value on 
religious observance, while Western Europe can view it as “illegitimate,”—especially any 
Muslim religious activity (Foner 2008).  
The understanding that a European culture increasingly embraces secularism as 
progress is cited as an underlying cause for the discrimination towards, and isolation of, 
Muslims in Europe. Pride in this secularist approach is a certain pride in the supposedly 
enlightened European perspective; as Katzenstein puts it, “What makes the European 
situation so unique and exceptional when compared with the rest of the world is precisely the 
triumph of secularism as a teleological theory of religious development” (2006). Statham 
remarks that the sometimes public nature of Muslim religious practice subjects the religion’s 




identifying Muslims are not practicing or might not even consider themselves religious, it 
appears that Muslim religiosity has been overemphasized, and that there is a tendency to 
group a diverse range of individuals, drawing from different ethnicities, economic and 
cultural backgrounds, into one “Muslim” category that simplistically emphasizes religious 
devotion (Banfi, Gianni and Giugni 2016). 
At the same time, it is perilous to maintain the view that secularism is a gradual 
eventuality that results from modernity and globalization. Religion has yet to fade with the 
advent of modernity. While in the West individualization may be taking place, worldwide 
religion is increasing (Pew Research Forum). Additionally, religion and religious collectives 
can serve as a path to civic engagement (Rodriguez 2017). Moreover, Nexon contends, the 
social and political diversity that can result from the practice of multiple religions in Europe 
needs to be considered in the efforts towards achieving Europeanisation (2006). A Europe 
with a commitment to secular values must take this into account. As Zemni puts it, “the best 
defence of a secular state is the real and honest defence of the idea of freedom of religion. By 
taking the religious claims from minorities seriously, the secular state not only reinforces 
itself but it also gives the minorities a voice in shaping the future of their society” (2002, 171).  
Religious freedom in Europe  
As briefly referenced earlier outline of church-state relations in Europe, there is 
indeed a supranational commitment to religious liberty (Ferrari 2002). A transnational 
discourse of human rights is embraced at the European level, including this right of religious 
freedom. This human rights discourse seeks to recognize religious difference, protect against 
discrimination, ensure equality, and promote multiculturalism; above all, it allows for religion 
to emerge as a legitimatized type of identity. Various supranational legal mechanisms meant 
to arbitrate beyond the bounds of state sovereignty have been put in place, including the 




Koenig claims that these attempts at transnational homogeneity may have 
paradoxically encouraged a reframing of church-state relations “as expressions of legitimate 
national identities” (2007, 916). Religion is indubitably tied to state sovereignty and national 
identity in Western Europe, as evidenced by each state’s individual legal and institutional 
frameworks, and their historical contexts. A new diversity, for example, the increased 
number of immigrants of Muslim faith, has provided heightened exposure of European 
religious traditions and church-state practices (Soper and Fetzer 2005). Moreover, many 
conclude that this societal consciousness or unconsciousness, regarding a nation’s traditional 
religious history and framework, manifests itself in how Muslim populations are treated as 
“the other” (Ferrari 2002). 
And so, a European tradition of Christianity and secularism, the relationship between 
which is argued to be of varying modalities, provides historical context for the debate on 
Islam in Europe. Trending secularization throughout Europe (albeit abetted by its immigrant 
populations), results in the higher visibility of Muslim symbolic practice in the public space. 
Additionally, both a church-state narrative and, in some countries, a Christian religious 
tradition, continue to remain. As a result, in addressing Islam in Europe, Statham points out 
that in almost all cases, states can be identified in two ways: either by the degree to which 
Christianity is privileged, or the extent to which the church-state structure attempts to 
accommodate other confessions (2016). After contextualizing the Christian and secular 
heritage of Europe, and before addressing how these states accommodate the religion of 
Islam and the ways in which its European believers are characterized and categorized, 
reference should be made to the historical trajectory of Islam in the region, as well.    
Islam and Europe: an overview 
Some caution against neglecting the history of Islam in Continental Europe, and its 
Muslim heritage. The most obvious example for this study is the expansion of the Muslim 




an offensive in 711 CE, reached a peak during the Golden Age under the Umayyad Caliphate 
around 912, and dwindled to an end when the Kingdom of Granada fell, and those of Muslim 
and Jewish faith were exiled from the Iberian Peninsula in 1492 (Kennedy 1996; Houghteling 
1995). However, a continuous Islamic presence in Europe has extended from the Baltic coast 
to the Balkans. The successor states that resulted from the advance of the Mongol armies in 
the 14th century led to Tartar groups with Muslim adherents that populated the area from the 
Volga River down to the Caucuses and Crimea. Ottoman expansion into the Balkans and 
central Europe represent a later stage of Muslim presence in Europe. Finally, the current, 21st 
century phenomenon of Muslim communities in Europe as the most recent influx of Muslim 
presence (Nielsen 1999).  
This past century’s wave of Muslim immigration to Europe can be attributed to 
historic ties, colonial relationships, and economic and political drivers, to name a few. In 
Spain, the majority of immigrants draw from former colonies in Latin America, and the most 
Muslim immigrants from Morocco. The latter country of origin, geographically proximate to 
Spain, was previously a Franco-Spanish protectorate and is where Spanish enclaves Ceuta 
and Melilla are located (Archick 2011; Arango 2005). Morocco’s inequalities, especially in the 
North and in rural areas, triggered, among other factors, economic migration to Spain, largely 
beginning in the late 1980s and increasing throughout the 1990s (López 2009; Cebolla 2010; 
Gavira 2008). Spain has Muslim immigrants from Senegal, Algeria, Pakistan, and Nigeria, as 
well (Archick 2011). In France, a majority of Muslim immigrants are of Maghrebi descent, as a 
result of the history of French colonialism and the relationships and networks that 
established (France held Tunisia and Morocco as protectorates until 1956 and Algeria until 
1962) (Beaman 2016). The United Kingdom, in turn, received many Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi immigrants. The 1980s also saw a rise in Muslim asylum-seekers, from Iran, Iraq 
and Turkey and then later from the Balkans, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. This 
timeframe experienced the migration of students and investors as well (At Home in Europe 




refugees to Europe, and polemic has arisen regarding the number of refugees settling in 
member states, most recently in relation to the Syrian refugee crisis.  
There are over a billion adherents of Islam globally, and while the religion originated 
in the Arab world, the majority of Muslims reside in Asia and Africa (“Islamic World,” 2015). 
In the past fifty or so years, the Muslim population in Europe has risen from just a few tens of 
thousands to 16 or 17 million in 2010 (Laurence, 2011). Rather than temporary labor 
migrants, these immigrants and their children and grandchildren have become a part of the 
European demographic reality. The Pew Research Center projects that (self-identified) 
Muslim populations in Europe will increase from 44.1 million (as of 2010) to 58.2 million in 
2030, which will include up to 10.3 % of the population in France, 8.2% of the population in 
the United Kingdom and 3.7% of the population in Spain (Grim 2011). Overall, Muslims are 
less integrated into labor markets and face higher rates of unemployment in Europe; this of 
course could be due to their migrant or minority status (At Home in Europe Project 2010). 
Islam: a brief outline of the faith 
Before elaborating further on the concept of Islam in Europe, a brief outline of the 
religion itself would be useful. Islam is a monotheistic, world religion that claims to be the 
most authentic, original and universal; prophets from earlier monotheistic religions including 
Christianity and Judaism complete its message.  The word “islam” can be translated as 
“submission to God,” and it is understood as the eternal religion of God; it originated in 
Arabia in the 7th century CE and was founded by the Prophet Muhammad (Gordon 2013; 
Rahman 2005). The Qur’an, the word of God, was brought to Muhammad verbatim (“Islam”). 
The five pillars of Islam, formulated early on in the religion’s history, include: publicly 
proclaiming the creed “There is no God but God and Muhammad is his prophet”; praying five 
times a day; paying zakat, i.e., providing for the poor; fasting during Ramadan, the ninth 
month of the Islamic year; and undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca once in a lifetime, if 




conduct, and the hadith are reports on these Sunna developed over time (“Islam”). Islamic 
jurisprudence was also formulated after the religion’s founding, drawing on these Sunna and 
the Qur’an, and there are four major schools of thought (Calder et al.).  
Islam itself takes many different forms, or is composed of several sects. The two 
largest and most visible branches, Sunni and Shi’a, separated as a result of a dispute about 
succession when Muhammad passed. Sunni adherents make up the majority of Muslims in 
the world today (Von Sivers et al. 1995). Ramadan, in his typography of Islam in the Western 
world, outlines six major tendencies in Islam.13“Scholastic traditionalism” strictly follows the 
interpretation of the texts as dictated by one of the Schools of jurisprudence. “Salafi 
literalism” adheres to the text in its literal form, following the “Salaf,” i.e., the Companions of 
the Prophet and devout Muslims from the first three generations of Islam; it only allows for a 
literalist interpretation with reference to the text. “Salafi reformism” also gives priority to the 
original texts, but practices “ijtihad,” or independent reasoning ,in their interpretation. 
Political literalist salafism is salafi literalism with a political mission, including with the 
objective of reinstating the caliphate. “Liberal or rationalist reformism” argues for the 
separation of religious and secular society. Finally, “Sufism” is a form of mysticism (2004).  
A brief aside about distinctions between these interpretations of Islam, religious 
fundamentalism, and violence: The political literalist salafism that Ramadan refers to is an 
interpretation of Islam often referenced when Islam is politicized or presented as a 
dichotomy with the West and with Europe. Salafism is also a transnational movement that 
puts Islam at odds with the West, in that it views Western culture as detracting from the 
purity of Islam (Cesari 2014). This reading of Islam, a form of Islamic fundamentalism 
sometimes termed “Islamism,” is often the reference point when political and social actors 
                                                          
13 Tariq Ramadan qualifies in his outline that Islam fundamentally is one and universal, with 
identifiable premises in its various sects and diversity. A Swiss academic with a career at the 
University of Oxford, Ramadan himself is a controversial figure as a figure of moderate Islam in 
Europe. Some critics claiming that he presents a liberal brand of European Islam as a veritable “Trojan 
horse” with which to enter European society. However, he is a professed proponent of a progressive 




(or otherwise) claim that Islam is incompatible with Europe and Western civilization. 
However, it is an interpretation or movement supported by a minority of European Muslims. 
Fundamentalism, found in many religions, can be defined as an attempt to return to a 
religion’s origins with a strict, sole interpretation of the past rules, and applying this 
interpretation for the purpose of a contemporary religious project (Koopmans 2015). 
Fundamentalism is distinguished from orthodoxy: the latter focuses on content of belief, 
while the former on the way belief is engaged in. Fundamentalism is also confused in the 
vernacular with violent extremism (Koopmans 2015). Violence is not a requisite of 
fundamentalism, though some fundamentalist movements may employ it.  
Of course, when a critique of Islam in Europe is present, the fundamentalist 
interpretations of Islam and any violent extremists who claim the religion as their own are 
cited as the way Islam in Europe is configured. Beyond popular sentiment regarding Islam in 
Europe, the current academic discussion ranges a large spectrum and involves many 
opposing theories.  Consequently, an outline proceeds of the diverse nature of Islamic belief 
and practice, in tandem with Islam’s paradoxically universal nature, in a presentation of the 
current debate on Islam in Europe. 
Theories regarding Islam in Europe  
Koenig argues that repetitive claims-making from religious groups, and specifically 
migrant groups, have led to various modes and avenues of Muslim incorporation and 
different varieties of Islam in Europe (2007). Indeed, governments in Europe grapple with 
the transnational nature of the Islamic community and how to position this group in relation 
to their respective states and societies (Laurence 2011). Especially given the nature of 
Europeanization, Islam presents a diversifying social element within these nations 
(Katzenstein 2006). It seems that the literature on Islam in Europe breaks down into three 




“European Islam” in development, or claiming that Islam is incompatible with European 
society.  
Ramírez argues that academia is obligated to engage in the “varieties of Islam” 
approach, claiming that other approaches risk an essentialist nature, and do not maintain 
intellectual integrity (2014). Indeed, Islam is a comparatively decentralized religion, with 
various different forms or branches and made up of diverse individuals. It is difficult to 
construe a unified Western or European Islam from a scientific point of view. Moreover, 
Ramírez highlights that Islam in Europe is entangled with immigration policies and elements 
that prevent it from being understood solely as a minority religion by European states. As a 
majority of the group has undergone relatively recent integration, whether first generation or 
no, European Muslims often times may not share the same rights as citizens. The state 
frequently attempts to manage the religion in terms of immigration and integration policy, 
and adherents can still maintain influences from their origin country (Ramírez 2005). Joly 
similarly points out that there can be different cultures of Islam in Europe, citing the reaction 
of British Muslims to the Satanic Verses in comparison with the reaction of communities 
throughout the rest of Europe (2005). In the British case, she observes, the possibility of 
identifying as an ethnic minority in combination with religious identification can explain this 
differentiation; in fact, Islam in Europe can be divided along ethnic lines and social classes, 
among other forms of diversification (Ibid.).  
Moreover, many contend that religious practice becomes increasingly individualized, 
especially among the younger generations of Muslims in Europe, to be elaborated further 
upon in this chapter. It would be difficult to typify Islam in the context of Europe as a whole, 
as Cesari explains, because, “These individuals… demonstrate their autonomy from the group 
and act as their own mediators between the content and application of Islamic law, in this 
way, they express their inventiveness and liberty” (Cesari 1998, 31). Cesari also puts forth 




Islam” or “Islam is a religion” argument is perhaps distinguishable from, but not directly 
contradicting, some strands of thought within the “European Islam” approach.  
Among those supporting the theory of a “European Islam,” there are varied and even 
oppositional assertions. Still, all positions are unified under the concept that Islam is 
reformulated or understood in the context of Europe and the European citizens that profess 
said faith. By contrast, Bassam Tibi, who speaks of “Europeanizing Islam,” is almost leaning 
towards the incompatibility category, as he insists, “European secularism and Islam are in 
conflict, because European secularism and traditional Islam are based on different world 
views and both need to adapt in their mutual encounter: Europe by reacquainting itself with 
its specifically Christian roots within the context of secularism, Islam by adapting itself to a 
new European context marked by different values” (2006, 204). In her survey of Muslim 
leaders in Europe, Klausen claims that a general consensus supports core liberal values, the 
separation of church and state, that they represent a minority religion, and that their religion 
must operate within the framework of democracy (2007). She holds that the Muslim 
leadership in Europe has embraced human rights and democratic institutions, and that there 
is a new “epistemology of faith” in Europe (Ibid.). 
Nielsen contends that, especially in regard to the rising generation, there is a leaning 
towards spiritual principles and shedding of traditional symbols and values that could lead to 
a general European Islamic identity:  
“Traditional dress codes, method of arranged marriages, and social gender-roles are, 
in these circumstances, losing their importance as symbols of Islam. The emphasis 
appears to be moving to the underlying values of ethnical and spiritual principles. 
With time, it may be expected that the basic Islamic principles identified through this 
process will, in turn, lead to new cultural forms of expressing Islamic identity” (1999).  
This is highly evocative of Cesari’s points about individualization of religion; however, 
it seems that Nielsen is presenting the possibility of this new religious identity forming a type 




academics; at the same time, Ramirez’s caution that it risks essentialist leanings is helpful to 
keep in mind. 
And finally, as mentioned previously, some argue that Islam and democracy is 
incompatible, invoking a neo-Orientalist language that posits the Muslim world is opposed to 
the Western world and human rights. Both political and media actors from several countries 
also condemn Islam as a threat to Europe, especially, and to a heightened degree, in the wake 
of terrorist attacks on European soil. When critics of Islam in Europe make their case, they 
usually reference the practices of theocratic Muslim societies outside of Europe, or a small 
minority of fundamentalists that exist within Europe itself (Laurence 2011). These critics 
point to the decentralized element of the religion, as well as to fundamentalist rejections of 
liberal values, as evidence that Islam could not even function under a separation of church 
and state model, and that it is in opposition to a thriving European society (Ibid.). In this vein, 
there are those, including Italian sociologist Giovanni Sartori, that claim Islam is thus 
inherently incompatible with European society (Sartori 2001). French political scientist 
Olivier Roy argues that Christian and Muslim groups will increasingly form communities in 
opposition to secular ideals, and thus European society (2004).  
Of course, there are ample and measured arguments to refute this incompatibility 
between Islam and democracy; Banfi, Gianni and Giugni have pointed to how minority 
religious experience among Muslim immigrants in their respective home countries have even 
encouraged these minorities to embrace democratic ideals in their new host countries 
(2016). For example, Alevis and Ahmadis (sects of Islam) that experienced persecution in 
their home countries have demonstrated a commitment to secular values in their host 
countries, and an appreciation for religious neutrality in public institutions. As part of the 
EurIslam data project, Statham and Tillie found that a sizeable portion of Muslims (including 
in the United Kingdom and France) believe that Christian religious-claims should be 
conceded as well; this demonstrates a recognition that religious rights are imperative among 




General European state policies towards Islam 
As we have noted, as Western states approach immigrant incorporation, religious 
identity remains a distinctive and contentious factor for a range of reasons. One principle 
reality includes that religion as a core belief system can influence civic behavior. However, 
several efforts have been made over the past decades in achieving religious equality for 
European Muslims. For better or worse, Muslim relationships with the state have even been 
translated into a policy measure. Sometimes, it can even be viewed as government regulation; 
this is manifested in the subsequent outline of church and state relations in several European 
states, and governments’ engagement with Muslim claims. As Laurence puts it, “We can see 
contemporary centralization and institutionalization of Islam as damage control in defense of 
national unity” (2011, 132). This has the goal of decreasing the level of foreign ties to Islamic 
leadership in Europe, and creating a “moderate” Islamic church-state dialogue (Ibid.). 
Previous contestation over mosque construction and Muslim cemeteries have been 
somewhat mediated via state-church relations. While discrimination in host societies still 
persists, there are new measures in place that attempt to address this at the European and 
state levels.  
Muslim organizations have lobbied for recognition, if not as an official state religion, 
then on the association level. They can represent ethnic groups vying for political, social, and 
economic rights in addition to religious, as well as can lobby for immigration issues, and 
make claims as economic organizations (Soysal 1997). Soysal asserts that these groups by in 
large support their demands with a discourse of citizenship and human rights, rather than 
citing religious principles (1997). However, Zemni points out that while this can be 
understood as a population eager to participate in society, critics call these efforts a threat to 
European civilization (2002). While there has been some advancement, policy initiatives, 
institutional arrangements and immigrant incorporation still require further attention. 
Koenig postulates that this could be achieved by transnational structures and commitments 




examples of national politics and European Muslims in the context of individual member 
states follow. 
The case of France 
France has the largest Muslim population in Europe, with around 5.72 million 
adherents, making up about 8.8% of the total population, as of 2016 (Pew Research Center 
2017). The majority of France’s Muslims are of Maghrebi descent, and hail from the Sunni 
branch of Islam. A discussion of religious practice in France necessarily entails a discussion of 
the values of French republicanism, and the French principle of laïcité as a bulwark of the 
French secular state. Republican ideals shape the French model of citizenship, which avoids 
origin-based distinctions (for example, identifying ethnicities, etc. via public institutions). The 
underlying principle is that a French citizen should be objectively appreciated for their social 
value. Laïcité, in turn, is a historical and political concept that can be defined as “neutrality 
towards religion on the part of the State,” though it can, has and does garner different 
interpretations (Salton 2012, 35).   Given the prevailing republican ideals of citizenship in the 
country, and the principle of laïcité driving the policies of the secular state, establishing Islam 
and Muslim claims in France has proven to be a battleground, with polemical and 
controversial arguments often surfacing in the political arena, as well as in the media and 
society at large.  
Republican ideals can be traced back to the French Revolution and the ensuing 
promulgation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789.  They find their grounding in 
the rejection of clerical and aristocratic hegemony that prevailed before the revolutionaries 
established a new regime. The idea of rejecting an origin-based citizenship in favor of a 
citizenship based on objective social value was enshrined and continues to maintain 
precedence in modern France (Noiriel 1995). In a similar way, laïcité’s historical 
underpinnings are crucial to current understanding. The word itself is used for the first time 




The democratic ideals espoused in the revolution argued for a State that subordinated other 
powers to its own supremacy in pursuit of the common good. Beginning with the Gallican 
tradition, which opposed the Roman See even before the Republic, the French state has 
continuously strived to assert its primacy over religious institutions (Bowen 2007).  
Throughout history and up until the present, laïcité has been defined in different ways 
by various members of academia and government, among others. The country practices a 
militant approach to laïcité in public life, to the extent that it actively constrains the private 
life. Now, scholars argue whether laïcité does not, or should not, contradict religious freedom 
and freedom of conscience (Salton 2012). The concept of laïcité is meant to find its 
foundation in the principles of neutrality, equality and freedom. Critics of French government 
and society argue that while laïcité might espouse such principles, the theory may not 
translate as well into practice (Gunn 2004). France is distinct in the intensity with which it 
carries out or even “enforces” this principle. For example, it certainly would not embrace a 
“multiculturalism” approach to integration, as it is obligated to view the French citizen as part 
of a strictly French culture. The danger of a narrowed version of French citizenship, however 
pure the intention may be (with a view to encourage equality, etc.), lies in that some may not 
fit into that model, and may feel excluded. 
This possibility manifests itself in the challenges that arise in the practical 
implementation of laïcité. Controversy and polemic regarding displays of religiosity in public 
continues to escalate in France, especially as Islam increasing visibility throughout Europe. 
The headscarf debate, wherein public schools banned head coverings in 2004 (as referred to 
earlier in this work) is a clear example of prohibition against displays of religious affiliations 
in public. Similarly, the full niqab was also banned in October 2010 in public spaces (Nielsen 
et al. 2014). And while there is no official legislation implementing the following prohibitions, 
women with headscarves are often targeted, and banned (as reported by the Collectif contre 
l’Islamophobie en France, or CCIF) from “celebrating marriages in the local municipality, 




bank agency, [and] participating in outdoor school activities” (Caeiro 2006, 218). A ban on 
burkinis14 issued by several town governments along the French Riviera represents a more 
recent controversy gaining international media attention. On August 26, 2016, a top French 
administrative court, Conseil d'État, struck the ban down; however, the issue remains heated, 
as political candidates have announced their continued support in favor of the ban (McAuley 
2016).  
It could be argued that in addition to a lack of Muslim religious accommodations, 
there is preferential treatment for Christianity. As of 2000, there were an estimated 1,558 
prayer spaces in France, while there are some 40,000 Catholic buildings (Alba 2008).15 This is 
significant because while the estimated Catholic population is larger than the estimated 
Muslim population, the percentage of self-proclaimed Catholics and Catholics who practice 
has rapidly decreased in recent years (IFOP 2010,). At the same time, Christian institutions 
receive significantly less state support in France than in other countries (Statham 2016). 
Moreover, a poll conducted by international marketing research firm Institut français 
d'opinion publique noted an increasing distrust of Islam amongst French citizens. Published 
in 2013, it reported that 74% polled claiming that the religion was intolerant and 
“incompatible with French values” (Nielsen et al. 2014, 230). As we have seen, that may be a 
logical conclusion to some if religion is rigidly relegated to the private; at the same time, 
Muslim communities may hold that it is a key part of their identity to manifest their religion 
as such (more obviously with the veil, for example). Further exploration of the French 
populace´s perception of Muslims will be conducted in the discussion of second generation 
Muslims in France.  
                                                          
14 The word “Burkini” is a registered trademark for female beachwear launched in 2003 by 
Lebanese Australian fashion designer Aheda Zanetti. However, colloquially it can refer to a piece of 
clothing, or several pieces of clothing, aimed at ensuring modesty in keeping with Islamic belief, but 






Yet, despite the previous observations, admittedly some gradual allowance of Muslim 
culture into French life has taken place. As a result of a 2008 circular, sections of cemeteries 
designated for religious groups have led to over 70 Muslim areas, with one entire public 
Muslim cemetery in Strasbourg (Nielsen et al. 2014). Communities and municipalities work 
with Muslim organizations to allow mosque-building (Ibid.).16 Additionally, chaplains are 
granted to all religious denominations in the army, prisons and hospitals. A Muslim Head 
Chaplain is appointed by the Minister of Defense for the French military, and a head chaplain 
for prisons oversaw roughly 147 Muslim chaplains in 2014. Finally, hospitals are granted the 
option to nominate Muslim chaplains as well (Ibid.). In terms of dietary laws, there are ritual 
slaughterhouses identified by three mosques that allow the faithful to easily access halal meet 
in supermarkets and butchers (Ibid.). France subsidizes religious schools as long as they 
provide the national, secular curriculum (Foner and Alba 2008). However, the majority of 
subsidized religious schools are Catholic (Ibid.). The first publicly funded Muslim School, 
Lycée Averroès, was founded in 2003 (Ibid.).  As of 2014, the Ibn Khaldun secondary school 
in Marseille was also pursuing a state contract. There are around 45 other private schools or 
institutions for youth education (Nielsen et al. 2014).  
In 2003, France established the French Council of the Muslim Religion (Conseil 
français du culte musulman or CFCM) to act as a mediator between the French government 
and Muslim community. This Council was the product of an extended effort to provide a 
representative Muslim body; previously, the Grande Mosquée de Paris, largely tied to those of 
Algerian origin, had served as an interlocutor. While it could be viewed as an overture to 
Muslims, some also argue that it is an attempt by the French state to contain Islam. The CFCM 
is legally an association, defined so in a 1901 law regarding associations that is not specific to 
religious groups in particular, thus allowing the state to continue to remain at a distance from 
religious involvement. Its ethos is summarized in its internal regulation, with goals to, “i) to 
                                                          
16 Albeit, there is still objection to mosque building in several cases, including the opposition of 




defend the dignity and interests of Islam in France; ii) to favour and organize the sharing of 
information and services between places of worship; iii) to encourage dialogue between 
religions; and iv) to provide the state with representatives of Muslim places of worship” 
(Caeiro 2005, 76-77).  
The CFCM has not garnered complete consensus in France’s Muslim communities. To 
begin, there is the claim that the CFCM has been the result of a great deal of orchestration by 
the French state (Caeiro 2005). This stems from the perception that the state is attempting to 
moderate certain bodies through the Council, for example, the Union des Organizations 
Islamiques de France (UOIF). The UOIF has been described by French media and academia as 
radical and fundamentalist, with an ideology similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
as such supposedly in conflict with the ideals of the French Republic (Ibid.). In turn, the UOIF 
has rendered itself as a collective emphasizing Islamic “citizenship,” (as opposed to other 
groups’ emphasis on Islamic “moderation”). It is also noteworthy that, to some extent, the 
organization promotes local religious authorities rather than transnational ones, and engages 
in religious instruction and text interpretation more so than some other Muslim 
organizations that are more politically-oriented (Ibid.). As of 2014, about 200 organizations 
were associated with the UOIF (Nielsen et al. 2014).  
Clearly, the negotiation between Islam and the state is an ongoing and evolving 
process in France (Caeiro 2006). As such, organizations like the CCIF point out that there is 
not necessarily a particular Islamophobic orientation of the state, but rather a distrust of or 
opposition to Islam that comes from individuals and institutions. For example, the Institut 
National d’études Démographiques, INED (the national statistics office) measures the 
integration of immigrants with Maghrebi descent by the degree to which they practice their 
faith (Ibid.). In other words, an individual is considered more integrated the less they practice 
their faith. A construction of “good” versus “bad” Islam has been put forth by some elements 
in the media and political arena (Klausen 2007). However, there are those that point out that 




the ratios of regular mosque participation to regular church participation, French Muslims 
are as “secularized” as other French people” (2016). Indeed, while state power merits 
consideration in Muslim claims-making, other powers, including those driving the media, 
need to be entered into the calculation when evaluating the situation. Needless to say, there is 
a diverse array of Muslim believers in France, from the devout to the secular, drawing from 
many different traditions and ethnicities.  
The case of the United Kingdom 
Joly argues that in comparing France and Great Britain17, Muslims and Islam factor 
into society in strikingly different ways. As of 2011, studies estimated that 2.9 million 
Muslims resided in the United Kingdom, reflecting a growing rate, as in 2001 the census 
counted 1.6 million and the 2005 Labour Force Survey estimated 2 million (Archik 2011). As 
Joly explains, Muslims were initially categorized into ethnicities or races, including “black” 
and “Asian”; they could also make claims based on class (2012). For this reason, reports like 
those issued by the European Monitoring Center for Racism use black and minority ethnic 
communities with migrant roots in order to facilitate their studies on Muslims in the United 
Kingdom (EMCR 2006). As mentioned earlier in this work, this pattern reflects how the 
country’s colonialist history has had a great effect on demographics and the demands Muslim 
collectives bring forth. Again, claims asserted by those of immigrant origin began in the 60s 
and 70s, with riots following in the 80s (Joly 2012). The majority of Muslims in this country 
are made up of those with immigrant backgrounds from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, 
along with those that come from families of Arab, African, Eastern European and East Asian 
origin, to total more than 56 nationalities (Allen 2006; Lewis 2002). However, while in the 
past these groups were first referred to in racial terms, and then ethnic, today they can also 
                                                          
17 While this work is referring to the United Kingdom, we can make a relative comparison with 




be differentiated based on religion (Joly 2005). It is noteworthy that approximately half of 
U.K. Muslims were born in the United Kingdom (Archik 2011).  
In recent years, British Muslims have engaged politically with the British 
“establishment” in a variety of ways: either as political candidates for the preexisting parties, 
members of lobbying groups, or even in the formation of political parties dedicated to Muslim 
claims-making.18 At the same time, there are those that have protested the political status quo 
by boycotting political participation entirely (Hussain 2004). In the past, Muslims have 
generally supported the Labour Party, as first generation Muslims had ties to the unions 
(Ibid.). However, Labour’s stance on the war in Iraq contributed to shifting these votes. In 
2004, Hussain counted the following Muslim political officials: “over 200 Councillors, two 
Members of the House of Commons, four Members of the House of Lords and one Member of 
the European Parliament, that are of Muslim origin”; at the same time, minorities continue to 
be underrepresented in comparison to the percentages of the U.K. population that they total 
(Ibid.). The Muslim Council of Britain, in existence since 1997, works with over 400 U.K. 
organizations, seeking, among other objectives, to foster unity amongst Muslims themselves 
as well as between Muslims and the wider community, and to combat forms of discrimination 
against Islam in society (Muslim Council of Britain). The organization’s predecessors include 
the Union of Muslim Organisations (1970), the U.K. Action Committee on Islamic Affairs 
(UKACIA) and the National Interim Committee for Muslim Unity (NICMU) (Ibid.).  
Beginning in the 1970s, U.K. education policies espoused a multiculturalism approach, 
and religious classes were to include an overview of many world religions, and not just 
exclusively Christianity (Soper and Fetzer 2007). The Standing Advisory Council for Religious 
Education (SACRE) advises local authorities on curriculum, and especially took action to 
resolve conflict after the protest of the Rushdie Affair of 1988 (Nielsen 1999). A hijab 
controversy in 1999 led to local educational leaders permitting head coverings if the colors 
                                                          
18 The Islamic Party of Britain was established in 1989 as a Muslim political party but has since 




were in keeping with school uniforms (Liederman 2000). From the beginning, as Liederman 
points out, while funding for Islamic schools was controversial, it was at least a consideration. 
There were 219 newspaper articles published on the subject from the years 1989-1999. In 
France, where it was a “non-issue,” only 3 articles were published in the same time frame 
(2000). The U.K. government sanctioned public funding for the first two Islamic schools in 
1997. Moreover, as of 2002, Islamic Studies were available at the postgraduate level at 
sixteen universities, with a growing body of academics that profess the Muslim faith (Lewis 
2002). At the same time, religious schooling still primarily lies with the state’s Church of 
England, with government funding supporting 7,000 Church of England and Catholic schools, 
and only seven Islamic schools as of 2007 (Foner and Alba 2008).   
However, in comparison with other European countries like France, the United 
Kingdom has been fairly permissive of Muslim religious claims-making, incorporating these 
claims from as early as the 1980s (Ibid.). Again, this can be attributed to the United 
Kingdom’s historical openness to diversity, united under the umbrella of a common 
nationality. This permissiveness included allowing for: the construction of mosques, to the 
point where Fetzer and Soper argue that mosque construction in the United Kingdom is no 
more difficult than obtaining a permit for any other like building; designating Muslim areas of 
cemeteries; and finally, permitting the ritual slaughter of halal meat (Fetzer and Soper 2005; 
Foner and Alba 2008). Studies reflect a significant sense of belonging amongst British 
Muslims. In a 2010 report by the Open Society Institute, 82 percent of Muslim respondents in 
Leicester and 72 percent of Muslim participants in London saw themselves as nationals (At 
Home in Europe Project 2010). 
In terms of an interlocutor with the state on behalf of the Muslim community, the U.K. 
government has, like France, taken steps to regulate and shape Islam within the country (Joly 
2012). While the state does not elect an official religious representative body, and does not 
require registrations of religions, the Muslim Council of Britain has certainly emerged as a 




involved as a result of the 2005 London bombings. As Joly calls it, “repression” was 
implemented domestically and abroad, alongside “outreach initiatives” to British Muslims 
(2012).  A marked difference between the United Kingdom and France, however, is that these 
“outreach initiatives” specifically target Muslim communities and dialogue in the United 
Kingdom, while the same thing could not be spearheaded by the state in France.  
The “Prevent” program, part of the U.K. Strategy for Countering International 
Terrorism (CONTEST) was launched in 2007 (Archik 2012). As published in 2011 in the U.K. 
Home Office’s 2010-2015 Policy Paper, the Prevent strategy was espoused as one of the four 
components of the CONTEST program (Home Office 2011). The program received 45 million 
GBP between 2008 and 2011 (Joly 2012). The Prevent framework was revised by the Home 
Office in 2011 to reflect a distinction between security and anti-terrorism efforts versus 
integration initiatives (Archik 2012). While this move received initial approval from the 
media and the Institute for Race Relations, some argue that it has proliferated a discourse of 
‘radicalization’ that leaves Muslim citizens vulnerable to discrimination, even going so far as 
to obstruct rather than to create community cohesion (Heath-Kelly 2013; Thomas 2010). 
At the same time, policies since 2011 have been increasingly emphasizing social 
cohesion, rather than multiculturalism (Joly 2012). Moreover, the government’s more active 
role in “shaping” Islam in Britain has led to decreased funding for bodies like the Muslim 
Council of Britain, once viewed as moderate but then faulted for not taking a sufficiently 
strong position on terrorism issues; a key point of contention included the organization’s 
leader’s views on Hamas (Thomas 2010). Instead, funding has been redirected towards other 
groups currently viewed as more moderate, like the Sufi Muslim Council, though some of 
these groups remain MCB affiliates (Thomas 2010). In recent years, including in reaction to 
the aftermath of the Paris 2015 attacks, some have pointed to possible undercurrents of 
resentment regarding the expansion of Muslim claims-making in the country (Statham 2016). 




United Kingdom (through state policy) has demonstrated a marked openness to Muslim 
religious claims in comparison with other European states. 
However, it is essential to keep in mind that while only about half of the United 
Kingdom’s Muslims are immigrants, Muslims can be associated with immigration, and 
immigration in U.K. public opinion has consistently been less favored than in other countries. 
Although immigration and asylum-seeking only started to increase in the 1990s, U.K. citizens 
have been wary of immigration from as early as the 1960s. Studies report that citizens 
associate immigrants with asylum-seekers, and a German Marshall Fund report as of 2013 
indicated that many prefer less immigration and see immigration as a key political issue 
(Blinder and Allen 6-7). The European refugee crisis of 2015-2016 could have been one of the 
drivers behind the “Brexit,” the United Kingdom’s ongoing exit process from the European 
Union. The campaign in favor of leaving the EU relied on anti-immigrant sentiment and 
populist leanings as they lobbied voters before the referendum. 
Repercussions of extremism 
This leads to a subject that will be less explored throughout this work, but 
nonetheless requires attention: the political and social reality of Islamopobia and its 
relationship with extremism and radicalization, and thus the ensuing securitization of 
Europe. It is especially opportune to bring these issues up in light of the recent 2016 Brussels 
and 2015 Paris bombings, which have only encouraged further wariness of Islam in European 
societies. After the terror attacks by Muslim extremists in New York in 2001, as well as those 
in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, policymakers and others claim there has been a 
failure of multiculturalist integration. Xenophobic parties have capitalized on these incidents 
and have begun to flourish in several European states. To add to this uncertainty, lone wolf 
incidents, including the Nice, France truck attack of July 2016, have compounded the recent 




The extremist Islamist attacks in have created a political and societal fervor that has 
contributed to islamaphobia and anti-immigrant sentiment. This has led to what Cesari terms 
a “process of securitization,” where Islam is perceived as an “existential threat” to European 
society, and thereby there is a justification for “extraordinary measures against it” (2009, 1). 
Ramirez goes further to say that Muslims are a scapegoat in a system of societal domination 
that certainly pinpoints them, but does not address them as the sole victims; neoliberal 
policies and the social uncertainty caused by financial and political crises have created a 
societal “moral panic” that legitimizes the repression of collectives like Muslims, and 
facilitates the construction of a Muslim “other” (2004, 12).  
Fundamentalist Islam, that is, the literalist readings of Islam, has been associated with 
violence, extremism and terrorism. Again, when making an academic distinction, one must 
note that religious fundamentalism, or an individual’s adherence to religious principles (often 
times subverting political systems in order to prioritize religion), is not equivalent to 
extremism (Koopmans 2015). For this reason, it can be and is argued that religious 
extremists are not practicing Islam in its true form. Despite this, extremist groups have 
prompted a European environment where Muslims bear the burden of proof to demonstrate 
they are moderate; securitization policies have been put in place in the name of security and 
counterterrorism that simultaneously threaten individual freedoms (Owers 2015). Similarly, 
these actions have encouraged the perception of Muslims as the “other,” apart from society 
both by nature of their immigrant background but especially due to their religious beliefs. 
While the French state has always taken careful steps to avoid creating distinctions, the 
aftermath of the Paris bombings has caused an increase in counterterrorism measures, and 
no doubt has facilitated a toxic social environment as all Muslims are shadowed by the 
attacks of religious extremists.  
The onus of proving “moderation,” and that one is not an extremist, gravely affects 
youth of migrant origin born and raised in Europe. In fact, all of the church and state 




Muslim collectives and the majority society or institutional frameworks impact this cohort. Of 
course, there are myriad elements that shape this group’s identity, which can vary from 
individual to individual. In seeking to isolate self-belonging and religious identity within this 
self-identity, the broader picture must be addressed. Now, the discussion will begin to focus 
more specifically on Muslim youth of migrant origin in Europe. The next chapter explores 
work to date on second generation or Muslim youth in Europe and self-identity, with both 






Muslim European youth and self-identity 
As previously noted, approaches to Islam in Europe are saturated with the lingering 
implication of Islam as juxtaposed with Christianity and secularism, as well as framed in 
terms of immigrant background. Integration comes to the forefront as a policy priority, as 
European member states seek to accommodate the Muslim diversity in a way that will 
encourage societal stability, with special attention to the second generation. A sense of 
belonging is thought to signify acculturation on the part of the second generation, as the 
discussion of integration and citizenship has become oriented towards emphasizing this 
belonging. In exploring the relationship between how European youth of migrant origin 
identify as Muslims and how or if this is related to their sense of belonging to their host 
society, it is imperative to simultaneously address the way in which the host society shapes 
both Muslim self-identification and a sense of belonging to Spain.  
Identity: an overview 
The indicator of self-identity is used in this effort to measure a sense of belonging 
among a research sample of second generation Muslims in Madrid, alongside comparative 1.5 
and first generation cohorts. Sense of belonging will be evaluated via a semi-structured 
qualitative interview with questions about discrimination (indicating that society is treating 
the youth as “other”) and whether the participant self-identifies with Spanish society, be it as 
a Spaniard, from Madrid or from their neighborhood. 
At this point, a digression to review identity is useful, especially as it is the integration 
indicator examined in this study. Identity is a cross-disciplinary concept found in sciences 
including anthropology, psychoanalysis, political science, logic, philosophy, psychology, 
history, and sociology, to name a few (Stryker and Burke 2000). In philosophy, or in the most 
basic metaphysical sense, identity means “sameness,” whether numerically or quantitatively. 




identifies with certain properties or characteristics which they believe makes them their 
“same” self over time) (Klein 2014). In the Platonic vein, having being—an identity—implies 
multiple forms; by having an identity, there are consequently many identities different from 
one’s own (Republic VII, 524e-525a). This sameness over time, that is unique in its sameness 
and differentiated as such, can lead to a more generic, interdisciplinary definition of identity 
as the distinct way in which a person or group conceives of itself.  
Identity is often characterized by an internal and external component. In social 
science in particular, identity pertains to how the individual or group relates to or 
differentiates his or itself from the group or groups (note that the underlying principle of 
sameness remains in play). Given this relational nature, there is substantial consensus in 
most fields on the subjectivity of identity. Bourdieu points out that while social scientists 
proclaim an objective aspect to sociology, still, “social science must take as its object both this 
reality and the perception of this reality, the perspectives, the points of view which, by virtue 
of their position in objective social space, agents have on this reality” (1989, 18). In other 
words, the way the self or the collective perceives its identity is the identity itself.  For this 
reason, the interview in this study asks the participants to distinguish between how they self-
identify, and how they perceive they are identified by others. 
A contested and continuously developed notion, identity is subject to diverse 
interpretations even strictly within the sociological field. There is especially renewed debate 
in light of recent work grappling with the new reality of modernity and its implications for 
the individual (Giddens 1991, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). Brubaker and Cooper warn 
that the ambiguity of the term identity can lead to its “use and abuse” in the social sciences to 
the point that it is detrimental to social analysis itself” (2000, 2).  For this reason, this work 
defines and focuses on two uses of “identity”: as collective in a group sense, or as self-identity 




the self, which implies a reflexive process, to be elaborated upon further (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000, 7).19 
Self-identity 
To begin with the latter, even this qualified use of self-identity within this discussion 
of identity remains constantly debated. One can look to Bourdieu as describing this type of 
identity in the form of his “habitus”, i.e., the social and cultural imprint on an individual that 
derives from their existence and growth in the “field” of society. Rather than conscious 
decision-making, individuals are encoded and reinforced by social practice (1977, 72, 166). 
Bourdieu does distinguish that reflexivity can prove an exception to this rule, taking place 
when there is a “disruption” to the habitus (Bottero 2010, 8, 11). However, there are 
arguments that this exceptionalism does not fully account for a more pervasive reflexivity in 
self-identity. Giddens, for example, ascribes more agency to the individual, observing, “The 
self is seen as a reflexive project, for which the individual is responsible” (75). For the 
purposes of this work, the reflexive element in self-identity will be emphasized and explored. 
This reflexivity implies a fluidity and situational aspect as the individual reevaluates 
based on the context. Depending on the situation, the extent to which one identifies becomes 
more or less important (Joly 2005). Because the process of identity construction can be 
affected by external variables, when the context and circumstances change, identity remains 
fluid. For example, a child of immigrant parents from Morocco might identify more strongly 
with Islam while still living at home, and being exposed to both cultural and religious 
practice. However, once they move out to live with peers or begin university, they might learn 
other cultural or social viewpoints that cause them to change the intensity or manner of their 
belief.  
                                                          
19 Brubaker and Cooper address several frequent uses of identity. For example, it can be used 
to refer to social or political action based on self-understanding versus universal interests, or in turn, it 
can be used to refer to a continuously fluctuating self.  They advocate for the use of “identification” and 




Again, self-identity, and in particular whether the individual self-identifies with 
society and how society identifies the self in return, is an important indicator in this study of 
the second generation because it can serve as an indicator of this population’s sense of 
belonging to their society and thus their relative integration in society. Bottero reminds that 
self-identity remains inherently relational to society as “agents must account for their actions 
towards others” (20). For this reason, Joly points to the internal and external components of 
self-identity, elements previously mentioned in our general overview of identity. In 
particular, she maintains that Muslim European youth have a self-identification, but are then 
simultaneously identified by other actors; in fact, identification can be imposed by these 
external influences. In the TIES study referenced in early chapters, the authors argue that the 
marginalization and discrimination the second generation (primarily Muslim) in Europe 
faces—“from simple remarks to overtly xenophobic treatment”—affects these youths´ 
feelings of belonging (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012, 291). Clearly, non-Muslim actors can be 
responsible for complicating second generation identity; this is a prime example of how 
identity has an internal and external nature.  
State versus society and identity 
Moreover, as in addressing themes of integration and immigration, the role of the 
state as a dominant power in categorization and identification remains, albeit challenged by 
transnationalism and globalism as discussed previously. As Brubaker and Cooper point out, 
“there is another key type of external identification that has no counterpart in the domain of 
self-identification: the formalized, codified, objectified systems of categorization developed 
by powerful, authoritative institutions...the modern state has been one of the most important 
agents of identification and categorization in this latter sense” (2000, 15). Of course, there is 
ample debate as to the extent of the state´s role in this regard. Gramsci emphasizes hegemony 
in civil society, albeit consensual, where the elite exercises control in an analytically distinct 




civil society co-opts the individual into its discourse ideologically through subtle and 
unobtrusive methods, as opposed to the coercive element of the state. As a result, the 
increasing subtle force of civil society can slowly and increasingly detract from the coercive 
power of the state. 
Foucault insists that it is not “the state” as such (or its fellow civil society) that 
demands analysis, but that power and its effects on the individual create what is recognized 
as state and societal entities (1980). Some theorists examine the state as part of a series of 
systems of power, without denying the fundamental reality of the state. With this approach, 
power articulates itself in a series of networks, and the state versus society conundrum is 
also addressed as they are placed in a series of interrelated systems that are indeed intricate, 
enmeshed and difficult to distinguish (Gupta 1995; Castells 2000; Migdal 2001). Moreover, 
this goes back to the discussion of how citizenship is now defined on a supranational sphere, 
in terms of individual rights and often in the ambit of transnational institutions or networks 
of power.  
This work recognizes the practical reality of the state, especially in light of migration 
studies. At the same time, though they are not as readily identifiable or easily recognized, 
acknowledging the networks of power that the individual contends with on a daily basis, 
including local networks or civil society, remains key in discovering the full breadth of how a 
community affects and shapes the individual (and vice versa). For this reason, this work 
alternates between referring to the Spanish state and Spanish society when approaching 
responsibility on the part of state or society in the two-directional relationship between 
individual immigrants and their receiving society.  
And so, in following the discussion on self-identity above, self-identity will be defined 
as reflexive and thus a fluid and relational concept, with an internal and external nature. One 
aspect of its external component includes the hegemonies that the individual encounters as 
they navigate communal space; in the endeavor to illustrate individual identities and the 




may alternate between resembling an understanding of the state or an interpretation of 
society, as it attempts to address all power networks and influences that affect how an 
individual operates within a community. As such, in the exploration of European Muslim 
youth self-identification, feelings of discrimination from these external factors will form a 
part of the analysis.  
Collective identity 
Group identity is also sameness, but contextualized, including sameness in the form of 
religious identity, ethnic identity, gender identity, and so on. Collective identity has already 
been touched upon to some degree. It involves both the collective identity one ascribes to, 
and the degree of importance one attaches to this ascription. And so, collective identity is 
founded in categorization or classification, in that the individual and the group elect a certain 
categorization. The way in which a collective identity is produced is also important to the 
identity itself.20   Given this, the following summarization is possible: collective identity 
involves a sameness, which is perceived, and ascribed to via classification. Finally, the 
importance or meaning that the group or individual assigns to that collective identity is key.  
Unlike individual identity, collective identity is less susceptible to variation by nature 
of the unwieldy composite it is, and its persistence despite individual behavior (Smith 1992). 
Religious identity is one such collective identity that endures; an example being, to state the 
obvious, Muslim identity.  Ethnic identity, ascribing to a collective culture, language, or 
nationality, cultural identity, or merely ascribing to a group in general, is a collective identity 
that is important to immigration studies, in examining how the migrant relates to society 
(whether origin or receiving). Gordon’s theories on assimilation a few decades ago 
spotlighted the subject of identity in the migration field, and targeted ethnic identity in an 
inclusive capacity, as he explains: “identificational assimilation takes place in the form of all 
                                                          
20 Group and collective identity are used here in an interchangeable and general manner; they 
are meant to express a collective of individuals classifying themselves into one category, but these 




groups merging their previous sense of peoplehood into a new and larger ethnic identity 
which, in some fashion, honors its multiple origins at the same time that it constitutes an 
entity” (1964, 125). And so, in considering the population under study, it is essential to 
recognize that Muslim identity can imply a singular categorization or a compounding of 
religious identity, ethnic identity, cultural identity, and social identity.  
Religious identity 
In the discussion of how Muslim European youth face unique challenges, and how 
religious identity fits into this narrative, religion and its sociological meaning orient the 
conversation. Religion as a phenomenon is discussed in a wide range of the sciences, though 
sociology serves as most useful in this case, as it treats of the relationship between religion 
and society. Collins summarizes four classical sociological approaches to religion, as 
synthesized by the founders of the science, explaining that they generally address religion in 
three different ways: in the “reductionist or illusionist tradition” where skeptics like Marx 
identified it as the “opium of the masses”; as “social order in morality,” wherein those 
including Durkheim explain society is conscious of its  group membership via symbolism in 
religion; or as an “organization and carrier group,” which Weber illustrates in his analysis of 
world religions, maintaining that the status groups of each religion lead society (Collins 2007, 
20; 27;31). Needless to say, there has been a wealth of literature since on the sociology of 
religion, ushered in by these founding thinkers. 
In exploring religious identity, Durkheim’s analysis is particularly helpful, especially 
in light of Islam in particular, and its both individually diversified and universal natures. 
Durkheim contends that the societal need to both simultaneously affirm its universal 
humanity and express its individuality is manifested via religion and its symbolism: “Thus 
there is something eternal in religion that is destined to outlive the succession of particular 
symbols in which religious thought has clothed itself. There can be no society that does not 




and ideas that provide its coherence and its distinct individuality” (Durkheim 1915, 429). 
And so, religion provides society with a set of tools, including symbolism, to affirm existence.  
Indeed, as a group identity, religion facilitates achieving goals and social processes; 
for example, as noted in the description of Muslim political organizations in France and the 
United Kingdom. Simultaneously, many thinkers have reformulated or expanded upon the 
concept that, at the individual level, religious identity can serve as a societal advantage. 
Several researchers have discovered increased health and wellbeing and “positive 
psychological health” among those with religious commitments (Ysseldyk, Matheson and 
Anisman 2010, 62-63). The individual can gain from both a sense of group belonging, as well 
as the embracing of a life purpose and sense of meaning (Ibid.).  
Just as in other group identities, religious identity is defined by both the out-group, 
and in-group. The individual in a religious group defines itself in relation to the religious 
group, as well as in relation to the out-group. The same process is valid in the case of ethnic 
identity, and so forth (Van Heelsum and Koomen 2016). The relationship between in-group 
and out-group can be negatively-oriented in some cases, a situation the literature often 
explores. 
Religious identity is key in the consideration of identity among second generation 
Muslims in Europe because, as previously discussed, religious identity can be intertwined 
with the nation-state narrative in European states. Consequently, there might be a special 
relationship between religious identity, citizenship and a sense of belonging. It is this 
relationship this project seeks to explore. There are arguments both for and against religious 
identity as a positive catalyst in a globalized world. At the same time, as Soysal points out, 
identity has not always been viewed as a public attribute: “Identity is commonly assumed to 
be something prior to the constitution of citizenry that belongs to the private domain. 
Identity formation and politics are not considered as part of the processes of the public 
sphere” (1997, 513). However, as a result of the post-war discourse on human rights, identity 




collectives are entitled to in the public sphere. Personhood, rather than citizenship, has 
become a strategy by which rights are claimed. Thus, claims-making groups have asserted 
their rights to religious identity, ethnic identity, feminist identity, and so on (1997).21  
On the one hand, religious identity can serve as a mechanism for forming an insular 
social group in opposition to other social groups. Moreover, society could stigmatize such a 
group. A negative public discourse or reception of immigrants or Islam may cause the 
ostracized group to identify separately from this critical public. On the other hand, religious 
group identity can also increase social activity to the extent that it is a positive force for social 
trust and can create “interreligious favorability,” i.e., tolerance among religious groups for 
any outside group (Ciftci, Asif and Sydiq 2016, 275). Furthermore, group identity in general 
can provide an advantage to the individual inasmuch as explained earlier: providing a 
cognitive or psychological stability. Moreover, the shared culture or community enterprise 
can encourage increased economic activity or support. For example, Eseverri points out that a 
Muslim neighborhood in Madrid can create new business by opening halal shops or clothing 
stores to meet the needs of the Muslim community and thus create growth (2015). In a 
similar manner, Portes and Rumbaut point to the "economic enclaves" of Cubans and 
Vietnamese that arrived to the United States several decades ago (2001, 83).   
As previously mentioned, sometimes European society has attributed a negative 
connotation to Muslim identity. Given the understanding that religious identity functions, 
both at the group and individual level, as a source of security, belonging, stability and 
purpose, it stands to reason that discrimination against one’s religious identity can be a very 
damaging encounter. The role that experiences of discrimination (perceived or otherwise) 
play in shaping religious identity, or simultaneously in this case ethnic identity, should be 
carefully considered. 
                                                          
21 Albeit such identities would most likely be considered group rather than person identity. 
The point, however, is that there is a move towards individual human rights (acknowledgement of 
personhood regardless of statelessness, etc.) that can be claimed, regardless of citizenship or legal 




Given the complexities of religious identity, a hybridized approach could offer the best 
lens with which to understand religious identity. In short, religious identity can serve as one 
facet of self-identification and the extent to which socialization is affected.  Bearing in mind 
the reflexive self and individual agency, while individuals may choose religious identity as 
part of their self-identity, this makes up only one part of the actor. European Muslims elect 
their self-identity, and the extent to which they choose to identify as Muslim or with the 
Spanish nation or society.  Religious identity can provide a sense of belonging in a space 
lacking such; however, it can also enrich and further social success in that it is a group 
support system. The extent to which the Spanish state and society tries to engender collective 
Spanish identity, or takes steps to be more inclusive of Islam, may aid in the process of 
integration. But it is also up to the individual to choose the degree of importance they on that 
identity, and their prioritization can be influenced by other factors. This will prove a useful 
dichotomy to bear in mind when exploring how young Muslims in Madrid self-identify and 
how the society they contend with may affect this self-identification. 
Fluidity of identity 
Finally, and most importantly, and as briefly alluded to earlier, while some identities 
can be described as more cemented than others (for example, collective versus individual), 
identity itself remains variable. Muslim identity in particular is a salient example of this. 
When an individual identifies as Muslim, this may not signify the same notion or state of 
being from one individual to the next. Indeed, the variance can be as significant as a religious 
verses ethnic identity. This is a very obvious clarification but one that should be highlighted 
in this work’s attempt to gain an understanding of the problem at hand: while the subjects of 
the investigation will be self-identified Muslims, this is certainly not a uniform concept (Joly 
2005). And of course, being “Muslim” can be both a self-identification and the way an 




The term “Muslim” has grown to encompass several categories in recent European 
history. As Brubaker notes, “Throughout northern and western Europe, populations that had 
previously been identified and labelled using national-origin, region-of-origin, socio-
economic, demographic, legal or racial categories--for example, as Algerians, North Africans, 
guest workers, immigrants, foreigners or (especially in the UK) blacks--have been 
increasingly identified and labelled in religious terms as Muslims” (2012, 2). More 
importantly, how Muslim individuals define themselves can encompass an even broader 
range of meaning. For this reason, Brubaker suggests using Muslim identity as a category of 
practice (how “Muslim” is identified by the self or identified as the other) rather than as a 
category of analysis (for example, degree of religiosity) (2012). This critique highlights the 
reality that self-identification or identity labels does not necessarily correspond to 
sociocultural practice or greater religiosity (Slootman 2016). The dangers of assuming a strict 
link between self-identification and practice will be discussed further below.  
Taxonomy of Muslim youth in the literature 
Given this varied element inherent to identity, many have provided their own 
accounts of European Muslim youth identities, producing a smorgasbord of characterizations. 
Some researchers present conflicting accounts, some employ a different discourse but 
provide the same general categorization, and some criticize an attempt to identify Muslim 
youth identity in Europe at all as essentialist.  
Nielsen outlines a series of Muslim youth identifications in Great Britain, asserting 
that they can be the following: acts of retaliation by gangs operating outside of or on the 
fringe of the law; silently residing in the traditional community and family structures and 
norms; limiting public activity to economic or educational but remaining in the community 
for social interactions; engaging in political and social activity in pursuit of a societal voice for 




behaviors and adapt Islamic culture in order to engage actively and constructively in society; 
and finally aggressive behavior attempting to change society into an Islamic model (1999).  
Farhad Khosrokhavar offers a similar range of Muslim youth profiles in France, 
typifying their religious behavior as either a personal Islam (in avoidance of discrimination 
and oppression), a low-profile practice of Islam limited to the Islamic community, radical 
Islam in which Western society is utterly rejected, and an Islam wherein young Muslim 
women embrace modern society both in the wider community and in the home (Joly 2005). 
To these classifications of Muslim youth identity, it is important to add that many youth have 
identified as Muslim without really espousing any belief or engaging in religious practice, and 
instead are “culturally” Muslim (Vertovec 2010; Vertovec and Rogers 1998). While these are 
just a few examples from the literature, it demonstrates the range of profiles with which 
some young Muslims in Europe align.  
Clearly there is an expansive amount of material and population to draw from when 
offering observations regarding European Muslim youth. However, for the purposes of this 
work, a certain number of reoccurring observations in the literature should be addressed, 
and some of them will even come into play later as they resurface in the content of the Madrid 
research. These findings include an increase in the visibility of individualism among youth, 
the existence of reactive identity among youth, this population’s expression of a sense of 
belonging in host societies, and the claim that Muslim youth are constructing a “European 
Islam.” 
i. Religious individualism 
Firstly, individualization and privatization of religion among European Muslim youth 
is reflected in the above youth profiles and is also noted in several youth studies throughout 
Europe. Multiple studies indicate that European Muslim youth feel compelled to restrict their 
faith to the individual, private level. In her 2008 study of Muslim youth associations in Spain, 




religion, and younger Muslims identified with religion in an individualistic way. In another 
study on Moroccans in Spain, Castien noted that some (Muslim participants) felt it was the 
spirit of the law, rather than the letter of the law, that drove their individual relationship with 
God (2009). 
Moreover, this privatization of faith also implies a decrease in manifestations of 
traditional or outward religious practices. Nielsen highlights how Muslim European youth 
often engage in self-guided learning of Islam, studying the Qur’an and Sunna, along with 
modern texts; they conduct this education alongside their peers, abandoning more traditional 
education in mosque schools as early as in their pre-teen years (1999). In a 2012 study, 
Kashya and Lewis found that British Muslim youth are frequenting the mosque less and 
praying less than their elders, in a parallel way to a decrease in religious practice among 
Christian peers. 
Much of the literature has noted how the second generation has certainly been 
steering towards more individual religious practice, rather than traditional public forms such 
as attending mosque. Indeed, the “new generations,” oftentimes second and third 
generations, emphasize belief in religion rather than the practice of religion. They may have a 
negative view about certain religious dietary or sexual restrictions, but still identify as 
Muslims (Vertovec and Rogers 1998).  There are attempts to pinpoint why this trend in 
individualization is so prevalent.  
Some argue that this youth’s faith life reflects a European culture of individualism and 
secularism. As such, Vertovec and Rogers attribute secularization to one of the factors 
affecting Islamic identification among contemporary Muslim Youth, explaining that there is a 
tendency towards “compartmentalization,” where religious values become a separate 
component of one’s personal life, but not central to it as such (1998). Beaman found in her 
study of the second and third generation in France that “middle class French Muslims are 
increasingly choosing more privatized and individualized expressions of their religious 




Beaman argues that because association with their faith can be problematic for these youth, 
they either consciously or unconsciously ensure that they associate with Islam in a manner 
that is compatible with secular European ideals.  Thus, faith practices translate into a 
“cultural” and individual way rather than in an open form (2016). The second generation’s 
negotiation of an Islam that adapts their parents’ host country culture into new forms of 
practice has led some authors to refer to a new “European Islam” (Vertovec and Rogers 1998, 
14). 
In turn, Soysal insists that this individualization is more of a manifestation of agency 
in a globalized community, rather than a “conformance” to European values. The second 
generation’s cultural practice draws from global practices in addition to the practices of their 
parents’ host country. She cites youth subcultures like rap groups in Germany, that assert a 
language of “resistance” that does not fit into one collective (1997, 521). Similarly, Vertovec 
and Rogers warn that approaches to the study of this group should steer clear of essentialist 
notions of identity, especially given today’s globalized reality (1998). Rather than claiming 
that second generation youth draw from or imitate their parents’ home countries or attempt 
to bind themselves to their host culture, theorists in contemporary sociology have asserted a 
discourse that attempts to reflect how these youth select, combine or preserve various 
aspects of more than one culture or ethnicity (Ibid.). While various terms have been coined 
(“translation, creolization, crossover, cut ‘n’ mix, hyphenated, bricolage, hybridity, 
syncretism, third space, multiculture, transcultration and diasporic consciousness”), Calgar 
and Jenks’ notion of “cultural reproduction” is especially pertinent in that it implies a concept 
of creativity and innovation on the part of these youth, rather than a passive subsuming of 
static cultures (Vertovec and Rogers 1998 6,8).  
Cesari insists that this individualization and personalization of faith does not 
necessarily present a lessened version of religiosity, just a different form and manner of belief 
(2005, 5). In fact, as we have seen in several studies, Muslim youth are not necessarily 




and advocate for their rights as a religious or ethnic group. Further, some studies contend 
that it is important to qualify these findings of individualization. In a study of large datasets of 
Muslim youth of different ethnicities from four European countries, Güngör et al. argue that 
instead of religious decline, there is rather a reaffirmation of religion among simultaneously 
acculturating youth (2016). However, the authors indicated that religiosity was more 
privatized among youth in societies that “offered some degree of institutional 
accommodation and where less unequal intergroup relations allowed for some social mixing 
and upward mobility across intergroup boundaries” (Ibid.) The study also found that 
religious affiliation was detached from acculturation or sense of belonging to the host society, 
except in their findings for the German case (Ibid.) 
In considering the discussion up until this point, it is clear that the second generation 
can embark on different trajectories, as well as contend with a different set of factors than the 
first generation. These considerations are important when contemplating the future of 
migration in host societies, and indeed when anticipating the future of the society as a whole. 
ii. Reactive identity 
A contrasting observation includes the claims that there is an increased religiosity 
rather than a push towards secularization, referred to as reactive identity, a theme emerging 
in Muslim youth studies. It harkens back to identity as both internal and external. While not 
significant in this work’s Madrid case study, it is a polarizing topic that bears mentioning. 
Again, identities can be formed as a result the migration context (Van Heelsum and Koomen 
2016). The experience of religious discrimination can further solidify religious identities 
among the second generation in Europe, for better or for worse (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 
2012). Some authors go further to posit that, as a result, Islam can also serve as an 
“oppositional identity” for the second generation, when they face rejection, discrimination or 




positive correlation between experiences of discrimination and greater religious affiliation 
(Torrekens and Jacobs 2016). 
Experiences of discrimination can unfold in a variety of ways, as pointed out in a 
study of Muslim and non-Muslim youth by the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights. Conducted over the course of 2008 to 2009, a survey of 3,000 participants in France, 
Spain and the United Kingdom resulted in the finding that among different Member States, 
Muslim youth experienced discrimination differently (2010). This implies that there are 
many factors influencing the discrimination faced by youth from immigrant backgrounds, 
varying depending on the host society. Islamophobia probably represents one of the greater 
obstacles that second generation Muslims face in their European host countries (Torrekens 
and Jacobs 2016). As mentioned earlier, political discourse arguing that Muslim values are 
contradictory to democracy is usually championed by one or several political actors in each 
country, and societal Islamaphobia, thanks to the extremist attacks in recent years, has risen. 
To a greater extreme, some cite a hostile environment for the second generation as a 
breeding ground for fundamentalism (Koopmans 2015). Current political rhetoric in the 
wake of the 2015 and 2016 extremist attacks argue that some of the second generation has 
engaged in this religious reactivity in a dangerous way. Ysseldyk, Matheson and Anisman do 
point out that negative reactivity like fundamentalism is not exclusive to a religious identity 
(2010.). It can also be the result of ethnic or nationalist leanings, and can be exercised by 
long-standing members of the host society just as much as it may attract a minority of second 
generation immigrants (Ibid.). Torrekens and Jacobs argue, in fact, that religious reactivity is 
an extension of “reactive ethnicity” (2016, 326).  
Moreover, it should be qualified that religious or ethnic reactivity can be confused 
with simply asserting one’s identity or beliefs. Dargent points out in his study of French 
Muslims, assertion of religious identity, rather than a signal of marginalization, may instead 
be an indicator of a more advanced integration: populations with immigrant origin may feel 




Similarly, as mentioned earlier, experiences of discrimination can lead to positive 
developments. For example, in the form of political participation and as an impetus to pursue 
active claims-making.  
iii. European Islam  
As previously highlighted, in addition to the theory of “European Islam” applied to all 
Muslims in Europe, second generation Muslims are also said to ascribe to a European Islam, 
and in some cases are supposedly integral to its existence. Vertovec and Rogers arrive at this 
conclusion by observing the range of factors within Europe, distinct to the second generation, 
that may lead second generation Muslims to arrive at their own version of Islam and thus a 
“European Islam”: conditioning to organized action in an ethnic/religious context; 
“rationalization” of Islam in that the Western system of schooling may encourage more 
critical debate and argumentation within the religion; Islam being disseminated in European 
languages; and how youth are immersed in American and European youth culture that 
includes various media and consumerism, to name a few (1998, 10-14). For the purposes of 
this work, the empirical observations do not so much encounter a strong argument for such a 
generalized European Islam, though in the literature analysis, it is worthwhile to reference. 
iv. Sense of belonging  
A sense of belonging to their respective host societies among second generation 
European Muslim youth is another recurrent debate, and especially pertinent to this work. 
Again, the indicator of a sense of belonging should supposedly signal greater levels of 
integration. The 2010 Open Society Institute report on Muslims in 11 European cities claims 
that according to their study, Muslims have a sense of belonging to their neighborhood and 
city that is stronger than their belonging to the nation, whereas non-Muslims maintain more 
of a sense of belonging to the nation. They extrapolate from this finding that instead of the 




absent ties to the community or society, Muslims indeed do feel a sense of belonging despite 
the fact that they face substantial discrimination (At Home in Europe Project 2010).  
Similarly, in their study of first and second generation Moroccans in France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Switzerland, using data from the EurIslam project, Van 
Heelsum and Koomen studied sense of belonging in the form of national identification 
(2016). As Moroccan-origin immigrants and their children frequently identify with Islam, this 
study provides a vantage point in surveying sense of belonging among European Muslim 
youth. They found that generally throughout these countries, the second generation had a 
lower ethnic-group identification and a higher religious and national identification, in 
comparison to the first generation (Ibid.).  
In Slootman´s 2016 study of second generation Turkish and Moroccans in the 
Netherlands using the TIES survey data, the author made several observations about nominal 
identities as either “substantive” and “empty” signifiers when it came to self-identification in 
relation to “sociocultural practices” or “homogeneous culture.” The findings echoed 
precautions about essentialism as one observation included that neither the Turkish nor 
Moroccan second generation shared a “homogeneous culture.” She found that in relative 
terms, identification as Turkish could be a substantive signifier of sociocultural practice, and 
identification as Muslim by both the Turkish and Moroccan second generations also was a 
somewhat substantive signifier of Islamic practice. However, the Moroccan second 
generation did not demonstrate that identifying as Moroccan was a substantive signifier of 
Moroccan sociocultural practice.  One theory explaining a disconnect between nominal 
identity and practice includes that a label may serve as a substitute for practice, and indicate 
an advanced acculturation to the host society (Ibid.). 
This project seeks to identify a sense of belonging among second generation Muslim 
youth in Madrid, by inquiring as to how the identify (including whether they identify with 
Madrid or Spain) and by assessing any discrimination they perceive from Spanish society. It 




identity or degree of religiosity, assessing this Muslim identity in terms of both self-
identification and religious practice.  
Caveat: Risk of essentialism 
There has been an emergence of an “anti-essentialist critique,” wherein scholars 
argue that seeking to quantify religious identity, or other forms, is in fact an essentialist 
approach to science (Vertovec and Rogers 1998, 4). There should be a reconceptualized 
method of identity exploration that avoids the “static” and “bounded” notions were 
referenced in Chapter Two. This also relates to the earlier point that a nominal self-
identification may not translate to sociocultural or religious practice in tandem with that 
label. 
However, for the purposes of measuring levels of integration and societal cohesion, it 
has proved a practical tool in the sociological field, among others. It is still useful to maintain 
a critical view when exploring identity. Even when more specifically examining identity and 
belonging at the national and local level, as the next chapter does in addressing Muslim 
identity in Spain and Madrid, the diversified nature of identity is an important lens with 
which to conduct our analysis. 
Caveat: Qualifying determinants of integration 
This chapter has underscored religious identity in its overview of European Muslim 
youth and the literature examining this population. This identity is also explored in relation 
to levels of integration among these youth. However, it should be emphasized that, as 
mentioned earlier, identity and integration among Muslim youth may be more dependent on 
the many conditions second (or third and fourth) generation immigrants face when 
negotiating their place in host societies, rather than remaining solely influenced by religion or 
factors related to religion. 
Second generation Muslims are implicated in many factors that affect their inclusion 




integration. For example, there are those that contend any isolation or lack of integration that 
may take place is more likely the result of socioeconomic determinants and labor-market 
drivers. Laurence observes, “many of the basic socioeconomic inequalities endured by 
Muslim-origin young people reflect the familiar dynamic of relative newcomers in host 
societies, and do not appear to be religion-specific” (2011, 246).  Eseverri indicates that 
literature on both sides of the Atlantic highlights how the current second generation faces 
more obstacles than ever before in integrating into mainstream society, as they are often 
marginalized in impoverished suburbs and lack many opportunities as a result (2015). 
Indeed, there is a consensus, backed by quantitative evidence, that regardless of 
religious affiliation, second and third generation immigrants typically face higher rates of 
unemployment then those with native-born parents, lower levels of education, 
discrimination, and weak political representation (Laurence 2011; Joly 2005; At Home in 
Europe Project 2010,). While this group should enjoy the same conditions and advantages as 
the children of the native-born, this is clearly not the case; moreover, success in employment, 
education and social relations serve as indicators as to how these second generation citizens 
are integrating (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). For example, Archick describes the situation 
in France: “A significant number of France’s Muslims, and particularly Muslim youth, live in 
public housing projects located on the outskirts of urban centers. These areas, known as 
banlieues, are marked by poverty and high unemployment. The percentage of Muslims who 
fail to finish secondary school appears to be considerably higher than that of non-Muslims” 
(Archick 2011, 11). 
Connor and Koenig argue, based on results from their multivariate analysis of 
Muslims using the European Social Survey data collection, that perhaps some of these 
employment challenges faced by both first and second generation Muslims can be attributed 
to individual-level effects; for example, a religiosity that does not allow them to fully integrate 
into the workforce (2015). However, they find, the variables that seem to account in large 




socioeconomic disadvantage) or a discriminatory society is what affects their labor market 
incorporation most (Ibid.). They point out that the second generation’s socioeconomic 
disadvantage might outweigh the education they are receiving in the host society (Ibid.).   
By the same token, while flawed, the institutional conditions in the welfare states of 
Europe imply that children can become more independent from their parents than they could 
in host societies, and practice more self-determination (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). 
Moreover, the demographic makeup of Europe, increasingly diversified, allows for these 
youth to challenge the status quo and assert their own identities and claims (Ibid.). Indeed, 
second generation Muslims may engage in a more fluid identity than that of their elders, and 
have several additional dimensions to draw from when formulating this identity. In sum, 
while not as emphasized in this work as religious identity, social and economic structures in 
host societies, among other factors, can significantly influence integration and identity, 
whether to an advantage or disadvantage. 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to clarify the use of “identity” and outline self-identity versus 
collective identity in prefacing the study of second generation Muslims in Madrid. Self-
identity can be reflexive, as well as subject to internal and external influences. Participants in 
this study will be asked to self-identify, with the implicit acknowledgement that it is their 
personal understanding of the label´s significance. However, this does not mean that the 
participants´ understanding of their identity is not useful; in fact, it can help demonstrate 
their sense of belonging to the host society. Moreover, current observations regarding 
spirituality and identity trends among Muslim European youth are context for the study 
taking place. Literature to date on the topic has demonstrated the variance that comes with 
the “Muslim” identification,” including that the category is used broadly to mean a variety of 
affiliations, among those ethnic, religious and cultural. Reoccurring subjects touched upon in 




observations regarding reactive identity, and a struggle to define sense of belonging and how 
this relates to integration, and for the purposes of this work, religiosity. Once more, the 
danger of an essentialist discourse, or of limiting integration indicators to solely identity and 
sense of belonging, remain a challenge in this discussion. The importance of individual 
agency, as well as the fluidity of identity and the many factors that shape identity, should 
remain present throughout this investigation. In fact, the empirical potion examines this fluid 
identity and agency among the target population. Meanwhile, a brief segue to an analysis of 
the context of Islam in Spain and specifically Madrid, in which the population under study 







Islam in Spain 
Invariably, in providing context for the experience of Muslim youth of migrant origin 
in Madrid, it is useful to consider the history of Islam in Spain, current Spanish policy towards 
Islam and inextricably linked public opinion regarding this policy, and finally, the sentiments 
of the Muslim community in Spain and Madrid. Moreover, though the history of the Islamic 
caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula is cited as a factor in Spain’s relationship with Islam, a 
more immediate and relevant reality is Spain’s recent immigration and fairly new Muslim 
community, which sets it apart from other European countries with third and fourth 
generation Muslim populations. While the 1.5 and second generations are made up of 
individual actors shaping their own identities, those self-identifying as Muslim contend with 
contemporary public policies and current public opinion regarding Islam, and these societal 
perceptions may influence identity formation. 
Of course, second generation Muslims in Madrid may experience societal inclusion 
differently than their peers with native-born parents merely as a result of being second 
generation, rather than specifically due to their Muslim faith or culture. As alluded to in 
previous chapters, there are indications that discrimination is sometimes not religiously-
specific. However, in a report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), religion was 
cited as one of the most frequent reasons for discrimination among Muslims (2018). Muslim 
claims can be regarded as illegitimate, because, as discussed earlier, they may be perceived as 
the “other” and on the fringes of “European society,” whatever that notion entails. This 
chapter will endeavor to provide a context for Islam in Spain and how it relates to the 
population in question.  
Spain’s religious history 
When outlining Islam in Spain, many cite as a frame of reference the historic Muslim 




a thriving civilization under the Umayyad Caliphate’s Golden Age, and ended with the fall of 
the Kingdom of Granada and the first expulsion of the Moors in 1942. Muslims and Jews were 
later expelled again in the early 17th century. Historically religions, other than Catholicism 
were abolished until the Constitution of 1869 (Kennedy 1996; López et al. 2007). However, 
recent history is the most pertinent context for our study. After the Spanish Civil War (1936-
1939) and under the ensuing dictatorship, the government strongly favored the Catholic 
majority, making it the only legally-recognized religion; minority religions were forced to 
practice clandestinely (Ibid.). Later, pressure from the Vatican, and an alliance with the 
United States in 1953, finally led to a Law of Religious Liberty in 1967 (Ley 44/1967).  
During the post-war period, only a diplomatic few were practicing Muslims, as well as 
a small cohort of Moroccans that served as Franco’s personal guard (López et al. 2007). The 
Franco regime then took a pro-Arab turn in the mid-50s, encouraging contact with near 
Eastern countries and student exchanges (Ibid.). An Egyptian Institute of Islamic Studies was 
established in 1950 in Madrid, as well an Institute for Hispano-Arab culture in 1954 (Ibid). 
After the fall of the dictatorship and the transition to democracy, religious pluralism further 
improved with the Constitution of 1978 and the 1980 Law of Religious Liberty (CE 1978; Ley 
Orgánica 7/1980). Formal agreements between the government and Protestantism, Judaism 
and Islam finally took place in 1992 (López et al. 2007).  
Current Spanish institutional relationship with Islam 
As discussed earlier, Spain is unique in comparison with France and the United 
Kingdom due to this Concordatarian church-state structure, whereby the state engages with 
organized religion by way of agreements. Moreover, Spain’s recent Catholic history is in 
contrast with France’s secular tradition and England’s church state.22 For example, the 
Spanish citizenry’s attitude towards religion is based on a national identity tied closely to the 
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country’s Catholic history (Osorio 2012; Martín et al. 2003). Because of these close Catholic 
ties, while Islam is a recognized body in Spain, it does not share the Catholic Church’s specific 
privileges with the state (nor does any other religion). Some argue that due to the history of 
the Islamic presence in the Iberian Peninsula, an “otherness” has been attributed to Islam in 
Spain, not only based on current-day differences but also rooted in perceived historic conflict 
(Corpas 2010; Zapata 2006).  
At the same time, religious diversity management has evolved from a diplomatic issue 
(making concessions in order to maintain foreign ties) to more of a migration issue 
(addressing pluralism as a domestic reality) as immigration discussed in earlier chapters 
began to increase in the past decades (Astor and Griera 2016). Spain formalized relationships 
with Spain’s Protestant and Jewish leaderships, and an official agreement was brokered 
between the Spanish government and the Islamic Commission of Spain in April 1992 
(Communidad Islamica de España - CIE).  The CIE is composed of representatives from the 
group the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI, founded in 1989), and the 
Spanish Union of Islamic Communities (UCIDE, founded in 1991); these two groups 
sometimes find themselves in opposition (Medina 2012). The goal of establishing the CIE was 
to create a single Muslim entity for official government interaction, as part of the 1992 
agreement (Arigita 2006). 
As of 2015, according to a UCIDE publication, there were up to 1,427 Muslim religious 
communities, 44 federations and 20 associations registered in the Ministry of Justice 
(Observatorio Andalusí 2016). Some of them come under the umbrella of FEERI or UCIDE, 
but others are unaffiliated. Originally, upon the signing of the agreement in 1992, Muslims in 
Spain reflected a makeup of middle class immigrants or naturalized Spanish citizens from 
Arabic countries. More recently, throughout the 1990s, immigration from Morocco led to a 
demographic makeup more in common with rest of Europe; these recently arrived 
immigrants came to work in the labor force and now have children that are entering the labor 




degree of Moroccan origin, while other heritages included Algerian, Pakistani, Iranian, 
Lebanese, Syrian, Egyptian and Tunisian (FRA 2010). In comparison with the rest of Europe, 
an increase in Islamic adherents in Spain is relatively recent, due to this labor immigration in 
the 1990s (Ramírez 2005).  
As described in the previous chapter in the cases of other European Member states, 
while the establishment of the CIE was undoubtedly a deliberate recognition of religious 
plurality in Spain, it also served as a mechanism by which the Spanish government could 
mediate and observe Islamic activity within Spain (Arigita 2006). Corpas explains that the 
purpose of the CIE itself is twofold: not only to represent Islam to the Spanish state, but also 
to serve as a source of leadership, and as an avenue for consensus among the Muslim 
community in Spain (2010). 
Riay Tatary, Preisdent of both UCIDE and the CIE, is known for his ability to arbitrate 
as a result of his relatively good institutional relationships, and is fairly uncontroversial 
among the faithful (Corpas 2010). By contrast, Mansur Escudero of FEERI in the past sparked 
more controversy with a progressive approach that has alienated some conservative 
Muslims; FEERI sometimes caters to Muslim converts, as well. Currently, FEERI is led by 
Mounir Benjelloun Andaloussi Azhari. Arigita maintains that some feel the leaders of the two 
larger cohorts within the CIE, both Tatari and Escudero, are unrepresentative of the wider 
Spanish Muslim community. Their leadership has been prolonged and seemingly out of touch 
with those Muslims from a more recent migrant background or experience, and there have 
been calls for a more pluralistic and authentic representation (2006). In 2004, the 
Association of Moroccan Immigrant Workers in Spain (Asociación de Trabajadores 
Inmigrantes Marroquíes en España or ATIME) jockeyed to act an interlocutor with the state 
in religious matters, as well. Up until then, it had largely remained an immigrant or labor 
association (Mijares and Ramírez 2008).23 The ATIME’s efforts to regulate religious matters, 
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including imams and religious instruction, were not supported by either FEERI or UCIDE 
(Arigita 2006).  
On an institutional level, another prominent entity dedicated to the facilitation of an 
understanding between Islam and Spain includes Casa Árabe. It works to promote 
understanding between Arab culture (and the Muslim faith associated with it) and is an 
official arm of Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Casa Árabe). Casa Árabe 
could be described as less of a migration-oriented organization, and more of a diplomatic or 
cultural entity that educates about Islam and Arab culture.  
Estimate of Muslim population 
In terms of the current Muslim population in Spain, it is difficult to provide legitimate 
statistics on Islam because officially, the government only offers information on the 
nationality of foreigners, and there is also a portion of illegal immigration that cannot be 
accounted for (AFR 2010). Census data does not include information about the religious 
affiliation of households or individuals (Ibid.). As of their 2015 report, UCIDE estimated 
1,858,409 Muslims in Spain (40% Spanish, 40% Moroccan, and 20% other nationalities) in 
2014 (Observatorio Andalusí 2015, 37). This reflects an increase in comparison with the 
same organization’s 2014 report, in which they indicated there were 1,732,191 believers in 
2013, with only 30% of them Spanish and 50% Moroccan (Observatorio Andalusí 2014, 24). 
There are lower estimates of total Muslims in the country from other sources. The 2017 EU 
Agency for Fundamental Rights report estimated the population to be around 1 million 
(2017). A further census UCIDE published in 2016 used registries from the Spanish 
government and from the Islamic Communities of Spain (CIE). They estimated that there are 
about 779,080 Spanish citizens who are Muslim, 433,030 of which are progeny of Muslims, 
most of them immigrants who did not originally have Spanish nationality but naturalized 
(Observatorio Andalusí 2016).  




In 2004, the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence (“La Fundación Pluralismo y 
Convivencia”) was created by the Council of Ministries through the recommendation of 
Spain’s Ministry of Justice. The Foundation describes its objectives as both to promote 
religious freedom through cooperation with religious minorities, and to create a forum for 
research, debate and the generation of public policies that promote religious freedom and 
peaceful coexistence (La Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia). It conducts many activities in 
support of social cohesion. These include aiding recently arrived immigrants with Spanish 
instruction or labor market entry, helping young children enter the Spanish school system, 
celebrating religious events and publishing relevant materials. Álvarez-Miranda also points 
out that this Foundation reinforces the structure of the CIE (2009). UCIDE has received funds 
from the Foundation for activities like organizing conferences, as has FEERI.  Moreover, the 
Foundation encourages other Muslim communities to register in the Ministry of Justice’s 
records Ibid). Astor and Griera hold that while the practical implementation of state policies 
supposedly open to managing religious diversity is lacking, the Foundation is a hopeful and 
perhaps even well-intentioned step towards closing the gap between policy and social reality 
(2016). 
The Foundation, at the federal level, also collaborated with the Spanish Federation of 
Local Governments (Federación Española de Gobiernos Locales) in 2011 to create an 
Observatory for Religious Pluralism (El Observatorio del Pluralismo Religioso). This 
combined state and local initiative is directed towards monitoring religious diversity in Spain, 
especially policies at the local level, and recommending good practices. This is an important 
mechanism because of the competing jurisdictions of state, community and local in Spain, and 
the questions that arise as a result. For example, in Catalonia, as Astor and Griega note, the 
community government challenged a provision in a 2013 federal law that made stipulations 
for religious spaces, albeit leaving a great deal of decision-making to the local authorities. For 
this reason, the Observatory and the good practice manuals it provides local authorities can 




varying levels of jurisdictional power (2016). The Observatory also provides information 
about legislation or judicial decisions relating to religious pluralism in a format that allows 
you to search by topic. 
Of course, there is confusion between what constitutes religious discrimination 
versus ethnic discrimination, xenophobia, and so on. In addition to the recourse of Spain’s 
Observatory for Religious Pluralism, institutional bodies in place that may affect the chosen 
cohort of this study also include the Spanish Observatory for Racism and Xenophobia 
(OBERAXE), under the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, or the Council for 
the Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination, under the Ministry of Health Social 
Services and Equality (the latter two referenced in the integration discussion in Chapter 
Four). OBERAXE and the and Council for the Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination 
both perform some of the functions of an equality body, and indeed the Council is listed as 
Spain’s Equality of Body by the European Network of Equality Bodies (Equinet). However, 
neither body is autonomous, i.e., each fall under the jurisdiction of a government ministry. In 
2011, there had been an attempt to create such an autonomous body, with powers beyond 
observation and reporting, however, the change of government during the Spanish election 
cycle interrupted the process. Moreover, a 2018 European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (under the Council of Europe) report criticized a lack of institutional protections 
in Spain. It lamented the 2011 failure to legislate a stronger body, and argued that 
Constitutional provisions and definitions of discrimination were not strict enough. In 
addition, it insisted that anti-discrimination provisions were so obscure that discrimination 
cases are almost never brought to court (2018). 
Still, there are several civil society organizations working towards education and 
rights protections. For example, Fundación de Cultura Islámica was formed in the 1980s to 
develop understanding between the West and the Arab Islamic world with a focus on the 
history of Al-Andalus (La Fundación de Cultura Islámica). Fundación Al Fanar similarly 




Spanish society (La Fundación Al Fanar). Moreover, various graduate programs and centers 
at Spanish public universities study Arab language and culture, as well as Islam.24As Arab 
cultures are strongly associated with Islam, Islam is consequently often discussed or is even 
the primary subject of study at some of these institutions and organizations. Of course, among 
the Muslim community in Spain itself, there are multiple social media groups dedicated to 
self-instruction in Islam, combating islamophobia, or creating community among young 
Muslims. Official Muslim associations are established throughout Spain, with those in Madrid 
to be described shortly. Finally, Informe Raxen, a report periodically published by the group 
Movimiento Contra la Intolerancia, as well as reports by SOS Racismo, the Fundación de 
Cultura Islámica, and the Observatorio Andalusí, document and monitor incidences of 
Islamophobia in Spain (Movimiento Contra la Intolerancia, SOS Racismo, Fundación de 
Cultura Islámica, Observatorio Andalusí). Most recently, a joint project has produced an 
observatory for Islamophobia in the media (“Observatorio de la Islamofobia en los Medios”), 
with partners including Fundación Al Fanar, El Instituto Europeo del Mediterráneo 
(European Institute of the Mediterranean, IEMed, in Barcelona), La Fundación Tres Culturas 
del Mediterráneo (The Three Cultures of the Mediterranean Foundation, a collaboration 
between the governments of Seville and Morrocco), Casa Árabe and the University of Murcia 
(Observatorio de la Islamofobia en los Medios).  
Education 
As for Islamic education, the FRA report mentioned earlier used data gathered from 
2007-2008 to find that Spanish Muslim youth indicated their religious education took place at 
home (2010). There are certainly community organizations and mosques that offer more 
formal instruction. Since the 1992 Agreement with the Spanish Islamic Commission, Islamic 
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education has theoretically been available in Spanish public school. In practice, however, this 
situation has been slow to materialize; as of 2010, there were 46 public school teachers of 
Islam, versus 15,000 public school teachers of Catholicism (Archick 2010). Organizations like 
UCIDE argue that the number of Islamic teachers funded by the government is low in 
comparison to demand for the courses (Ibid). Technically, children in kindergarten, primary 
and secondary are entitled to Islamic education in both public school and private 
“concertados.”25 This can take place given the following conditions: if the request comes from 
over 10 students; if a candidate for the instruction is put forward by the CIE; and if the final 
decision for the candidate’s eligibility is approved by the school administration (Álvarez-
Miranda 2009). UCIDE estimates that there are 275,324 Muslim children and youth in school 
(40% Spanish nationality), a number which would require at least 400 professors 
(Observatorio Andalusí 2014).  
Religious freedom in educational institutions has remained a constant debate, albeit 
the topic attracts less headlines and controversy in the media than it does in countries like 
France. The first “headscarf case” that gained media attention in Spain took place in 2002; the 
student was initially banned but then readmitted, and there have been several incidents since 
(Mijares and Ramírez 2008). In 2013, The Supreme Court declared any laws that barred 
wearing a headscarf in public spaces, such as those that had existed in Lleida, Catalonia, 
unconstitutional (Ibid). In fact, there is no federal law prohibiting the use of religious 
symbols. However, depending on the case, whether in a public setting, the workplace, or in 
educational institutions, restrictions on the veil are dealt with on a case by case basis (Pascual 
2015).  
For example, in a court of first instance ruling in 2012, where parents took legal 
action after their daughter had been banned from school due to her veil, the defendants 
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argued that laicism represented a constitutional value, and for that reason demonstrating 
religious affiliations can be restricted (Mijares and Ramírez 2008). When taken to the 
Supreme Tribunal of Madrid, the court ruled in favor of the institution on two grounds: it 
established the school had the right to enforce its internal regulation against head coverings, 
and it also argued that based on a technicality, rulings cannot be appealed in a dispute over 
less than 30,000 euros. A dissenting decision contended that this ruling infringed on religious 
freedoms (Álvarez 2013). The rulings regarding headscarves thus remain nebulous in the 
spheres of employment and education. However, Mijares and Ramírez note that very few 
schools exercise their ability to enforce internal regulations against head coverings, if 
students do so for religious reasons (2008). When this does occur, the press often pursues 
the story very quickly and the school finds itself under public scrutiny. 
The workplace 
There is certainly a consensus regarding difficulties in integration due to 
comparatively less labor market entry and stable employment among Muslims. In 2011, the 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) recommended that Spain make 
further efforts to tackle workplace discrimination, especially when directed against Muslims 
from North Africa or of that descent. The ECRI admitted that while the economic recession in 
Spain could also be to blame for unemployment and work instability, discrimination in the 
workplace and in employment processes still remained a significant issue (Solanes 2015).  
Apart from discrimination in the workplace, devout Muslims face a certain difficulty 
in that their holy day of obligation rests on a Friday; similarly, the holy month of Ramadan 
and the traditional fasting it involves can be difficult for practicing Muslims given that the 
Spanish workday does not provide for the prayer and fasting obligations (Observatorio 
Andalusí 2014).While Catholics in Spain have several public holidays that fall on their own 





The media is accused of inciting Islamophobia and of painting a poor image of 
Muslims throughout the continent of Europe. In Spain, the media provides very cursory 
coverage of Muslim activity, apart from reporting on extremist activities at home or abroad. 
This coverage, of course, can amplify during certain periods, depending on political and social 
events that the media may determine are compelling content for their audiences. 
Sensationalism and politicization of the issues prevails in the mainstream outlets, and 
content is created for pure political consumption rather than for objective analysis. 
There are a few informative documentaries of the Muslim religion, and discussion of 
the religion is usually restricted to negative news (Sánchez 2013). Some grassroots 
movements attempt to document perceived violent incidents of islamophobia that do not 
reach mainstream media outlets. Aside from “Islam Hoy” of Televisión Española’s Chanel 2, or 
the Córdoba TV chain, news reports can encompass documentation of extremist behavior, 
conflicts in school or in communities, or negative opinion pieces.26 One news story in a local 
newspaper in Aragon reported Muslim parents demanding halal menus in public high schools 
in Zaragoza, implying that these were unreasonable demands, and that public high schools 
had already been sufficiently catering to Muslim students (Figols 2013). 
As a result, in a study by Cea D’Ancona, the author finds that Spanish media does 
indeed drive public perception of Islam; at least, the way in which the media echoes the 
political debate and rhetoric on the subject has an effect. An obvious example includes when 
local election campaigns single out immigration or Muslims as an issue, and the candidate 
attributes economic woes to the immigrant population, and the media disseminates this 
discourse to the public (2016). 
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A 2015 Observatorio Andalusí report (again, headed by UCIDE) provides readers with 
the organization’s own take on the treatment of Islam in Spain’s media. They believe that the 
discourse the media uses is prone to diffusing negative views of Islam. It explains that when 
Islam is covered in the international news, especially in relation to Muslim majority states, 
the words “islamist” and “extreme” are used; “social democratic” or “Islamic democracy” are 
phrases that rarely feature alongside stories treating of Islam (Observatorio Andalusí 2015, 
3). 
Islamophobia 
Several authors note that the historic relationship between Islam and Spain 
distinguishes the latter from fellow European counterparts (Zapata 2006; Corpas 2010). As 
Corpas points out, Andalusia, and all the history it connotes, has left a distinctive mark on 
Spain, and Islam remains both a close and historical adversary in the evolved Spanish identity 
(2010). There is evidence that points to Spain having a past tradition of Islamophobia, and 
that negative reactions to immigration in Spain are thus mainly directed at Muslim 
immigration (Zapata 2006). Indeed, one can observe how such a sentiment is enmeshed in 
quotidian life, as there is a frequently used term in the Castellano Spanish vernacular, “el 
moro,” referring to Muslims in general, but particularly aimed at today’s Moroccans, 
specifically. It can be interpreted as derogatory, although some may maintain that it is used as 
a term of identification and without malicious intent. In the past, Islam was understood as the 
opposite of Spanish identity, an understanding that can still be cultivated today in some 
circles. Zapata theorizes that public discourse in Spain, rather than embracing a shared 
tradition with Islamic culture, historically remembers the oppositional relationship it had 
with Islam during the period of the Islamic caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula (2006). This 
past is further complicated by later colonial relationships with Muslim countries and 




approach to Islam, it is still perceived as the “other” and a migratory phenomenon (albeit 
cyclical) rather than a modern reality in a diverse Spain and Europe.  
Islamophobia can be described as an intolerance of the religion of Islam and its 
practice, and can even be couched in terms of modernity and progressivity, as voices in 
politics and the media, and even in academia, characterize it as an anti-Western threat to 
liberal democratic values. Essentialism and the tendency to generalize regarding Islam 
predicates Islamophobia. Those who warn of intellectual islamophobia caution specifically 
that there is a danger in making simplistic distinctions between a “good” (moderate, and 
majority) Islam, versus a “bad” (minority, more traditional or strict) Islam (Gomez 2014, 53). 
In her study of Muslim youth associations, Téllez confirms that many, if not the majority, of 
participants had in some form or another had encountered this message of a “good” versus 
“bad” Muslim paradigm (Téllez 2011).  
The 2004 bombings were a significant event in the trajectory of islamophobia in 
Spain. On March 11th of that year, ten different bombs, set off within a matter of minutes in 
the early morning, killed 191 people in Madrid on commuter trains. Spain had been familiar 
with terrorism in the past beginning as early as the 1960s, due to the ethno-nationalist group 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) from the Basque country, but this group had never achieved an 
attack of such scale. The attack was attributed to Islamic extremists linked to the Al Qaeda 
network (Alonso 2013).  
As a result, the word “islamofobia” (Spanish for islamophobia) began to surface in the 
media in 2004 (Gomez 2014). Still, the La Fundación de Cultura Islámica had published a 
manifesto against Islamophobia in 2003 (Fundación 2003). The word itself has yet to receive 
official recognition from the Dictionary of Spanish Language of the Real Academia Espanola, 
which as of 2014 still did not have the term in its entries. Over the course of its existence, 
OBERAXE has identified Islamophobia identified as a phenomenon that required attention 
(D’Ancona and Valles 2012). In addition to the historical implications of Spanish identity and 




whole new dimension to islamophobia. Gomez observes that islamophobia begins to spike 
around election periods, implying that in it can be exploited as a political tool; essentially, 
there may be a perception islamophobia pervades society more than it actually does (2014).  
It should be borne in mind yet again that apart from the historic relationship between Spain 
and Islam, as well as recent extremism, Muslims in Spain also face an academic prejudice 
against Islam as a threat to secular society and liberal values; this is a belief entertained by 
various academics throughout Europe. 
Spanish public opinion regarding Islam 
There is some indication as to Spanish public opinion regarding Islam and Muslims in 
Spain, or what public institutions and the media register as public opinion in Spain. A 2015 
“Global Attitudes” survey by Pew Research Center found that the majority of Spanish society, 
52%, had a favorable view of Muslims. While favorable percentages were higher in France 
and the UK, these countries also have much larger Muslim populations (Stokes 2015). In a 
2008 survey by CIS, 16.2% of Spaniards said people of all religious faiths should practice 
freely, 43.6% said free religious practice should be permitted as long as it does not bother 
others, and 34.2% said religions should be practice freely as long as it is not prosthelytized 
(Centro de Investigaciones 2008). 75% of Spaniards said having Muslims as neighbors would 
not bother them at all (Ibid.).  
Again, as explained earlier, Islam is often largely associated with immigration, and 
Spain has a record of a very open and positive attitude towards immigration in comparison 
with the rest of Europe. In a 2007 Gallup Eurobarometer, out of 27 member states, Spain had 
the fifth greatest percentage of participants indicating that they believed diversity enriched 
cultural life very much (Cea D’Ancona and Valles 2009; Gallup Eurobarometer). Similarly, a 
2014 CIS study found that 78% of Spaniards believed legal immigrants should have the right 




and 68% believed they should be able to obtain Spanish nationality (Centro de 
Investigaciones 2014). 
Still, resistance to immigration remains a reality in Spain, and this as well as 
xenophobia and racism is measured by several government institutions and organizations. 
The CIS has monitored it since 1990 in a series of barometers and surveys using those 
indicators. Xenophobia can stem from the perception of immigration as a social problem (i.e., 
uncontrolled borders) or as a threat to the societal status quo. Within such threat to the 
societal status quo falls competition in the labor market, competition access to social services, 
and finally fear of losing cultural homogeneity or national identity: in short, a socioeconomic 
or cultural threat is perceived (Cea D’Ancona 2009a). In terms of the former socioeconomic 
threat, a CIS 2014 report found that Spaniards indicated delinquency and labor market 
competition as the two greatest negative aspects of immigration (Centro de Investigaciones 
2014). 
Then there is the latter, cultural threat. As for some, Islam represents a foreign 
religion or culture and way of life practice, Spain can be slightly less welcoming toward 
Muslim immigrants as opposed to immigrants overall. The fear of losing national identity can 
be linked to how individual differences, including “prior attitudes and experiences” as 
Pettigrew describes in his intergroup contact theory, can shape contact between groups 
(1998, 77). Perhaps for this reason, in the Spanish MEXEESS27 project, the data suggested that 
immigrants of Latino origin encountered less native resistance than North African 
immigrants, or those that professed the Muslim faith. To begin, immigrants hailing from 
Spanish-speaking countries share a common language with the host country of Spain, and 
thus a certain homogeneity with the society (albeit less so among the ethnically diverse). 
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Furthermore, Cea D’Ancona found a significant rate of rejection of Muslims due to their 
religion distinguishing them from the Catholic tradition and culture of Spain (2009b).  
In a 2013 CIS study conducted five years later than the one previously referenced, 
Spanish participants were again questioned as to how much it would bother them to be 
neighboring various groups (Centro de Investigaciones). The reluctance to be neighbor to an 
immigrant was slightly less than being neighbor to a Muslim: 67.4% said they would not 
mind at all having an immigrant as a neighbor, versus 60.9% who would not mind having a 
Muslim neighbor (Ibid.). However, there was also recognition of discrimination, as 14.3% 
percent of Spaniards agreed that a Muslim or another religious minority could face prejudice 
in accessing public services; 30% and 22% believed it was possible that religious minorities 
could face prejudice in renting a living space or accessing the job market, respectively. In a 
2014 CIS study regarding attitudes towards immigrants, when participants were asked which 
immigrants they had the least sympathy for or got only the worst with, Moroccans and other 
North Africans received 9.6%, Arabs 8.4% and Muslims 2.5%, surpassed only by Romanians 
at 11.8% (with immigrants from South and Central America drawing much lower figures) 
(Centro de Investigaciones 2014). 
Noya uses data from the del Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano to indicate that there 
is not islamofobia in Spain per se (he maintains that Spaniards can distinguish between 
extremists and practitioners of Islam), but instead a Catholic empathy for Muslims. He 
qualifies that the any rejection of Islam is a public rejection by secular citizens that would 
reject the same display of religion if exercised by Catholics; he argues it does not so much 
constitute fear as much as an assertion of democratic values of separation of church and state 
(2007).  By contrast, based on analysis of attitudes towards immigrants from CIS data 
beginning in the 1990s and proceeding up through projects in conjunction with OBERAXE, 
D’Ancona asserts that there is a tendency among the religious or conservative to be anti-
Islam or to reject Muslim immigration; religious or conservative Spanish are more likely to 




Again, societal sentiment in Spain, or at least the record of sentiment, can vary within 
a year or from year to year based on either media or political influence. In 2010, when 
debates regarding the burqa surfaced, as a consequence of the aforementioned attempt to 
ban the burqa in Lleida, public opinion also fluctuated.  The primary Spanish newspaper El 
País published 71 articles related to Islam that year, and the main newspaper from the 
Catalonian province where Lleida is located, La Vanguardia, published 163. Two years later, 
articles on the topic only totaled 37. This rise in the public consciousness of debates 
regarding Islam, thanks to media and political actors, had an effect on public opinion, as a rise 
in Islamophobia and a push to ban veils and ban mosques increased that year (Cea D’Ancona 
2016).  
Islam in Madrid 
Nonetheless, Corpas holds that the Autonomous Communities in Spain have adapted 
to Muslim immigrant diversity with more success (albeit not total success) than other 
neighboring European states (2010). Earlier chapters have outlined processes of immigration 
and integration in Spain, as well as integration policies at the state, regional and local levels, 
and how a certain amount of autonomy is afforded to the regions in terms of integration 
policy.  Moreover, Madrid itself has a unique history with Islam. The city was founded by 
Mohamed I in the 9th Century. After the Muslims were expelled from Spain in 1609, believers 
from Islamic and Jewish faiths were forbidden from practicing in Madrid until the Spanish 
Constitution of 1869 allowed religions aside from Catholicism to practice again (López et al. 
2007). With the arrival of Muslims to Madrid in the past few decades, as indicated earlier in 
the description of Muslim immigration to Spain beginning in the 80s, prayer rooms and 
mosques have been established throughout various neighborhoods in the community.  
Madrid has the second largest Moroccan population of all Spanish cities and the 
second largest Moroccan population of all Spanish communities, after Barcelona and 




was founded in 1971, the Muslim Association of Spain (La Asociación Musulmana en España) 
(López et al. 2007, 51). As Madrid is the nation’s capital and hosts the Spanish central 
government, the CIE and the UCIDE and FEERI organizations that serve as CIE’s 
representatives are also based in Madrid. However, they do not operate as much at the local 
level. Rather, López et al. claim that several local communities in Madrid are more active in 
reaching out to civil society; this finding was confirmed in the empirical study of this work, 
where greater outreach and community was encountered in associations like the CCIF Al 
Umma De Fuenlabrada or Comunidad Musulmana de Getafe Al Falah. 
There are two larger and well-known mosques in Madrid city itself. The oldest, 
located in the Tetuan neighborhood, “Mezquita Abu Bakr,” was inaugurated in 1988, and 
according to the President of the Muslim Association of Spain was funded by individuals 
(rather than foreign governments, a phenomenon that has taken place in Europe) throughout 
the world. For a while, it served as the nucleus of the Muslim community for Arab language 
teaching, celebrations, prayer, conferences, observing Ramadan, and many other activities 
(López et al. 2007, 56). In 2013, this mosque arranged 166 visits from a total of over 14,000 
visitors, with visitors hailing from university faculties, neighborhood associations, and so 
forth (Observatorio Andalusí 2015). The second, known as the “Mezquita de la M30” sits on 
the periphery of Madrid city and was established in 1992. It is more grandiose and houses a 
large library and several cultural exhibits, gathering about 3,000 faithful every Friday for 
prayer (López et al. 2007). Of course, there are many more mosques and prayer spaces 
throughout the community of Madrid and the city, including those in Fuenlabrada, Parla and 
Lavapiés, some of those visited during the empirical portion of this study. 
Organizations like SOS Racismo Madrid monitor discrimination against Muslims and 
other minorities in the community, and certainly hold that there are elements of 
islamophobia in Madrid (SOS Racismo Madrid). However, Astor theorizes that Madrid 
inhabitants are less wary of immigration or Islam due to a more equal distribution of 




overall levels of immigration are the same in these two regions, in Madrid there are not so 
much ethnic ghettos rather than just diverse, lower class neighborhoods (2009). Astor’s 
innovative socioeconomic reasoning for discrimination against Muslims, or lack thereof, can 
be combined with more traditional and general observations about Spanish society in general 
and its relationship with Islam. Of course, this goes in tandem with acknowledging recent 
concerns about extremism, in order to provide a comprehensive picture of the nature of 
discrimination towards Muslims in Madrid. 
Muslim attitudes in Spain 
One observation distinct to Islam in Spain, and more specifically Muslim behavior, is 
how it seems Spanish Muslims attempt to remain less publicly visible than Muslims in other 
European countries. For example, in the Martín et al. study, the authors observed that some 
women had stopped wearing their head covering to work because they felt it would elicit 
rejection from traditional Spaniards (2003). In fact, there have been several surveys 
undertaken in the past two decades that enable a rough understanding of Spanish Muslim 
attitudes, with a few noteworthy findings: that the majority held beliefs aligned with Spanish 
societal values, that they were open to integration, and that they embraced Spanish society. 
For instance, a 2011 report conducted by Metroscopia (briefly referenced earlier in 
this work) and commissioned by the Spanish government, provides the most recent 
information in a series of five surveys that began in 2006. It offers several insights into 
Spanish Muslim attitudes, demonstrating how this population’s views are compatible with 
liberal democracy societal values, including in terms of the participants’ tolerance. 
Metroscopia interviewed 2,000 participants. According to the survey, the majority of Spanish 
Muslims believed that no religion was superior to another, that non-believers maintained the 
same dignity as believers, that violence was an unacceptable way to defend one’s religious 
beliefs, and that a laical state should treat all religions equally (2011). The 2006 report by the 




more likely to believe that their values were compatible with Spanish society, whereas, in 
comparison, Spanish non-Muslims felt Islam was less compatible with dominant societal 
values or norms. Both of these surveys demonstrate the extent to which Spanish Muslims 
believe that their religion and Spanish societal values are reconcilable. 
The Metroscopia report also offered two further conclusions: that Spanish Muslims 
demonstrated a desire to integrate, and that they expressed a positive view of Spanish 
societies and institutions.  Regarding the participants’ efforts to integrate into their host 
society, 67% said they were content in Spain, 83% of those who lived in Spain for more than 
5 years said they believed they had adapted to Spanish life, and the majority had a good level 
of Spanish language skills (2011). They felt that Spanish society rejected Islam the least, only 
36% rejection versus the 43% rejection and 49% rejection perceived in France and the 
United States, respectively (Ibid.). Moreover, 75% believed that Muslims and Christians in 
Spain at least attempted at mutual understanding (Ibid.).  
In a study of Moroccan integration tangentially related in its approach to religion and 
integration, Martin et al. observed that the Moroccan population faced considerable 
integration difficulties in a socio-economic sense; most of all, they had difficulties with 
employment instability and workforce entry. The authors explain that when conclusions are 
made about Moroccan integration, they are usually couched in terms of cultural and social 
differences (including religion), because this collective is perceived as different. Still, one of 
the main influencers of integration, socio-economic status and workforce instability, is 
applicable to the Moroccan populations and perhaps has a greater impact than socio-cultural 
differences (Martín et al. 2003). At the same time, the authors do indicate that religious belief 
or Muslim identity was indeed an active, rather than a passive, factor in both identity and 
social relations among the Moroccan population in their study (Ibid.). Beyond these surveys 
treating of the larger Muslim population, recent investigations into second generation 
Spaniards identifying as Muslims, or being identified as such, provide a picture of how Spain’s 




identification with Spanish society. In these studies, observations unique to Spain are present 
alongside observations regarding trends among second generation Muslim youth in Europe. 
Second generation integration and identity in Spain 
For example, one common theme that resurfaces in the study of second generation 
Muslims in Spain, which is also is found in several analyses of the same populations in the 
United Kingdom and France, is how the second generation relates to Islam on a more 
individual than institutional level, as cited in the previous chapter. Martín et al. explained that 
youth participants in their study did not feel religion meant adhering to various obligations 
or manifesting outward practices. To them, it instead signified conducting an individual and 
less outwardly visible relationship with God (2003). Female Muslim youth chose to dress 
more in their own style than in the traditional style that their parents thought was 
appropriate for their religion (Ibid.).  
However, the aforementioned FRA report, comparing Muslim youth with those in 
France and the United Kingdom, found that Spanish Muslim youth felt they faced more 
discrimination due to their religious beliefs than in the other two European countries. 
Overall, second generation, non-Muslim youth rarely faced discrimination due to their 
religious affiliation in the three states; however, this was often the reason for discrimination 
against Muslim youth, and especially so in Spain (2010). At the same time, the TIES study 
described in Chapter Five held that “Only in Berlin, Frankfurt, Antwerp and Stockholm (and 
not in the other cities) were experiences of discrimination significantly related to religious 
attachment” (Crul et al. 2012, 362). This paints a picture of the conflicting evidence and 
overall difficulty of comparing second generation Muslims across Europe. However, it may 
point to how second generation integration and experience is distinct from first generation 
experiences. It highlights how the relationship between faith and individuality among youth 
may complicate any capacity to make larger generalizations about second generation 




López et al. found that the second generation certainly underwent a different 
experience in their study of Moroccan youth in the San Cristóbal neighborhood of Madrid. 
They found that sometimes those youth of Moroccan origin inspired less trust or confidence 
on the part of the community; it was theorized that this rather than a result of racist attitudes, 
this mistrust was more due to being part of an alien group. As such, the youth were more 
predisposed to lag in education, as a result of this differential treatment, or lower 
expectation. At the same time, their families and group culture encouraged higher 
expectations for success, a success that was difficult to achieve given the reality of the 
neighborhood’s resources and socioeconomic contexts, among other factors. The authors 
found that this dichotomy was distinct to their second generation experience. From these 
observations and several other key takeaways, the authors of the study concluded that these 
youth faced a greater degree of negative circumstances. In terms of religious identity, they 
were described as influenced by Islam and their family’s faith culture, though not to the point 
of detracting from their individual agency.   
Similarities are found in a 2005 study of children of immigrants alongside children of 
native peers conducted for the City of Madrid’s Study of the Observatory of Migrations for 
Intercultural Coexistence  (OMCI28). The findings serve as a reminder to consider the 
experience of youth of migrant origin, irrespective of religious affiliation. The investigation 
was conducted in five neighborhoods in the Madrid municipality, including Justicia, Acacias, 
Ciudad de los Ángeles and Vista Alegre. It asserted, unsurprisingly, that youth of both migrant 
and native origin confront many of the same challenges in both institutional settings and via 
socialization outside of places like school. However, the study noted that, evidently, youth of 
migrant origin faced added challenges that included but were not limited to: the legal 
situation of their family, whether they faced a hostile or welcoming receiving society or 
                                                          
28 The Área de Investigación del Observatorio de las Migraciones y de la Convivencia 
Intercultural de la Ciudad de Madrid (OMCI) was a public service provided by the Madrid Muncipality 
as part of its Family, Social Services and Pariticipation section at the time of the study in 2015. It is no 




community, and the human capital their family could offer to their social network (Barbosa 
2007). 
And so, in addition to the discrimination faced as youth of migrant origin, other 
studies found that Madrid’s Muslim youth specifically found a greater experience of 
discrimination. Still, this did not always discourage youth to the point of marginalization. The 
following qualitative studies provide observations of Muslim youth, mostly second 
generation Muslims: Adlbi’s 2009 publication on identity among young female Muslims in 
Madrid; a second 2010 publication where she expanded to include Ceuta and Melilla, as well 
as Valencia; and Téllez’s 2011 dissertation entitled, "Contra el estigma: jóvenes españoles/as 
y marroquíes transitando entre la ciudadanía y la “musulmaneidad” (Against stigma: Young 
Spaniards and Moroccans transitioning between citizenship and “Muslimness”). Moreover, 
the studies are helpful in that they are not particularly exclusive to one ethnicity (i.e., 
Moroccans). The authors found that this demographic does face discrimination, presumably 
due to their Muslim identity, but that they also seek to integrate in Spanish society.  
Adlbi’s studies were conducted among young Muslim women with parents originating 
from Syria, Morocco, Sudan, Palestine, Jordan, Tunisia, and Spain. From this sample, she 
found that despite the women’s diverse range of backgrounds and experiences, they all 
seemed to expertly juggle both their ethnic background (or parent’s original culture) with 
Spanish society; they also strived to preserve their religious identity within the Spanish 
context. However, they faced a tricky balance in this religious aspect, due to the difficulties of 
assimilation, rejection and marginalization that they encountered trying to maintain this 
balance (2009). The majority of the girls Adlbi interviewed reported at least some 
discrimination during the course of their lives, especially if they wore a headscarf. Those who 
didn’t wear a headscarf explained that once they were identified as Muslims, they also 
experienced discrimination (Adlbi 2010). Indeed, it seems that these second generation 




say that the offending party knew whether to distinguish between the girl’s religious 
affiliation, immigrant heritage or ethnic background. 
Téllez’s study of Muslim youth associations in Spain is another example of a study of 
Muslims in general, primarily geared toward the second generation, and not exclusive to 
Moroccan ethnicity (again, a scarce type of demographic study in Spain, as Moroccans make 
up the majority of Spanish Muslims, and are often the targeted population of study). As 
briefly referenced earlier, Téllez found that Muslims from around 30-35 seemed to shy away 
from religious identification, perhaps because of how it could be associated with being 
perceived as immigrants. Younger Spanish Muslims seemed to possess a stronger Muslim 
identity, though they practiced on a more individual level, which they combined hand in hand 
with pursuing association work as “a good Spanish citizen.” She theorized that the desire to 
be considered a “good or bad” Muslim or a “good or bad” Spanish citizen is the result of 
policies directed towards Muslims, not only in Spain but in other European countries (2011).  
However, Téllez noted that in contrast with other countries she compared, Spain has 
recognized the necessity of facilitating religion in its state policies and legal code, rather than 
viewing it as threat (Ibid.). In another Téllez study, she explained that her target group was 
not composed of immigrants or those that suffer from legal exclusion, but youth that seek 
social approval and political representation (2008). Again, rather than being uncooperative in 
integration processes as some maintain, and perhaps as a result of these accusations, Muslim 
youth were attempting to find acceptance as good citizens or societal contributors. 
Conclusion 
Studies so far indicate that the majority of Spanish Muslim youth can be characterized 
by their openness to integration, along with an awareness of being discriminated against due 
to their faith. While access to formal rights seem to be robust, an attitude of mistrust in 
society and lack of rights implementation can still make integration difficult. A tendency to 




trend that seems to be common throughout Europe. The Spanish state itself presents several 
distinguishing characteristics in its relationship with Islam, including its Concorditarian 
church-state structure, its familiarity with organized religion, its acceptance of immigration, 
its relatively new experience with Muslim immigration and its openness to formalized 
integration policies.  
Thus far, in order to provide a context for the experience of the second generation in 
France, Great Britain and Spain, there has been an explanation of European immigration and 
integration realities and policies, church-state structures and societal attitudes (including the 
phenomenon of European secularization). While there is relatively substantial comparison 
with Spanish Muslims and other European counterparts, it is more difficult to find ready 
comparisons with second generation Spanish Muslims (i.e. specifically Muslim youth of 
migrant origin). This is perhaps due to the recent arrival of this cohort, or may find its cause 
in the nature of second generation integration and the very diverse paths to integration this 
population faces. Moreover, increasingly individualized religious belief among these youth, 
and the variegated forms of practice that can result, further adds to this diversification. With 
this in mind, we approach the specific case study of Madrid, in order to examine to what 
extent religious identity and identification with the host society may influence each other 
(whether one the other, mutually or not at all). Madrid and the identity of its young second 
generation is an important case study, as this Spanish city, with a larger Muslim population 
spread through diverse neighborhoods, has the potential to set a precedent for successful 
cohesion. This contrasts with countries bearing longer Muslim integration trajectories, where  







The empirical analysis recorded self-identification and sense of belonging, including 
religious identity, as well as explored related experiences of discrimination and their impact. 
Moreover, throughout the course of the study, the population demonstrated expectations of 
rights recognition. A pattern of hybrid identities repeatedly included evidence of attachment 
to Spain or the community of residence, demonstrating high levels of integration and social 
adaptation on the part of the youth. Meanwhile, societal and institutional discrimination 
simultaneously threatened cohesion and presented cautionary lessons for future trajectories. 
Throughout the discussions and analysis, experiences of discrimination frequently linked to 
self-identity as well as to individual and collective rights claims.  
The findings both align with and digress from results in other Spanish and European 
studies. For example, in the taxonomy outlined earlier in this work, various investigations of 
European Muslim youth were categorized into research that either explored themes of 
religious individualism, reactive identity, European Islam or a sense of belonging. The latter 
trend is most emphasized in this study, and this sense of belonging is the first pattern that 
will be examined in the empirical analysis. Moreover, religious individualism was also 
observed, and European Islam surfaced in the sense that participants expressed hybrid 
identities in how their religious identity, and other identities or beliefs, were blended 
together (albeit again, the concept “European Islam” risks essentialism and for that reason is 
not termed as such in the below analysis). Finally, the reactive identity explored in other 
studies is not particularly apparent in this investigation, although experiences of 
discrimination did sometimes link to feelings of alientation. Apart from the comparative 
patterns in relation to previous research, the various trends observed and unique to this 
study, particularly that of the rights claims, provide a point of departure from which to offer 




Initial observations  
In order to communicate the participants’ views as directly as possible, the languages 
are reported as the participants termed them, so as not to obscure any intentional or 
unintentional reasons for their being specific or general about the language or languages they 
spoke. The reader will notice that there is varying reference to Castilian or Spanish. Castilian 
and Spanish can be understood as referring to the same language, although of course the 
Spanish language varies regionally. The participants also sometimes made distinctions 
between Moroccan and Arabic. Moroccan Arabic is a dialect of Arabic, while Arabic may refer 
to the general standard Arabic derived from Classical Arabic. Berber is a language originating 
in North Africa that is spoken by large populations in Morocco, and Riffian is a northern 
Berber language spoken by ethnic Riffians. Just as the languages have been as literally 
translated as possible, the term Madrileño will not be translated. This term seemed the most 
accurate way to communicate the participants’ manner of expressing that they were “of 
Madrid.”  
Of the five first generation participants, none had Spanish citizenship, and while four 
of the eight generation 1.5 did not hold Spanish citizenship, two of them were planning on 
receiving it within a few months. The following chart lists: each participant’s first name; 
whether they were first, 1.5 or second generation; their age; the origin country of their 





Origin Gender Identity Languages 












Moroccan Spanish, Arabic, French 
Aya 2 16 Ceuta F 
Spanish 
Muslim 





                                                          
29 Jauad, Jihan and Nouha chose to select an age bracket rather state their exact age. Jauad 
selected bracket 26-30 years and Nouha and Jihan 16-20. The average of the respective brackets was 
calculated and Jauad, Jihan and Nouha assigned ages 28, 18 and 18, respectively, to enable the flow of 
the narrative. All other ages are the exact age the participant stated at the time of the interview.  




Arabic, Spanish, Italian, 
Romanian; prefers Arabic 
Ayeh 2 20 Morocco F 
Spanish 
Muslim 
Arabic, Spanish; prefers 
Arabic 
Ayim 2 30 
Morocco, 
Egypt M 
“Sum of my 
experiences” 
Arabic, Spanish, English; 
prefers Spanish 




Arabic, Spanish; prefers 
Arabic 
Hanaa 2 20 Morocco F Muslim 
Spanish, Moroccan; prefers 
Spanish 









European Spanish, Arabic 





a person and 
that's it” Spanish, Syrian, Moroccan 
Iman 1.5 23 Morocco M 
Muslim, 
Spanish, and 
Arab Spanish, Arabic 





Spanish, German, Arabic; 
prefers German 






Castilian, Arabic, Berber; 
prefers Castilian 
Jihan 1.5 18 Morocco F 
Muslim 
Moroccan  
Spanish, Arabic, English, 
Catalan; prefers Spanish 
Laila 2 24 Morocco F 
Muslim 
Madrileña 
Arabic, Spanish; prefers 
Spanish 
Malek 1 25 Tunisia F 
Tunisian, 
Muslim 
French, Arabic, English, 
Spanish 
Moha 1.5 29 Morocco M Moroccan Moroccan, Spanish 
Monaim 1.5 20 Morocco M 
“I try to feel 





you”; Muslim  










Spanish; prefers Spanish 
Nessrin 1.5 32 Morocco F 
Muslim 
Moroccan 
Spaniard Castilian, Arabic 
Nouha 1 18 Morocco F Moroccan 
Arabic, Moroccan, French, 
Castilian; prefers French 







Arabic), Spanish, Arabic, 
Ingles; prefers Spanish, 
English 
Obadah 2 26 Palestine M 
Citizen of the 
world 
Arabic, Spanish; prefers 
Spanish 




Arabic, Spanish; prefers 
Arabic 





like that, but 





Spanish, Arabic; prefers 
Spanish 






Moroccan, Spanish; prefers 
Spanish 
Sami 1 33 Morocco M Moroccan 
French, Arabic, Spanish, 
English; prefers French 
Tariq 1 25 Senegal M 
Muslim, 
Senegalese 
Londoner Arabic, English, Castilian 
Warda 2 19 Morocco F 
Muslim 
Spaniard Moroccan, Castilian 














Again, the participants were identified as Muslim based on their own self-analysis. As 
displayed above, 31 of the 32 youth identified as Muslim; one second generation participant 
with Muslim family on his father’s side did not identify as Muslim or religious. Out of the 31 
identifying as Muslim, four described themselves as Muslim but non-religious. Of those that 
defined themselves as religious Muslims, there was a range of difference as to what that 
might signify in several areas, including but not limited to: whether they considered 
themselves as practicing; what they defined practicing to be; whether they felt observation of 
traditional practice necessary to be considered religious; and whether they believed religion 
was an individual relationship with God or also had a collective and visible component. 
Several times participants explained how they would adapt their practice to the Spanish 
workday, or their observance of religious dietary constraints as best they could, given the 
options they had available. These aspects are addressed both in further exploration of 
religious identity, and in conclusions regarding efforts on the part of these youth to adapt 
their beliefs to societal norms and quotidian reality. 
Initial note on participants’ religiosity 
While religious practice or spirituality may be individualized among many of the 
participants, it is notable how many strongly identify as Muslim. Of course, the sample was 
selected on the condition that participants self-identify in some way as Muslim, or at least 
that they have self-identifying Muslim parents. Still, it could be argued that this group’s 
spirituality, or religious orientation and identity, may contrast somewhat with their 
counterpart peers with native parents. These peers may have originally grown up Catholic, 
but perhaps no longer identify as such, or do not express the same degree of religiosity. In a 
2008 CIS survey studying religiosity among participants ages 18 and above with only Spanish 
nationality, 27.7% percent identified as practicing Catholic, 45.8% as non-practicing, 14.5% 
Zacarias 2 18 Morocco M 
Muslim 
Spaniard 
Arabic, Spanish; prefers 
Spanish 
Zayneb 2 13 Ceuta F 
Spanish 




as non-believing and 9.6% as atheist, with 46% explaining that they never attend religious 
events.  
Again, this treads contested territory, as some have argued for an interpretation of 
Islam as wielding more overwhelming power than other religions, citing the strength of youth 
religiosity and rising numbers of faith adherents in a purportedly secular Western context. As 
mentioned before, the threat of reactive religiosity due to marginalization is also frequently 
presented (Torrekens and Jacobs 2016). Indisputably, there has been a trend of de-
Christianization in recent history in most Western countries, perhaps with the exception of 
nations like the United States, Ireland, and Poland (Gorski and Altinordu 2008). 
It seems reasonable to keep in mind Durkheim’s emphasis on the element of 
solidarity as characteristic of religion. And, in the migration context, to understand that when 
examining integration of religious identity, one should consider the totality of the integration 
process. Perhaps a Muslim identity is especially important to these youth as the second 
generation in Europe, as essentially they may find themselves to be minorities (in various 
aspects, apart from religion) in a vulnerable and often disadvantaged position. Muslim 
identity may allow them additional support, community and sense of belonging in the face of 
obstacles due to migrant origin and minority status (Slootman 2015). In fact, in a 
postnational framework of social relations, formal and information Muslim collectives can 
indeed provide communal support in a variety of ways. As Soysal explains,  
“Some of these associations function as ethnic interest groups, claiming for their 
members not only religious, but also political, social, and economic rights. Like their 
secular counterparts, they take stands on such migrant issues as racism, 
discrimination, and integration. Other Islamic associations are involved in economic 
activity, usually small-scale enterprises, such as local broadcasting stations, travel and 
insurance agencies, import-export shops, bakeries, and grocery stores” (1997). 
In fact, the economic support desrcibed by Soysal, provided by ethnic enclaves and in 
this case, religious communities, can be very important to creating social cohesion and 
establishment within a community. As described in the second generation literature review, 




"outsiders" to better integrate into the societal fabric and gain equal footing with native 
counterparts (Waldinger 1995).  
Above all, modern society has fundamentally recognized the significance of religious 
belief by enshrining religious choice and freedom in its international human rights norms. It 
seems perilous to make value judgments about one belief system wielding more power than 
the other. Still, it remains important to address determinants of religiosity, especially within 
the European context. Some factions argue that religion is illegitimate in public life, and 
where there has been a historically continuous debate about church that continues to 
permeate the discourse even today. Nonetheless, in such an analysis, it is important to remain 
cognizant that the liberal systems governing our societies operate on the principle that 
protection of the rights of individuals is paramount to a functioning coexistence.  
Self-identification and sense of belonging 
These initial observations provide a preliminary starting point from which to embark 
on a series of analyses that address the root of the theses questions, beginning with findings 
regarding sense of belonging, or expressions of attachment, as part of identification. Of the 19 
second generation participants, 16 made some reference to Spanish or Madrid identity in 
their thoughts about self-identification. Out of the three that didn’t, two were instead 
emphasizing their identity as a world citizen (not exclusive of Spanish affiliation); one more 
selectively identified as Muslim because of the discrimination she felt from Spanish society, to 
be addressed in more detail. Out of eight generation 1.5, five referenced some ties to Spanish 
or Madrid identity. One of the five first generation participants expressed affiliation with the 
city of Madrid, and the rest identified with their origin country. While they are relatively 
small comparative groups, the first generation selection is useful in comparing the second 
generation’s affiliation with their community, whether that of Madrid or Spain. It is of course 
notable that overall, more of the second generation conveyed sense of attachment to the 




generation did not express attachment to their place of residence. These brief first 
impressions begin to provide an overall idea of sense of belonging among the population 
investigated. 
In fact, sense of belonging to Spain or to the immediate community manifested itself 
in various aspects, and before proceeding to explain how this only formed a part of these 
participant’s identity, it should be noted that Spanish identity was not only communicated by 
the declaration “I am Spanish.” It was especially marked when they recounted experiences of 
discrimination and found themselves having to defend their Spanish loyalty. Moreover, while 
they may have not specifically identified as Spanish in the chart above, some second and 1.5 
generation youth felt most at home in Spain, and indicated they planned on remaining in 
Madrid or Spain in the future. For example, Jauad, a 28-year-old financial analyst and 
generation 1.5, identified as Moroccan and part Madrileño, and said he felt more at home in 
Spain than in Morocco. He wanted to stay in Madrid in the future. Jihan, an age 18 university 
student and also generation 1.5, said she felt Muslim and Moroccan, but felt more at home in 
Spain than in Morocco, preferred to speak in Spanish, and wanted to remain living in Madrid. 
Safia, a 22-year-old, second generation university student, did not specifically identify as 
Spanish, but considered herself more at home in Spain than in Morocco, did not feel different 
than other Spaniards, and wanted to live in Spain in the future. Several more examples like 
these demonstrate that while participants may not have resonated with a specific national 
identification, they still manifested attachment to their community.  
As attachment can be multiple, it is important to examine, with attention to detail and 
aided by specific accounts, how a sense of belonging or lack thereof figures into the hybrid or 
complex identities the participants communicated over the course of their interviews. 
Throughout the data and discussions, self-reported, multi-faceted self-identities surfaced. In 
the basic outline one can observe different combinations of nationality, community ascription 
or identification with Islam (again, with varying interpretations of what being Muslim 




the trend of emphasizing individuality and the rejection of exclusive and bounded identities 
is addressed first, there are also several other patterns reflecting an underlying hybridity 
theme. To varying degrees, participants identified: multiple language use in interacting with 
different groups; national identification that differed from language preference; diverging 
understandings of religious identity and combinations with other expressions of identity; the 
desire to live abroad in the future; and a feeling of “neither here nor there,” as produced by 
experiences of discrimination. These patterns, albeit drawing from diverse backgrounds, 
reflect relationships with the variables of religiosity and discrimination identified earlier.  
A final consideration to take into account when analysing the empirical data relating 
to sense of belonging includes the Padrón referenced earlier in this work. Again, the Spanish 
municipal resident registry, independent of citizenship or legal status, is a very particular 
case, and provides several social rights that migrants and foreigners would not have 
otherwise. In allowing one to become resident of a municipality and have access to various 
rights, including public health care there is a possibility that this provides for a sense of 
belonging in a way that other countries, even those that endorse the welfare state, cannot. In 
particular, this is especially relevant when considering generation 1.5 participants, as they 
may have had access to schooling and other services before they were regularized as Spanish 
citizens. Jauad, generation 1.5, came to Spain around the age of ten, and still does not hold 
Spanish citizenship. However, he identifies as from Madrid, and underwent Spanish 
schooling; he continued on to receive a Master level education. Similarly, Jihan, generation 
1.5, at the time of interview had lived in Spain for 18 years without citizenship, and was 
planning on receiving it in a few months; she had also completed her education through 
secondary and is now in university, and feels most at home in Spain. Perhaps the Padrón is a 
factor in sense of belonging in that it allows residents of the community, and especially these 
youth, to become a part of the system and access rights, despite holding a foreigner status or 




Hybrid identities and emphasis on the individual and the collective 
A few of the participants that typified a pattern of hybridity directly articulated an 
emphasis on individuality, alongside a rejection of bounded nationality and an embrace of 
multi-faceted, fluid identity. They described their own understandings of identity in terms 
that very much resembled what new citizenship theories advocate: accommodating pluralism 
and encouraging engagement at both the individual and universal level. In fact, some even 
referenced the universal in their accounts. Ibrahim, a second generation and 22-year-old 
student, provided an extended reflection on individual and universal identity that also 
touched upon how identity can change over time, how it is subjective, how it can take the 
shape of a process of self-reflection, and how it is above all, multiple:  
“There are stages in our life where we reject a little bit our identity or our origins, 
sometimes we are more closed to it, I think that it is according to the stage, but in the 
end, I believe I am many things. I couldn’t say that I’m only Spanish, I also couldn’t say 
that I’m not Spanish because it’s a reality. But I also can’t deny that I’m Arabic or I am 
Moroccan or that I’m Muslim or that I am a lot of other things that later I’ve taken as I 
go… in all of my personal life experience I have been travelling an I have realized that 
I’m many things, that I’m also European in my way of seeing many things. I was born 
in Europe, I’m European. And it could be that I have much more in common with a 
well-traveled Spaniard than with a Moroccan from a small town, because we find 
ourselves in the same thing, we grew up in the same way. Basically, I also believe that 
the Spanish identity is a little complex. What is Spanish, right? …. And I think it’s true 
that I for example, or the fact of being Spanish or from Madrid makes me share this 
identity with a lot of people from Madrid, and the fact that I am Arabic means I have 
something in common with these people although they are from different worlds, but 
in the end, I feel I share things with them. … We are composed of many things, we 
can’t limit ourselves. Identity is multiple.” 
At the collective level, Ibrahim noted that one can experience a common identity not 
only based on ethnicity, race, culture, or creed, but on shared experience of daily life, and that 
a sense of community can reach a universal level. Obadah, a 26-year-old second generation 
dentist, also transmitted a global attitude: “I identify as a citizen of the world, because I was 
born here, but my family, my origins are from there. I was born in Granada, but later I lived in 
Valdepeñas and then came to Madrid. I have so many places that I don’t feel rooted in one. I 
am a citizen of the world, you have to change the chip, there aren’t as many borders between 




has…we have to open the mind and think of what we have in common with people, rather 
than what sets us apart.” Both Obadah and Ibrahim evoked Massey’s “global sense of place” as 
they communicated their understandings of and engagement with identity (1994). Ihsan, a 
20-year-old student, also argued for a more universal personhood: “I can initially say I am 
Spanish and Muslim, but what can I say, I’m a person, and that’s it.” 
Rami, a 30-year-old polling analyst with a Moroccan father and the one participant in 
the study that did not identify as Muslim or religious, similarly rejected the idea of identifying 
with a certain nationalism, or the idea of identity as static.   
“I don’t think this way, you know? For example, I have travelled to other places, like 
Morocco, I’ve travelled to Paris, and to Rome, and honestly to me any city abroad, 
where are you from? …Washington. If I went there, I’m sure I’d love it and I would feel 
like I’m from there. Even though I’ve only been once. You know? I don’t think in this 
way that, if I’m from Spain I am Spanish. In this I feel certain. Although of course I feel 
Spanish. Because I have friends, I have my family. But I also feel Arab, I feel like I’m 
from there. No, for example if you ask me here, I would say I am Spanish, but if I go to 
another place, I don’t say I’m Spanish. I say I’m from Madrid, for example. I don’t have 
nationalism like that.”   
The emphasis on an unbounded and continual reconstruction of identity continues via 
30-year-old, second generation international development professional Ayim’s description of 
his identity:  
“Honestly, I identify as the sum of my experiences that have composed my identity. 
Something that makes it unique is that I speak and write Arabic, a characteristic that 
unites me with a large part of the population. I grew up in Spain, where I have had the 
most important experiences of my life, and Madrid is my city. I consider myself 
Muslim, the religion in which I was raised. So, the sum of all these experiences, this is 
what makes me who I am.”  
 
Further expressions of hybrid identities 
The youth referenced explicitly argued for a heterogenous, de-territorialized, and 
fluid identity in no uncertain terms, with reference to the collective and the individual. The 
majority of the remaining participants (generations 1.5 and second) also expressed hybrid 
identities (again, as available in the chart), sometimes even directly asserting that identity 




nationalities or communities. Beyond that, hybrid identity almost always included 
identification with Islam, with differing interpretations of what being Muslim signified (to be 
further discussed). Moreover, among those that did not combine nationalities or communities 
in their self-identification, some would identify with a certain country, but then would prefer 
to speak the language of another, or saw their future in a different country.  
Hybrid national or community identifications included participants like Iman, a 
generation 1.5, 23-year-old engineer. He explained: “I identify as Muslim, Muslim and 
Spanish, also. Also Arab. I don’t have any problem with it. You don’t have to feel only Muslim 
or Spanish or Arab, there’s no reason, so I feel like all of them. If you call me Arab, yes, I speak 
Arabic perfectly. If you say Spanish yes, perfectly Spanish. If you say Muslim, yes, perfectly 
Muslim. I can identify with any of them without an issue.” Nur, a second generation, 13-year-
old student, identified as Spanish, Muslim and Madrileña with Syrian origins. She felt most at 
home in Spain, although in the future she wanted to travel and perhaps live in another 
country, like the US. Yusuf, an 18-year-old second generation student, explained his Riffian 
origins, and identified as a believing Muslim that feels more Moroccan when with his family, 
and more Spanish when with his friends. Chaima, 16 and second generation, identified as 
Spanish, Muslim, and partially Moroccan, feeling most at home in Spain. Zacarias, an 18-year-
old second generation student, while identifying as a Spanish Muslim, felt at home both in 
Spain and Morocco. 
Nessrin, a 32-year-old lawyer and generation 1.5, identified as Muslim, Moroccan and 
Spaniard, and elaborated on why she believes a hybrid identity is an asset:  
“I never thought about the question of identity until I was in an interview a couple of 
years ago. They asked me if I felt Moroccan or Spanish and I didn’t answer because I 
didn’t know what to answer. I never thought about having to choose between one or 
the other, and I always thought that both added up to more than the two alone. So, I 
don’t know how people see me, but I think above all they see me as special because 
they see me as different. I have the two things, the two worlds, and I like to work with 
that and I think it’s something beautiful, I can show to the world that you can be 




She went on to further describe how her facility for Arabic has opened many doors for her in 
her career in Spain, and how she saw that as an advantage, as well.  
Hybridity in language use 
As demonstrated in the chart, the participants often communicated in multiple 
languages, depending on the environment or in which they found themselves. This enabled 
them to connect and navigate among a variety of groups. Obadah, like Nessrin, valued the 
advantage multiple languages provided: “It is very important and good what my parents did 
with me, because they have insured that I have another language, and what is more, culture.” 
Of the first generation participants, there was an unsurprising preference to speak in another 
language apart from Spanish, although Nouha and Rajae confirmed they spoke in Spanish 
often. For those that went into their language use in detail, most of the second and 1.5 
generation confirmed that they largely spoke Spanish among friends, including Amal, Ayah, 
Ayeh, Ayim, Chaima, Hanaa, Ismail, Jauad, Jihan, Laila, Monaim, Moseen, Obadah, Nessrin, 
Nouha, Nur, Obadah, Rami, Safia, Warda, Yusuf, Zacarias and Zayneb. Arabic was sometimes 
spoken in the home at least partially, and if they had friends with migrant origins, they often 
used a mix of Arabic to speak with them.  
For example, as Iman described it, it would depend which language was more useful 
given the context: “with my friends it depends, a bit more [in Spanish], there are times when 
it’s not easy in Spanish and other times when it’s not easy in Arabic. It depends on what you 
are talking about, because sometimes you feel like a subject is a lot easier than the other.” 
Ayeh, a 20-year-old second generation student, similarly commented, “with my friends I 
speak in mixed [languages], because we are used to speaking Spanish, but if there’s an Arabic 
word, we use it.” Even with family and first generation parents, the language depends on the 
context. As 20-year-old, second generation student Ihsan described, “It depends on who I am 
talking to. When my mom is happy…we speak in Moroccan. When she’s angry we speak in 




Moroccan jokes.” Nur, second generation and 13, spoke with her parents in a mix of Spanish 
Arabic [“Españarabe”], and with her siblings in Spanish or English.  
Remaining in Spain in the future 
As demonstrated so far, most of these youth expressed an affiliation with the 
community, either via identity, sense of belonging, or language use. They maintained these 
links simultaneously alongside hybrid identities and practices. As could be expected, of the 
first generation, only one participant expressed the desire to remain in Spain in the future. 
However, four 1.5 and five second generation participants agreed they were content to 
remain in Spain in the future, often in Madrid. At the same time, others, while identifying with 
Spain in some form, were either reluctant to limit themselves to Spain in the future, looked 
forward to possibilities abroad, or thought there were improved job opportunities abroad. 
Ibrahim, who had also identified with Spain and Madrid in part, believed that he had more to 
learn from living abroad: “The truth is that I believe I really don’t [want to stay in Spain in the 
future]. In the short term I don’t think I want to stay in Madrid. Because I believe there is a lot 
of world to discover, a lot of things to see, and to stay, above all when you are young, within 
four walls, limits you a lot, and I would like to get out, to live abroad for many years.” Yusuf 
also said that he might like to just try living in France or Germany.  
Nessrin (who again identified as Muslim, Moroccan and Spaniard) explained she 
couldn’t predict the future, or rule out the possibility of job opportunities outside of Spain: 
“I’m more carpe diem; I don’t know what’s going to happen in life. I don’t know what’s going 
to happen in 10 years. I feel very comfortable in Spain at the moment, and I can say I am in a 
very rich and fulfilled part of my life but you never know. Many things can happen, like a job 
opportunity, the love of your life.” Others, like Iman, believed that he might have to go with 
his current job to another country, like Germany, for work. Presumably, search for economic 





However, second generation, 20-year-old student Ayeh specified that she thought her 
job opportunities were limited in Spain because she wore the veil: “I love Spain, but the only 
problem I would have in the future would be working with the veil, I would have to work in 
other country. But apart from this problem with work, this country is very good. The problem 
is that there is still a lot of discrimination in that regard.” Several participants were 
concerned about women who wore the veil facing discrimination in the labor market. 
Experiences of discrimination remained a consistent and reoccurring theme both in 
discussions of identity and expectations of inclusion or societal participation. Of course, these 
experiences and how they impacted identity and expectations require much more profound 
description and analyzation. It is indeed difficult to even separate discussion of 
discrimination from the overall narratives the participants presented. Still, a bit more 
exploration of the religious component of these hybridized identities follows, before outlining 
accounts of discrimination and proceeding to how it relates to identity and expectations of 
inclusion.  
Religious identity as part of hybrid identity 
Again, apart from one second generation participant with Palestinian origins, 
interviewees self-identified as Muslim, with varying degrees as to whether this identification 
presented as religious belief or spirituality versus sociocultural practice. Ayim, for example, 
identified as Muslim, but not religious. At the same time, he still sometimes went to mosque 
and observed Ramadan, although didn’t generally observe dietary restrictions or pray. 
Obadah also identified as non-religious, though he did observe dietary restrictions, and made 
efforts to observe Ramadan; he explained that in Spain in recent years, it has been taking 
place in the summer, with very long and hot days. Without the possibility of modifying the 
Spanish workday, it had been difficult. Nouha, 18 and first generation, also responded that 
she was not religious, and barely went to mosque, but she did observe Ramadan and did not 




The rest of the participants identified as religious or at least did not deny religiosity. 
Of the 1.5 and second generation, 11 could be described as traditionally observant: they 
attended mosque regularly, prayed regularly, observed Ramadan and followed dietary laws. 
Many also participated in traditional practice, with the exception of attending mosque. This 
seemed to occur for several reasons. One reason, expressed by Yusuf and Moseen, included 
that it was difficult to fit mosque attendance into the Spanish workday, although they 
attempted to do so. Warda, a second generation, 19-year-old university student, explained 
that she did not attend mosque because she did not have access to one for women, though her 
father attended regularly, and she did go to mosque when she visited her extended family in 
Morocco.  
Seven out of the eight that replied yes to frequent observance of all questions about 
traditional practice, but indicated they did not frequently attend mosque (if ever), were 
female. It is argued that Islamic precepts only oblige men to attend mosque. Shannahan notes 
that UK mosque space is preferential to males; Smits and Ultee cite different studies of 
Muslim immigrants in the US and Belgium, as well as of Muslims in several countries, 
reporting higher male mosque attendance (2014; 2013). As such, it might be inferred that the 
participants not attending mosque frequently or at all, may simply indicate a varying 
understanding of what constitutes traditional practice of Islam.  
In fact, about eight in the 1.5 and second generation groups were traditionally 
observant apart from frequently attending mosque. Rajae, a 30-year-old, first generation 
Arabic teacher from Morocco, with a second generation husband, observed that attending 
mosque in Spain, in her experience, seemed to assume another meaning from what it 
signified in her origin country:  
“Here in the mosques in Europe, they can take on a different role than mosques in a 
Muslim country. For example, I come to the mosque to pray and perform my religious 
activities, but apart from that, the mosque is a place where we can do interesting 
things, like teach Arabic, provide activities for young Muslims—for example, young 




about a religious theme. So, the mosque relates to things apart from religion, we do 
community things.”  
 
Muslim identity, individualized practice and privatization of faith 
Apart from varied mosque attendance, some also reported that finding a halal option 
was complicated, and that they sometimes didn’t pray consistently. While identity, citizen 
claims and discrimination were more prevalent patterns, it is additionally noteworthy and 
not extraneous that some youth in this study expressed an individualized and private 
spirituality that mirrored the findings of other studies discussed in Chapter Five. Again, 
studies in England, France, and Spain found that Muslim youth of migrant origin approached 
religion in a more individualistic way than their parents, especially in comparison with what 
might be considered traditional practice (Kashya and Lewis 2012, Beaman 2016, Téllez 
2008).  
In terms of dietary restrictions, participants discussed how options in Spain could be 
sometimes limited, though they often observed this is a non-critical manner, and adapted 
their practice to the reality they faced. For example, Iman admitted that eating halal was a bit 
complicated, but that in recent years more options were available, including more Pakistani, 
Turkish and Indian restaurants that provided halal meals. Aya, an age 16 second generation 
student, also said that it was difficult to determine whether products contained pork, but that 
one can adjust. Indeed, pork and dishes containing pork are prevalent in traditional Spanish 
cuisine. Ayah, a generation 1.5, 18-year-old student, maintained that almost everything 
contained pork, but that simply meant being careful and reading ingredients when buying in 
the supermarket. Obadah also said options had improved, explaining that there were more 
halal butchers. Ibrahim, on the other hand, did not eat halal because he found it very difficult 
to manage in Spain. Moha, Monaim, and Ayim said they infrequently ate halal.  
Sometimes a break from tradition could be found in informal education. A few 




young, including Arabic classes in order to read religious texts, or religious classes at a 
mosque or community center. At the same time, others combined or replaced religious 
education with informal self-study. Amin, a twenty-two-year-old second generation student, 
who also worked and volunteered part-time, described his religious study:  
“We were in an Islamic science course but didn’t finish. But then we liked to read a lot, 
read texts like the Koran or hadiths, go to talks. And we have a lot of wise friends that 
can explain correct interpretations. … for interpretation, because some things in 
earlier times are not like today, a lot of things have changed. And there are things that 
maybe were applicable then or things that don’t make any sense to apply today.”  
Moseen, 35, second generation, and a graphic designer, also advocated for educating yourself 
in addition to formal study, taking initiative in sorting out correct information from 
misinformation, and knowing which sources to seek.  
And of course, another way in which this individualized practice manifests itself is in 
the behavior described above: how prayer may be conducted on the individual rather than 
communal level (i.e., prayer at home vs. attending mosque), and how sometimes the above 
mentioned dietary restrictions are not followed. Moseen elaborates further on how prayer is 
adapted, given the situation:  
“It depends on the circumstance of everyone, for studies, for work, depending your 
schedule, if you are out all day, the prayers may add up, and when you get home, you 
pray the whole day and that’s it. You should follow to the schedule but logically you 
can’t. Well, here God, or Allah, however you want to call him, is very flexible, so you 
can get home and pray the whole day and it’s not a problem.”   
In addition to customized and varied practice of the religion, a few participants 
stressed the personalized and private nature of their faith. Zacarias, a second generation, 18-
year-old student, disclosed that there were some principles of Islam he thought were too 
strict, and agreed that religion should be a private matter between an individual and God, 
because it was a very personal matter for each individual. Ayim similarly explained, “I think 
religion should be lived as an individual experience, in a lucid and conscious way. [I am in] 





Obadah also added that he did not believe in all of the principles of Islam because he 
felt religious prescriptions, independent of creed, were written many centuries ago, and that 
they needed to progress alongside modern society. He felt that religion could be manipulated 
for human purposes, though Islam was most impervious to this because it preserved the 
word of God in the most unmitigated form. He also noted that an individual relationship with 
God and the spirit of the law, rather than the letter, was what he found most important:  
“At the end of the day it’s between me and God. Moreover, I think that it doesn’t help 
to go mosque every day so they see you praying, and then later not to respect the 
values of the religion or ideology you espouse. It doesn’t do any good if you go to 
mosque and then you go home and behave badly with your daughter, with your wife--
if you aren’t respectful with everyone”  
Nessrin, professed the five pillars of Islam and its mysticism, though was skeptical of 
interpretations, or of what society had transmitted. She also emphasized the private nature of 
her belief:  
“I don’t believe in intermediaries...I think that religion is a question of the private life 
of each individual and that what people do in their house is private and I don’t care 
about, nor should I be interested in that. At the same time, this implies that society 
and governments should guarantee that people can defend their right to religious 
freedom, the religion each believes.”  
Indeed, many of the participants indicated that while they felt religion should be a 
private matter, or that there should be separation of church and state, they qualified that 
there should still be a right to religious freedom, and to open practice of one’s religion, via 
societal protection of religious pluralism. This topic, of course, has been mentioned as a key 
finding in the study; further discussion will thus ensue, especially in conjunction with the 
theme of discrimination. 
Visibility of Muslim identity 
Again, a different form of religiosity does not necessarily signify lessened belief 
(Cesari 2005). Moreover, while a trend of individualization in faith and religiosity permeated 
much of the data, this did not consequently translate to participants obscuring their Muslim 




emphasized that they were open and direct about their faith. For example, Laila, second 
generation and 24, asserts: “I’m Muslim and I practice my faith openly, and it’s not just a part 
of my life, but rather a very important facet of it, and I don’t think I should hide it.”  
Monaim, a generation 1.5, 20-year-old student, talked about how he felt he was not as 
religious as others, and said he did not believe in everything that Islam represented. Still, he 
was very open about his faith, to the point where his friends were well aware of it and tried to 
accommodate any religious practices he followed:  
“I identify more or less with Islam, for example my family is very religious and I am 
not so much but yes, more or less. I consider myself Muslim, and openly, and I go to 
mosque, for example when it’s Ramadan my friends know and they ask what time to 
have dinner to make sure that we can all eat …they are curious about it. If I am 
thinking about taking a trip there [to Morocco] I tell them and we talk a lot and I try to 
explain very openly.”  
Warda was also very candid about her Muslim identity and how she manifests it: “I’m 
Muslim and I practice openly and everyone that knows me knows I do, and to them it’s fine. 
And if it’s not fine for them, I respect all opinions, another thing is if they respect me. I am 
religious and I support al that Islam is.” Openness about Muslim identity among the 
population set was not restricted to verbal assertions, however. The visibility of Muslim 
identity could also take place via issues surrounding the veil, for example, an issue that is 
important to touch upon, not only as a matter of identity, but in terms of how it intersected 
with discussions about discrimination and individual rights.  
The veil as part of identity 
When asked why women should use headscarves or cover their head outside of the 
home, only five of the participants (two of them first generation) held that it was purely a 
religious obligation (one of the multiple choice options). The majority, about 21 males and 
females, replied instead that it was some version of a “free and personal choice” and many 
elaborated that it was an important part of identity. Females Hanna, Rajae, and Jihan, for 
example, all stressed that it was an integral part of their Muslim identity. Nessrin, who does 




rather that it was a cultural tradition. At the same time, she felt it was certainly related to 
personal identity. Males Moseen, Ibrahim, and Yusuf also thought it was very related to 
identity, and were emphatic that a woman should never be compelled to wear it.  
In fact, within those 21 that composed the ‘free and personal choice’ responders, 
many were very vocal about how it should be solely the decision of the wearer to adopt their 
head covering. As Iman explains, “I would say that it’s something the woman has to decide. A 
man can’t impose this on anyone, if a woman wants to put it on she can and if not, then not; 
it’s her thing and depends on her, her faith and her beliefs, and you can’t go there.” Ayeh, 
Ibrahim, Moha, Moseen, and Zayneb also underlined that as part of a ‘free and personal 
choice,’ no girl or woman should be ordered to wear it, including by their family. Several 
others also pointed out that just as no one should be obligated to cover their head, they 
should similarly not be compelled to uncover it. Many participants and their family and 
friends had been asked to remove their veil to access the labor market. Ayeh believed she 
would have to work in another country because of her experience at an interview. She 
recounted: “I was interviewed with the veil and they asked, ‘’Why can’t you take that cloth 
off?’ And I replied, ‘It’s called a headscarf, a veil. And I can’t.’ And they asked, ‘not even at 
work?’ And I answered, ‘No, because for me, it is like telling me to take off my shirt, it’s part of 
what I wear.’ And [they said] ‘Oh, I’m sorry, it’s an image problem.” 
Hanaa, a second generation 20-year-old, also believed it was difficult to obtain a job 
where you could cover your head or perform daily prayers. While Chaima, 16 and second 
generation, said she did not face discrimination frequently, the times she did occurred in 
school or on public transport, and she attributed this to the fact she wore the veil. Ihsan also 
reported that in public school they discouraged wearing the hijab. Malek, a first generation, 
25-year old-architect, theorized she did not encounter discrimination precisely because she 
did not wear a veil, and explained how a friend of hers was specifically told she would not be 
hired because she wore one. Moreover, Malek noted that she was discussing the subject with 




have offered her a position. Warda, still in university, had not yet attempted to access the 
labor market herself, but had three female friends that encountered resistance in either the 
interview or hiring process due to wearing a veil.  
Participants were not only preoccupied with obstacles to wearing the veil or 
headscarf in the workplace or at school, but also perceived that society identified the veil as 
foreign and “the other.” Rajae explained that she had many friends, born in Spain, who were 
treated as foreign because they wore a headscarf. Zayneb, 13 and second generation, offered 
that while she did not wear a headscarf, her sister did, and was consequently identified as 
“…moro, Moroccan or foreigner.” Moreover, Ibrahim argued that it in addition to attracting 
unwanted attention, the practice of head covering could even incite aggression: “I know many 
girls that have a lot of friends that have been attacked or molested physically and have been 
insulted and couldn’t find work, at the European level, it’s difficult. It’s complicated for girls 
who were born here. Our mothers came and were used to it. It’s a problem.” 
The topic of the veil and its intersection with identity and discrimination preludes a 
more in-depth and labyrinth exploration of experiences of discrimination. The Muslim youth 
in this study confronted penalties and bias not only due to displays of religious or cultural 
symbolism, but also as a result of skin color, their name, their migrant origins, socioeconomic 
status, an unidentified reason, or some combination of these factors. The youth faced 
discrimination that not only impeded a sense of belonging and place, but also discrimination 
that threatened to obstruct socioeconomic mobility allowing for eventual status attainment 
and increased societal recognition. If they faced resistance in the workplace or different 
treatment in education, while the majority of this particular group seems to have overcome it, 
such continued ostracitory treatment could create disparities between this minority and the 
majority population. In sorting through their experiences of discrimination, responses were 
varied as to whether they perceived it was societal or institutional, and to what factor(s) the 




overlap, and must be approached with a critical view as well as a cognizance of the processes 
behind the definition of these terms. 
Experiences of discrimination 
Discrimination sometimes directly affected identity and sense of belonging in a very 
obvious way, with a few participants even verbalizing the connection between the two. On 
the other hand, at times participants denied they felt any personal discrimination, but after 
further discussion would note examples of pervasive discrimination in society, or report 
discrimination felt by friends or family. The various patterns in participants’ experiences of 
discrimination follow, and are linked to ensuing observations regarding the youth’s claims for 
individual and collective rights. Twenty one of the 32 confirmed that they had encountered 
discrimination personally. Ten more initially may have denied personal discrimination, but 
later in the discussion would remember an event, or agreed that generally there was societal 
or institutional discrimination, or that a friend or acquaintance had been personally affected. 
Amal, a second generation, 21-year-old student, was the only one that did not perceive 
discrimination as directed at her, or as identifiable in Spanish public or private life.  
“Neither here nor there” 
The most striking repercussions of experiences of discrimination or victimization 
manifested as a sense of displacement, or a lack of belonging, in any society or community. 
Amin, who had again identified as a citizen of the world, more Spanish than Moroccan, 
explained how he experienced a sense of double displacement, despite being second 
generation with a hybrid identity: “Since I was young, and was 12 years old, 13, 14, I felt like 
here they called me, ‘You, Moroccan!,’ and later [when visiting extended family] in Morocco 
they said, ‘You, Spaniard!,’ because I came from Spain. It’s true that, our generation, the 
second generation as you call it, we feel like outsiders here and outsiders there.” Ismail, 
generation 1.5, reported that he did not feel at home in Spain or in Morocco. This out of place 




as an important issue to address in the multidisciplinary study of displacement, given the gap 
in the literature (Pratt 2003).  
Perspectives on discrimination  
Distress at feeling rejected and ostracized could, at the same time, coexist 
simultaneously with feelings of attachment to Spain and awareness of a right to inclusion. 
The case of Moseen is a particularly salient example of this: he is very adamant about his 
Spanish identity, yet relates a particularly painful experience of discrimination. When 
applying to a summer internship multiple years in a row, with a high probability of 
acceptance, he decided to investigate why he was unsuccessful:  
“It turns out that the that the executives told human resources not to hire me just 
because of my name and my origin. So there I felt, in my life, I felt really bad. I felt 
really bad for at least two or three days…It seemed to me so false, come on, I’m 
Spanish, I’m Spanish and patriotic, but they make you, they discriminate and they 
make you feel, it’s painful.”  
Moseen’s account reflects coincides with descriptions of labor market barriers due to the veil. 
Participants described a range of scenarios and settings wherein they encountered 
discrimination, and differed on whether they felt it was societal or institutional, or at the level 
of ethnic or religious bias. Many understood the discrimination to be a xenophobic or racist 
reaction, though often combined with other factors.  
Discrimination in an educational setting 
In addition to the workplace, the youth described discrimination in renting 
apartments, attempting to enter clubs and on public transport. Amin felt that Spanish media 
was especially biased in comparison to other European countries. And given that many of the 
participants were students with the educational environ as their daily reality, there were 
several reports of discrimination from either professors or fellow classmates. Ihsan reported 
biased treatment in second and third year of ESO from professors, including from the director 
of the school. When Ayeh first began school, she was the only one wearing a headscarf, and it 




know her, she was less ostracized. Ismail also reported discrimination on the part of 
professors, and Nessrin was told by a professor at 12 years old that because she was of 
Moroccan origin and had parents with little education, she only had a future in cleaning 
service. She replied that it was honest work, and then described how later she met the 
professor in Constitutional Court in her work as a lawyer, and he was taken aback.  
Several participants noted that while initially their peers harassed them, as they grew 
and progressed to later stages of education, it became less traumatic. It is difficult to 
determine whether this was because the participant had grown more comfortable with 
themselves, if the peers had become more accepting, or if the children had simply matured. 
For example, Amin reports:  
“When I was young, in school and everything, and I didn’t have Muslim friends, I 
didn’t live in Parla, I lived in a place that wasn’t as multicultural, I was ashamed 
because they said, ‘Man, moros or Muslims you are very closed and everything,’ and 
they attacked me with stuff…Today I am open about it. For example, my friends from 
university, the second or third day they already knew I was Muslim... And there wasn’t 
a problem. Everyone was very open. I think that age, when you are more of a 
teenager, when you get older people are more open.”  
Zayneb also described how she was more comfortable now than earlier in school: “In 
primary school it’s true they discriminated against me but now that I am older I feel more 
comfortable... For example, when I was in primary the people when they get mad at you or 
start something with you they say ‘Go back to your country mora’ and whatever.” Yusuf felt 
that discrimination from his peers took place when they were less mature: “when I was little 
yes, when I was little they gave me hard time in school, but now no. Everyone respects me 
because we are older and we behave well.” Finally, Aya describes increasingly less 
discrimination as she progresses in her education: “In school they discriminated against me 
because I was Muslim, they called me “mora” and all that, there were some professors who 
discriminated and fellow students at times, but ok, not that many people and very few now.” 




Many participants attributed discrimination to racist or xenophobic sentiment, 
sometimes using the two interchangeably. Others emphasized more that ignorance incited 
the biased treatment or reaction; of course, one could argue this ignorance may be fueling 
racism or xenophobia, depending on the case. Religious symbolism such as the veil could 
often be associated with ethnicity or migrant origins. Some participants, like Ibrahim, noted 
that discrimination may stem from a complex or combination of factors, including ethnicity, 
migrant origin, postcolonialism and socioeconomic disparity, among others. This section will 
attempt to sort through distinctions between ethnic or immigrant background, and 
communicate as clearly as possible the participants’ thoughts on what motivated the 
offending party, although there is considerable overlap between these causal factors.  
Chaima believed that societal discrimination in Spain targeted “everyone without 
Spanish origins, is directed against all those who have a different way of seeing life.” Hanaa 
specified that “there is discrimination in Spanish society against any social minority and more 
concretely towards immigrants with Arab or Latin origins.” Tariq, first generation, insisted 
that he faces constant discrimination and also concurs that society is resistant to foreigners. 
Sami, also first generation, found that discrimination is directed at foreigners, and more 
specifically those from Africa. He argued, however, that many are identified as foreigners 
when really they are second generation and should be recognized as equal members of 
society: “The majority of people that are ‘moro’ are from here...they are people that were born 
here and grew up, studied here. There’s a lot of them.”   
Safia, Yusuf and Ibrahim (all second generation) talked about how because they were 
perceived as foreign, and how perhaps due to the race or ethnicity the offender associated 
with them, they were grouped together with terrorists. Yusuf said that since he was little he 
had been called a “bomber, terrorist” although he contended that the majority of society was 
unbiased. Ayim, Safia and Warda agreed that terrorist incidents led to increased problems 
with islamophobia. Ibrahim noted that even if difference was not visible, like skin color or 




Arab, begets racism. So, the problem isn’t on my end. It’s not that I look the way I look, the 
problem is that we live in a racist society, in a racist Europe.” 
And so, a few felt discrimination was a result of migrant origin, and some due to 
ethnicity, though again it is important to note how many stereotypes are conflated together 
and directed at Muslims in Europe. The term ‘moro’ described in Chapter 6, is frequently 
levied at the participants, and most often, due to Spain’s demography, at Moroccans or those 
of Moroccan origin. It is a clear example of how some relegate those not just from the 
Maghreb, but from Arabic-speaking countries, or those professing Islam or with a different 
skin color, all into the same category. While people may use it as a term of identification 
without seeking to offend, it can of course be interpreted as an insult. Ibrahim continued to 
elaborate upon the term:  
“Even though I’m from Madrid, from Madrid all my life, they see me as ‘moro.’ It’s a 
concept that we make negative and doesn’t exist in Arabic, or in other languages...it’s a 
name that a lot of people in the world are grouped under, ‘moro,’ it reduces us to just 
that and it’s a negative thing. So, I believe that there is a very stereotypical vision of 
‘moros,’ as they call us.” 
While some pointed to migrant or ethnic origin as underlying discriminatory 
behavior, Monaim distinguished between a type of uneducated ignorance, versus a directed 
and intentional racism, as he explained how when he went out with his Spanish friends to 
clubs, he was denied entry:  
“Yeah, there are things that are more because of ignorance and everything, but at the 
level of big clubs in Madrid it is just racism, the security there is very fascist and they 
are Nazis that don’t accept anyone else. I think it’s about being Arab, from another 
culture, another race. They associate us with Arabs—we are thieves, we are terrorists, 
whatever cliché society has. But in other aspects I haven’t had a problem.”  
In keeping with Monaim’s distinction about an uneducated, or unaware ignorance, 
other participants also identified a lack of education as an underlying problem. Iman 
asserted: “The principal reason for discrimination is ignorance. The majority [of Spain 
welcomes religions] but there’s always a minority of ignorant people that know nothing of 




In referencing history Monaim was referring to the medieval Al-Andalus period as 
demonstrative that Muslims are not foreign to the Iberian Peninsula. Nessrin talked about 
how ignorance related to the Muslim community as associated with terrorism, as she noted,  
“I think that society has a problem, a problem with knowledge, and it’s that they aren’t 
informed. They see you as a stereotype because of fear and because of the things that 
have occurred in recent years, things that have caused society to see the Muslim 
community in a very bad light. But this is lack of information, because any person with 
basic education perfectly well knows that the most vulnerable in attacks with 
terrorist connections is the Muslim community… But I think it’s a problem of 
education and it has to do with schooling from the beginning.”  
Obadah, Laila and Moha also cited ignorance in particular as the principle driver behind 
discrimination.  
Institutional discrimination  
In addition to offering their viewpoints on what factors motivated persecutors to 
behave as they did, participants were also asked for their perspective as to whether 
discrimination seemed institutional in particular. In recalling experiences of discrimination, 
Rami, Ayim, Monaim, Moha, Nouha and Sami (the latter two are first generation) described 
incidents or difficulty with the police or with Spanish administrative entities. Sami said that 
in his neighborhood of Lavapiés, the police stopped him on a daily basis, “They see you and 
that you are Moroccan, that you are black, from Africa, or from someplace. For example, the 
police come by here every day, even though they know you, even though they came the day 
before. They come back for you today.” 
Others argued that there was institutional bias against Islam in how the Spanish state 
was configured. Nessrin, with her background in law, explained how subsidies and favoritism 
systemically were allotted to the Catholic Church, more so than to other confessions. Rami 
and Hanna also felt that Catholicism or Christianity had influence in public matters, despite a 
supposedly secular state. Zayneb and Amin pointed to regulation of mosques as indicative of 
institutional religious bias. At the time of her interview, in fact, Zayneb was protesting the 




been targeted unfairly, as they had only received three complaints over the course of 21 
years. She said that the mayor had initially visited with their community, but had changed her 
position and sought the mosque’s closure, and that the Getafe’s administration reasons to 
close the mosque were fabricated.30  
Amin objected to how mosques were designated in Spain, explaining,  
“In the Spanish Constitution, it says that it is a secular country, that all religions are 
equal, etc., but it always gives more weight to Christianity, to Catholicism. Buddhism 
or Judaism or any other religion is respected. But to have a mosque they create 
obstacles. To have a mosque, you have to open it as a ‘cultural center.’ In Tetuán there 
is one, in Madrid there are two, no, Tetuán is a ‘cultural center.’ It is a mosque but they 
call it a cultural center. The M30 is the only mosque, mosque.”  
Furthermore, he noted that because of societal pressures, his community felt the need to 
remain less visible and did not exercise a collective right to practice openly:  
“A while ago, the mosque we have here [in Parla] we went every Friday, because 
Friday is the day of collective prayer, and many people came, and there was not a lot 
of room, so we took the mats outside and prayed in the street, without interrupting 
traffic, and nothing happened. But with things like terrorism and all, we have become 
more private.”   
Some of those who reported discrimination simultaneously noted a caveat, both about 
discrimination institutionally and societally. For example, despite Nessrin’s experience of 
discrimination in education, she noted that in all of her professional experience with Spanish 
administrative bodies, she had not been subjected to different treatment:  
“The only selection process I went through was when I was working in the public 
administration, or for example the Bar Association of Madrid where I worked as an 
intern, or in the Observatory of Justice and later in the Constitutional Court…These 
were the only places that I had to interview and it was very much a meritocracy. They 
never judged me for my name, or my last name, for how I look. They never said 
anything that could have hindered my application.”  
Rami, who worked in polling and social science research, noted how at the societal level 
Spain was more open to immigration, and one of the most receptive countries in Europe. He 
                                                          
30 After weeks of protest, the Cultural Association of Getafe Al-Falah (Asociación sociocultural 
de Getafe Al-Falah) were successful in their protests, and the mosque was not closed down. The Getafe 
city government originally set a date to close the mosque down citing that it did not meet building, 




asserted that individuals were less likely to blame migrants as problematic, but instead 
political rhetoric and manipulation by the media caused bias. 
Attitudes towards discrimination  
Throughout these experiences of discrimination, due to migrant or ethnic origin, and 
either encountered institutionally or societally, a sizeable number of participants were either 
resigned to or dismissive of discrimination; sometimes, they were perhaps even hardly 
consciously aware of it. As they provided accounts, a few participants pointed out that any 
society has such problems, and as such Spain was not an especially problematic case. The 
problems were described as not terribly grave, and not alarmingly frequent. And again, 10 of 
32 initially denied personal examples of discrimination, but would later recall instances, or 
acknowledge discrimination was prevalent in general. For example, Jauad said he never 
encountered problems personally, but said discrimination existed in how a CV with a foreign 
name would not be considered for a position. Still others could come up with multiple 
experiences of discrimination suffered by those close to them. As Ibrahim put it, it seemed 
that at times, discrimination was so pervasive, it went unnoticed: “There are lots of levels, but 
I believe that many of us, well I speak for myself, I believe that to have grown up in a society 
that is racist, it has made us accept many things as normal, many things that later I realize are 
racist. It has been naturalized in the end.”  
Ihsan was one of those who noted discrimination but disregarded dwelling on it: “I 
don’t know, I dismiss it, I talk to ignorant people and that’s it and you learn and it’s done. You 
can’t focus on whether they are discriminating or not. I’m a person like you, you have to 
accept me the way I accept you, period. And that’s it. Of course, Spain could improve, but the 
public has to want to.” Similarly, Nessrin said she preferred to focus on the good, rather than 
the bad, and also tried not to dwell on the topic. Ayah said she did not let it affect her: “I 




me, because I’m not a person that gets offended and shuts up, I respond, well, I respond in a 
way, like you insulted me, you said something wrong, well explain yourself.”  
Warda noted that discrimination troubles all societies, and thus Spanish society could 
not be exceptionally faulted: “Spanish society and even Moroccan society have 
discrimination. In all societies there is discrimination, racism, homophobia, anything, in every 
society, there is no perfect one, no one respects everything.” Moha argued that discrimination 
in the labor market could be surmounted, because while there were some companies that did 
not hire Moroccans or people of color, there had to be companies that did hire them. In short, 
these youth sometimes accepted negative behavior directed at them, and did not conceive of 
themselves as victims.  
It could be argued that in a similar way, those who denied personal discrimination but 
later detailed various incidents, also did not conceive of themselves as victims. Jihan said she 
did not face discrimination, but then later mentioned an experience with a professor. Iman 
also denied any real problems of discrimination, and yet related a very arresting example in 
the workplace. When asked about discrimination directed at him, he remarked:  
“The typical comment, but really no. it was pretty problematic when a colleague for 
the yearly Christmas dinner invited all the Spaniards and not the foreigners. The 
Christmas dinner where everyone gets together. Also, there is a person I work with 
pretty closely, daily, and he is fascist, and I don’t have any problem with him, because 
he has to accept me.” 
Rami could recall even more incidents of discrimination, but denied feeling rejected 
or out of place.  
“I don’t feel this way. Discriminated against. No, no, no, no, no, no, no. It’s not the same 
as other people that yes, they were born here, and they don’t feel integrated. I am 
integrated and I haven’t had this type of situation. Sometimes. But it’s individual 
people. More times with the police, for these types of things. For example, there are 
some people in the street that give me a look. They grab their purse and everything, 
once in life that’s happened to me. But not normally. At least in my case. Others yes. 
But in my case no.”  
Monaim also described being repeatedly stopped and search by the police, being called a 




he feels welcome in Spain. He did not view discrimination as very prevalent: “I think that 
there isn’t that much discrimination, there are just little things that one notices.” Rajae also 
did not view the occasional racist comment or dirty look as an issue, because she was treated 
well by those close to her in both her professional and personal life. 
These attempts to move past the challenges they face could be interpreted as a strong 
signal of the youth’s willingness and efforts to adapt to their community, sometimes in a one-
sided attempt at what should be a two-way process of community cohesion. Perhaps, as well, 
in order to connect with their community, they were forced to look past these experiences of 
rejection in order to be able to formulate a sense of belonging. Essentially, they had to work 
harder to cooperate or ‘integrate’ in order to compensate for the lack of cooperation from 
their receiving society or community. These efforts certainly represent the opposite of a 
reactivity or self-segregation that is sometimes described of second generation Muslims in 
Europe, or Muslims in Europe in general. This downplay of discrimination experiences was 
only one approach to such challenges, however. Others were more aggrieved by such 
treatment and convinced that they deserved more respect for their rights, an important 
pattern in this study. Channeling such legitimate shock and indignation into action and 
deliberate claims for individual and collective rights could prove one way to facilitate 
improved coexistence and societal pluralism in Spain.  
Rights discourse and expectations of social participation and inclusion 
Discussions about discrimination gave rise to repeated calls for recognition as both 
individuals with rights and a collective with rights in a purportedly liberal democratic society. 
In describing experiences of discrimination, participants noted that there were either 
discrepancies between Spanish institutional and legal commitments and implementation, 
and/or societal realities. Nur expressed her frustration with the previously described issue of 




headscarf in the workplace, and to me that it is absurd and unjust, I would like to work just 
like anyone, and I have the right to do so.” 
Several others highlighted a deprivation of fundamental rights that are supposedly 
enshrined in the law at the Spanish, European and international level. Ihsan also stressed 
difficulties with the veil, in her case in school: “Supposedly we can be free, in the Constitution 
it says we have freedom of religion. So, I don’t understand why when I have to study, when I 
have to work, when I have to live my life, I need to be restricted to what you want. I don’t like 
it, I don’t understand it… because they have the law and later there is what they say.” Amin 
believed that this deprivation of the right to wear the veil, while a fundamental right, was not 
protected in Spanish law, “Of course in Spain you can’t work with the veil, there is a law that 
says companies can hire, have the right to dictate the dress they want. In England or France, 
it’s normal to encounter policies, to see women with the veil and everything. In the US too.” 
Jauad also emphasized individual fundamental rights. He pointed out that in a 
pluralist society with respect for each individual, religious practice should be accommodated: 
“Religion and politics have their respective places and shouldn’t be mixed. This doesn’t mean 
that you can’t create policies for practicing religious, and they should also be able to 
participate as citizens with full rights.  I think people practicing their religion in freedom 
should be normalized, in the same way it is for people who don’t believe.” Laila stressed how 
a citizen’s individual rights included that of religious belief and practice, as part and parcel of 
universal human rights norms:  
“Religion is an important part of some people’s lives and they practice it, so there 
should be representation in the public sphere, to ensure that there is respect for 
religious freedom and to guarantee equal treatment and the same advantages to 
people who profess different beliefs. I believe that everyone has the freedom to 
practice their religion in a public way, in their daily life, without having to hide, 
enjoying the rights and liberties as long as they don’t hurt other people and always 
respecting everyone else’s individual rights.” 
Ibrahim additionally underlined the primacy of universal individual human rights, 




anyone has the right to liberty of conscience, the liberty of thought, the freedom of religion, 
and this means having the right to show it, provided …that everyone shows what they want 
but within the limits that we have, our individual rights, without getting in the way of the 
rights of others.” He goes on to explain that he believes visibility of other religions goes 
uncontested, whereas visibility of Islam is often targeted. Chaima insisted religious 
representation should occupy both political and societal space, because “it is our way of 
thinking and acting in this world.” This reflects Statham’s point that European states are 
constrained in attempts to shape immigrant integration in the ambit of religious identity, due 
to Europe’s simultaneous commitment to ensure individual liberties, including freedom of 
thought (2016). 
Hanaa and Monaim both underscored collective rights as well, as they argued for their 
uninhibited exercise. Hanaa asserted: “Religion should be expressed in community with the 
objective of sharing knowledge and obtaining a social identity. When different religions are 
expressed in politics and society it allows for an enrichment of cultural diversity….freedom of 
religion and religious expression should be a natural right.” Monaim advocated for the rights 
of a collective within a society: “I don’t think ìt [religion] should be represented [in politics] 
but it should be taken into account, knowing that there is a group of people that have these 
customs and culture. I think that practice should be in a free manner, as each one wants.” 
Again, while these individual rights are protected by transnational and national commitments 
in theory, a complex array of factors, including societal distrust of religious attachments and 
competing confessional, secular or national ideologies, can relegate religious youth to a kind 
of ‘second class citizenship,’ bereft of full rights, as previously explained in Chapter Two 
(Taylor and Maclure 2010). 
Legal background to rights discourse 
In order to put the participants’ experiences and understandings of rights into 




or understandings. Indeed, the participants’ rights claims and indignation at rights 
deprivation find justification in both international and national legislation. At the level of 
international human rights, freedom of religion, as well as to manifest belief in public and 
private, is enshrined in Article 18 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” Similarly, 
Article 10 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights guarantees religious freedom, and Article 
22 protects religious diversity (as well as cultural and linguistic diversity), prohibiting 
discrimination based on religion. As noted in Chapter Eight, Spain’s 1980 Law of Religious 
Liberty complements the Spanish Constitution’s Article 16 right to religious liberty, as well as 
its Article 14 prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or any other 
personal or social attributes. One area where contestations arise includes in how Article 16 
also provides for the secularism or neutrality of the state. Another area of dispute includes 
how the Law of Religious Liberty allows for the right to freely manifest one’s religion and 
thus presumably religious symbols, while at the same time, Article 16 of the Spanish 
Constitution allows for limits in religious manifestation if necessary for the public order 
protected by the law. In short, public powers are called upon to strike a balance between all 
religions, and maintain a neutrality, that simultaneously allows for religious pluralism (Vidal 
2016).  
And so, despite these guarantees of freedom of religious manifestation, and as the 
participants noted, in practice they face many challenges. With regard to the claims of 
discrimination in the workplace, it could be that the employers were objecting to the veil with 
the argument that the work contract contains stipulations about a certain type of dress or 
hygiene and security norms, based on one of two legal grounds: Spanish Constitution’s Article 
38, that recognizes the rights of businesses and ensures their protection by public powers, 
and Article 20.3 of the 1980 Worker’s Law, that allows the company to oblige employees to 
meet their work requirements as so far as they meet standards of human dignity (CE 1978; 




the employer’s request did not comply with standards of human dignity, or that the objection 
to the veil was merely a matter of discrimination (rather than the employer’s concern for 
their ability to carry out workplace duties), a defense could be more easily accomplished. 
Needless to say, and as very clearly demonstrated in Malek’s case, the episodes of workplace 
rejection cited seemed to be cases of discrimination rather than grounded in the other 
constitutional provisions mentioned. Moreover, it is striking that the individual right to 
religious freedom might be less prioritized than these other constitutional guarantees 
(Pascual 2015).  
And in education, again, while there are guarantees to personal religious liberty and 
the individual right to manifest one’s religion in both the Spanish Constitution and Law of 
Religious Liberty, court cases involving wearing the veil in school often vary from case to 
case. One provision cited in defense of requiring female students to remove the veil can be 
found within the 2002 Law of Quality of Education, which delegates responsibility for school 
management to the school’s governing body (Bedmar 2010). The 1992 Law for the Protection 
of Citizen Security is another law invoked in cases against wearing the veil in school. In 
utilizing this legislation, a court case about a girl’s right to wear the veil in school could 
revolve around whether the school is public or private, what type of veil it is, and the age and 
maturity of the student (Pascual 2015). Again, one can see why Ihsan, age 20, was upset that 
she would be challenged to remove her veil in public school, as part of her internationally 
recognized right to manifest her religious convictions. The continued battle between the 
recognized right to religious manifestation is doubtless due a widespread European view that 
faith expression in the public sphere is illegitimate (Shadid and Koningsveld 2002). 
Furthermore, a Catholic bias, or foreign connotation attributed to Islam could encourage 




this study legitimately expect freedom of religious expression, and an equal treatment of their 
confession alongside Catholicism.31  
Yet another example of this struggle, as outlined earlier, is how Amin pointed to a 
deprivation of collective rights in the Spanish institutional management of mosques. Indeed, 
ambiguity in legislation and lack of implementation of the legislation that does exist has given 
rise to issues in the management of religious centers (Astor and Griera 2016). Places of 
religious worship have multiplied in number with immigration. Before, such places of 
worship might have been afforded public land or recognition by public authorities, as Ayim 
pointed out about the “M30” (Centro Cultural Islámico) mosque.32 However, increasing 
numbers of places of worship have resulted in a transfer of regulatory responsibility to local 
and city authorities. While the Observatory for Religious Pluralism provides best practice 
guides for authorities to follow, the decentralization or religious worship site regulation 
allows local authorities a great deal of leeway and thus could result in variance or 
discrepancies in the management of places of worship, and in conflicts like the one described 
by Zayneb. Regulation could include norms regarding health, security, accessibility, noise and 
capacity (Astor and Griera 2016).  
A study by Astor interviewed the leader of the mosque in Parla that Amin referred to, 
and the leader confirmed that while they had to sometimes go to the street, they had received 
minimal complaints (2009). Astor argues in his study as well that mosque opposition in 
Madrid is relatively low compared to activity in Catalonia for example (Ibid.). Still Amin’s 
concerns regarding visibility present possibility of at least mosque opposition in Madrid, and 
Zayneb’s experience in Getafe presents another example. Indeed, as establishing places of 
                                                          
31 Contestation within education, the workforce and mosque building are not the sole areas of 
confrontation. For example, is a supposed conflict between a veiled lawyer in public court and the 
guarantees within Spanish criminal law; this type of challenge did not arise in the situations presented 
by the participants and is thus not discussed here (Vidal 2016). 
32 The land for the M30 mosque was donated by former Mayor of Madrid during a visit from 





worship is managed at the local and community level, there could be a risk that local 
regulation is motivated by reasons other than facility management. Thus, the rights protected 
in the Law of Religious Liberty or the 1992 agreement with representatives of Islam could be 
jeopardized in this way (BOE-A-1980-15955; BOE-A-1992-24855). 
As such, despite this brief overview of the legislation utilized to defend what is 
interpreted to be deprivation of rights, the participants’ various instances of perceived 
discrimination seem to point to a reoccurring possibility: that conflicting legislating 
protecting rights other than that of religious liberty do not necessarily seem to be the true 
motivation behind why actors objected to the participants’ religious manifestations. In fact, it 
seemed that the participants encountered rejection or biased treatment based on migrant or 
ethnic origin or a supposed Muslim threat, rather than due to the offending actors attempting 
to protect a conflicting constitutional right. Furthermore, some participants seemed to be 
highly cognizant of this, with an awareness of the inherent priority of fundamental rights to 
religious liberty and freedom of expression, both at the individual and collective level. For 
this reason, they repeatedly demanded protection and full realization of their rights. As 
Moseen put it, 
“By right one should be free to practice any religion because you should not be 
deprived of your rights, because for example in my case I’m Muslim and if they 
deprive me of my right to, I don’t know, observe Ramadan for example, this is 
depriving me of a right. So, we can say they are completely different things, and at the 
same time I am a citizen, a Spanish citizen, I observe the Spanish Constitution and 
everything.”  
Frustration with democratic system and promise 
Unsurprisingly, given experiences of discrimination and perceptions that rights were 
denied or breached, disillusionment with the democratic system in Spain recurred 
throughout the interviews. Ayim saw room for improvement: “with its defects and virtues, it’s 
the best system we have known until now. But you have to keep working to improve those 
gaps that don’t work well.” Safia also said that she believed there were many undemocratic 




opined that while democracy was a perfect model, in practice it was riddled with corruption. 
Moseen was also critical of political corruption in Spain. Both Nouha and Ismail presumably 
also were critical of Spanish democracy, as they specifically termed the democratic system 
itself ‘a utopia.’ 
Furthermore, Obadah felt that the democratic system was immobilized by economic 
powers. Warda, interviewed in 2016, was frustrated with repeat national elections because 
the parties could not come to an agreement: “it is a lot of public spending, it’s a lot of money, 
and they can’t form a government…we could have progressed a little bit or taken a step 
forward.” Of course, given the recent Spanish recession and political climate, Spain has seen a 
fair share of political disaffection and critical voters, including among the youth of the 15M 
movement (Muñoz 2015). In fact, a CIS study conducted after the 2016 elections found that 
on a scale of 1-10, with 0 being completely unsatisfied with how democracy functioned in 
Spain and 10 being completely satisfied, roughly 61.8% of the Spanish population surveyed 
rated satisfaction at a five or below (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 2016). 
While experiences of discrimination and the obstacles these participants face may 
produce these disenchanted views of the Spanish political system, the group could also be 
simply part of a larger cohort of their peers experiencing frustration with the current 
socioeconomic and political climate in Spain. Still, it is important to note how disappointment 
with the supposed institutional safeguards protecting their citizen rights could contribute to 
disaffection and distrust of the systems in place. While only 13 of the 32 total participants 
expressed this disappointment, further obstacles and institutional failures in protecting 
rights and ensuring societal inclusion could augment this dissatisfaction and perception of 
disenfranchisement.  
Expectations of equality and pluralism  
Despite these instances of disillusionment or mistrust of institutions, there were clear 




values of equality, along with the expectations of rights described earlier. Moreover, in order 
to achieve this protection of rights, many participants upheld the principle of separation of 
church and state, with the understanding that this separation would ensure protection of 
religious pluralism. Of course, a disclaimer follows about remarking that these youth of 
migrant origin demonstrate allegiance to liberal democratic values and thus must be 
acculturating to society: it presumes inherent judgment that liberal democratic values are the 
universally accepted correct values.  As Baumann puts it, “Why should it be the nation-state 
as we know it, a supertribal and quasi-religious enterprise, to which we look for ethnic or 
religious equality, and what exactly is meant by equality?” (1999, 99). As such, an emphasis 
on the framework established in Chapter Two is key, in that a dialogical process of pluralism 
should be maintained. At the same time, from the perspective of integration and societal 
cohesion, these youth do indeed reflect mainstream cultural values in their considerations of 
equality and the public and private sphere and, consequently, acculturation with their 
country of residence.  
For example, in response to inquiries regarding gender equality, twenty-five 
participants responded there should be equal sharing of household tasks between genders, 
with only one first generation participant in disagreement. Out of the twenty-seven who 
spoke about the issue of gender equality overall, each one was a proponent of equal 
treatment. Several were very emphatic about equality in education, as well as in personal and 
professional life. Amal maintained, “Education should be equal for all and just being women 
shouldn’t make us feel inferior; everything a man can do a woman can do and vice versa.” Aya 
argued that education was in preparation for a professional career: “You don’t study for 
nothing. You study for your career and to work.”  
Warda remained critical that there was still gender wage inequality in Spain, and 
Chaima also emphasized the importance of equal salaries: “If she has chosen herself [her job] 
then both genders should receive the same salary and the same treatment.” Laila similarly 




no one should be judged by their gender, but rather by their ability to perform the requested 
task, or their knowledge and capabilities. They should receive the same treatment. And we 
should only make distinctions about whether an individual is more capable than the other.” 
Nessrin also specified that there should be no gender-based discrimination in either personal 
or professional life: “I think that a woman should develop both her personal and professional 
life to the utmost extent, and under the same conditions as men, and that there should be no 
type of discrimination.” 
Some noted that there has been an evolution in gender roles, progress that they 
supported. Warda compared her views with that of her parents’, and regarding staying at 
home with children maintained,  
“If you want to bring up kids while they are infants, but no, after a while you have to 
have a life and you don’t spend your whole life dedicated to the kids. My parents no, 
the woman has to be at home, helping, doing the chores, taking care of the kids, but 
we are more modern, the woman can be more independent, for herself, working and 
pursuing her life.”  
Iman commented: “Today, both in the Muslim world as well as the West, the woman has to 
share household tasks with the husband, because just one person can’t do it. Everyone helps 
and it seems right to me.” Amin similarly noted how that the female professional career was a 
modern reality: “In Islam, the woman can work… Now that the word is modernized, 
globalized, it is viewed as normal for men to be alongside women working, and from my point 
of view too.” All of these views on female self-determination parallel the European TIES 
survey findings, claiming that large cities enabled Muslim youth, “to claim a more 
emancipated and self-determined position for highly educated second-generation women. 
This comes up against their largely conservative communities whose mores run counter to 
female self-identities as students and working women” (Crul et al. 2012, 29). 
By in large, the conservative mores referenced in the TIES study were few. Regarding 
whether a woman should stay at home with the children, some participants either expressed 




best for the family. Amal said it was preferable for the woman to stay at home, but depending 
on economic circumstances, perhaps the woman might need to work. Amin said that he 
would not object to a woman working outside the home, but would personally prefer his 
children raised by their mother. Ayeh and Ihsan also said that educating the children, while a 
responsibility of both parents, fell more to the mother.  While this may appear to digress from 
mainstream cultural values of gender equality, a February 2018 CIS survey found that 60.6% 
of Spaniards at age 16 remembered their mother as “inactive,” including in unremunerated 
household work. As such, the few participants that expressed a preference for the female 
household member staying at home with the children does not appear to especially deviate 
from the Spanish societal norm overall (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2018). 
Separation of church and state and safeguarding pluralism  
Moreover, in keeping with liberal democratic values espoused in the Spanish 
Constitution, several in the study elaborated upon why they supported the liberal view that a 
successful public sphere necessitated a clear division between civil society and the state. In 
communicating this, they included a special emphasis on how religion as part of civil society 
should be protected. As Jauad succinctly summarized: “Religion and politics have their 
respective places and shouldn’t be mixed. This doesn’t mean that you can’t create policies for 
practicing religious, and they should also be able to participate as citizens with full rights.” 
Zacarias concurred that religion and politics should remain independent of each other, as did 
Yusuf. Moseen similarly noted, “One thing is civic responsibility and public laws, and another 
thing is religions.” Ibrahim argued that separating the two was for the sake of protecting 
religious pluralism: “I believe that in such a diverse world, more and more there are people 
sharing common spaces of things so different, religions so different and ideologies so 
different, that it seems important that everyone have their space and that there isn’t an 




Iman and Obadah also argued for separation of religious and civil law, while at the 
same time maintaining that religion was often integral to and enmeshed in society. Rami, 
while not religious, stressed that civil law should protect certain rights, like the right to 
religious freedom. Ayim similarly echoed the importance of a separation between civil society 
and politics that allowed for protection of individual rights like religious exercise: “Religion 
should be represented in civil society, with associations, organizations, collectives, but not as 
political parties and not in political life. It should be practiced in an open way, without stigma, 
but not in public spaces.” The right to free and open exercise of religion was a subject of 
consensus among the group. Twenty seven agreed that religion should be allowed to be 
openly practiced. Only one first generation Tunisian, Malek, was in disagreement, and the 
remainder had not addressed the subject.  
Indeed, a key consideration to take into account when evaluating the empirical 
findings, and referred to earlier in this work, includes how religious associations may 
influence the youth, especially as several of the young people were contacted through the 
help of associations where participants were active members. While they may be religious 
civil society organizations, these associations received funding from local government and 
municipalities in an effort to create cohesion in the community, a type of cooperation that is 
not practiced in France, for example (Eseverri 2017). Of course, institutional bias towards 
Catholicism described earlier also came up several times in the discussion about separating 
civil society and institutions; this leads to overall conclusions that while cooperation between 
religious associations and public institutions may be beneficial to providing this group with 
support, careful and vigilant management of the church and state relationship remains 
necessary. 
Moreover, safeguarding religious liberty and individual and collective rights were of 
course not only a concern expressed by the youth interviewed. Speaking with a leader from a 
Muslim faith community in Leganes and a leader from the Association Tayba, they were both 




youth had been born in or had grown up in Spanish society.33 They felt that rather than 
demanding how these youth identified, societal actors demanding such integration should 
analyze whether they were truly accepting this demographic. A social worker who similarly 
worked among second generation Muslim youth noted that she believed they were not in fact 
withdrawing or segregating themselves from mainstream society, but instead were thriving 
in remarkably multicultural and diverse communities.34 She noted that perhaps Spain had a 
better facility for encouraging interaction and pluralism given that it was “Mediterranean 
culture” of socializing outside on the street, an observation not dissimilar from the one that 
Eseverri makes about public space in her comparison study between Muslim youth in Madrid 
versus Paris (2015).  
Concluding thoughts 
As one can garner from the general narrative of the empirical data, the majority of the 
participants interviewed were very generous and forthcoming in sharing their story, and this 
open and cooperative interaction is indeed a striking pattern. Of course, it could be that those 
who were more reticent would not accept an invitation to interview in the first place, as 
oftentimes invitations to interview were rejected over the course of the field work.  
Moreover, as is undoubtedly evident, the participants expressed themselves in an 
articulate, thoughtful, and often intelligent manner. One can gather from this consistent 
articulate expression throughout these narratives that there is perhaps a selection bias, most 
likely due to the utilization of the snowball method (causing a self-selective pool of 
participants). Despite their young age in the majority of the cases, they are able to 
communicate in a very studied and thoughtful way. It is important to note that this consistent 
eloquent expression would be difficult to encounter so regularly among any selected 
demographic. Of course, this observation also has a twofold significance: it additionally 
                                                          
33 Interview with Ahmed June 10, 2017; Interview with Mohamed, September 6, 2017. 




indicates a strong level of integration, in that these participants manifest such a high level of 
education. Their manner of speech reflects a solid educational foundation and the thoughts 
and concepts they express similarly communicate that they have received formation in 
critical thinking. This could reflect high levels of aspiration on the part of their family or 
community supporting them, an effective and extensive Spanish state education system, or 
both. It is notable as many of the youth, when asked, indicated that their parents were not 
educated beyond mandatory secondary school.  
Finally, in relation to this very studied and intelligent expression among the target 
population, and as noted earlier in the empirical findings, the participants are highly 
cognizant of their individual human rights. Whether referring to rights guarantees at the 
national or international level, they make clear and coherent arguments for why they feel 
their rights should be ensured, better protected or not violated. Specifically, they pointed to a 
right to non-discrimination and freedom of religious expression enshrined in liberal 
democratic legal regimes. The participants’ own recognition of a discrepancy between 
guaranteed rights and societal and institutional biases harken back to earlier discussions of 
multiculturalism and pluralism, and redefined notions of citizenship. 
It seems that in order to seek integration from these youth, or better put, to ensure 
societal cohesion that incorporates more vulnerable populations, it is paramount to both 
guarantee equality of opportunity, and to recognize that embracing pluralism is important in 
maintaining societal balance. Again, the interview attempted to record self-identification, a 
self-identification that measured sense of belonging, but it also observed religious identity, 
alongside the experiences of discrimination that impacted both variables. The results 
demonstrated hybrid identities and claims for full citizenship rights, with religious or 
minority accommodation and recognition. The following chapter explains how these 
observations provide a basis for policy recommendations and potential future studies that 
can help to ameliorate concerns both highlighted in the analysis and to be further explained 






This work sought to understand second generation identity and belonging, in light of 
factors including religiosity and societal and institutional inclusion.  These objectives were 
motivated by the heightened rhetoric surrounding Muslims in Europe, which has consistently 
pervaded academic and sociopolitical dialogues for several decades now. Despite the 
longevity of this theme’s discussion, contestations continue, and indubitably reflect perceived 
global transformations that pit an emphasis on pluralism and transnational phenomena 
against competing nationalist sentiment and integration measures.  Whether imagined fault 
lines or no, Islam has been highlighted in the European context as a manifestation of “the 
other,” associated with modern immigration processes and depicted as antithetical to 
Europe’s Christian past or secularist present. Meanwhile, regardless of contentions that this 
is simply polemicizing a larger debate regarding the individual, the state, and their respective 
changing roles and relationships in modern conditions, European Muslims must continue to 
negotiate their place in the community. Second generation Muslims in Europe come to the 
fore as an especially pertinent focus in this case, as they represent a growing component of 
future society with a compounded challenge; they are burdened not only by any 
disadvantages that migrant origin may cause them, but also face further obstacles with any 
repercussions that their ascription to Islam affords. 
Spain, with its unique historical, sociopolitical context, and relatively recent modern 
migration, presents a unique opportunity for focus, as second generation Muslim youth are 
currently poised to fully participate in Spanish society, in the wake of almost two decades of 
literature and debate regarding Muslim youth in fellow European countries. In that previous 
groundwork, identity has emerged as a principal consideration in determining these youth’s 
place in society. This is because self-identity, a reflexive and thus fluid and relational 
conception of the self, with an internal and external nature, by definition manifests an 




society. In this case, the external relationship with society is determined via an assessment of 
whether self-identification includes a sense of belonging or attachment, i.e., if there is 
identification with the community of residence. Religious identity is also highlighted as 
important for examination, as that is often cited as the differentiated aspect of this 
population, and that it could be incompatible with a sense of belonging to the society of 
residence.  
Still, it cannot be over-emphasized that the second generation is not solely 
responsible for reaching their place in society. Whether considering past understandings or 
new formulations of citizenship, there is clearly a mutual responsibility to work towards 
coexistence both on the part of the individual and of society, and in this case the individual 
represents the minority confronting the majority. Institutional and societal realities affect an 
individual’s inclusion, and there may be more obvious structural factors, like economic and 
educational social protections, that contribute to this. However, institutional accommodation 
and societal acceptance of pluralism represents another important component in two-way 
integration (especially in regards to a group often rendered as “the other”). Liberal 
democratic norms and indeed Spanish constitutional commitments recognize this mutual 
responsibility of coexistence, and in theory promise protection of individual and collective 
difference. Yet, these Muslim youth of migrant origin find themselves facing a twofold hurdle: 
balancing a dynamic, pluricultural and differentiated position in society due to their migrant 
origin, as well as perhaps encountering resistance due to Spain’s Christian tradition and 
current secularist trajectory, which may cast ascription to Islam as an incompatible type of 
differentiation. Essentially, they may be more prone to discrimination and intolerance. In 
Spain, there are still few investigations to date on these issues, given the nature of the target 
population as an emerging demographic and the lack of largescale data available. Moreover, 
given that at the European level the subject remains disputed, a study at the local level 





And so, all of these considerations led to the guiding, two-fold inquiry of this work: 
How do second generation Muslims in Madrid identify, in terms of both sense of belonging to 
their community of residence and in terms of religiosity, and do these two identifications 
demonstrate the inverse relationship that is often presumed? Furthermore, how does this 
population’s perception of Spanish societal and institutional reception shape that identity? 
The former query seeks to respond to the various contentions regarding Muslims of migrant 
origin and whether in Spain it truly is the case that second generation Muslim youth do not 
engage with the community sufficiently and thus constitute a risk of societal fragmentation.  
The latter question is significant in that in the two-way process of integration or inclusion, 
institutional and societal factors could be in fact hindering sense of belonging among Spain’s 
emerging adult citizens, thus jeopardizing the societal future.  
The discussion found its logical grounding not simply in migration theory, but within 
a larger framework of how the individual, the state, and notions of citizenship and belonging 
fit within the multidisciplinary nature of migration theory. Initially, the nation-state narrative 
drove migration studies, defined by a collective nation or ethnic group, sovereignty of the 
people, and bounded territories. The nation-state proceeded to a liberal model with a rights 
discourse, and while state institutions remain relevant, state hegemony faces competition 
with various power networks and the individual agency and rights enshrined at the 
international level. While citizenship may have been understood in its most basic sense as 
individual membership in a socio-political community, the importance of the individual’s self-
identification and participation in that community has become key in discussions of societal 
cohesion amidst pluralist societies.  
The inclusion and belonging constructed and experienced in social spaces, and the 
importance of individual agency in these processes, has undergone increased and intense 
scrutiny in more recent theory, and particularly in migration theory. At first, multiculturalism 
was presented as a way to approach or create policy for plural societies. Transnationalism 




reality that should be applied to specific or micro-contexts in social science investigation. 
Diversity management similarly tackles issues surrounding pluralism, with particularly focus 
on the individual citizen’s sense of belonging, and their sociocultural rights as part of 
citizenship rights. Theories of super-diversity and hybridity, among others, accompany this 
progressing concentration on pluralism and cohesion, as well as a recognition of the 
dichotomies and parallels between the cosmopolitan and the local.  
Given this context, the work first addressed integration in Spain and Europe more 
broadly, emphasizing how multilevel integration policies are increasingly a necessitated 
reality. It provided the comparative country cases of France and the United Kingdom in order 
to give a more comprehensive picture of the uniqueness of Spanish immigration and 
integration policy, as well as historical context. It then offered an overview of the plethora of 
growing literature regarding the second generation in Europe, why the Muslim second 
generation has been singled out in many instances, and the recent and few studies that have 
addressed the second generation in Spain, specifically. From there, a more detailed account of 
the European church and state relationship and trajectory followed, as well as further 
explanation of Muslim religious practice in Europe. Why religiosity is addressed in migration 
studies and the social sciences was covered, as well. An exposition of self-identity, including 
individual, collective, religious, and how it relates to the second generation and sense of 
belonging, then prefaced an overview of the literature on Islam in Spain and the Muslim 
community in Madrid.  
Of course, in tandem the theoretical background and literature analysis, the empirical 
qualitative study provides a new set of data to consider. Qualitative interviews of twenty-
seven 1.5 and second generation Muslims in Madrid (with a small sample of five first 
generation Muslim youth for comparison) examined how the population identified, to what 
extent their identification incorporated religious attachment and/or sense of belonging to 
community of residence, and how Spanish society and institutions affected this identity. The 




the community of residence as well as experiences of discrimination, and religiosity, 
measured by the individual’s own parameters as well as inquiries into their religious practice.  
Questions addressing experiences of discrimination and how the participants believed 
society identified and approached them sought to measure Spanish societal and institutional 
influence on the second generation youth’s experience and formulation of identity.  Using the 
first generation as a comparative group serves to demonstrate how, theoretically, the second 
generation as non-migrants and citizens and residents of Spain for the entirety of their lives 
should express higher level of attachment to this community of residence, given that Spanish 
society and institutions are providing inclusion as they should; the more prolonged the 
insertion and interaction with society, the more they would presumably relate and identify 
with the community.  
Key findings 
Synthesized with this preceding framework, the observations that ensue as a result of 
the empirical portion of the study offered many promising insights that either affirmed past 
surveys and literature or provided new and slightly divergent insights. Spanish studies tend 
to focus on either specifically Moroccan immigration, the entire Muslim population in Spain, 
or youth of migrant origin overall. European studies have addressed levels of identity or 
alternative indicators of integration including employment and education, with some focus 
on Muslim youth, and have provided a comparative reference throughout this investigation. 
However, there are few Spanish studies that target solely Muslim youth of migrant origin and 
examine the relationship between self-identity and religiosity, comparing these variables 
with the participants’ perceived reception by the community.35 This group requires analysis 
given their vulnerable minority position and the combatively greater scrutiny that they face 
                                                          
35 As previously noted in this work, the European-wide TIES study somewhat addressed these 
variables, though the data dates back to 2007-2008 (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012); it was 
additionally reported that Téllez and Adlbi provide small qualitative studies regarding religiosity and 
identity among Muslim youth in Spain, albeit with slightly different foci, as well (Téllez 2011; Adlbi 




from a multitude of societal actors. Moreover, as these youth of migrant origin reach an age 
that presupposes active citizenship and participation in the labor market, and have matured 
almost another decade in the community, further study of these topics is even timelier. What 
follows are important themes raised, implications for theory, and suggestions for future 
policy and studies. In total, it ultimately offers a fresh, albeit complex, perspective:  the 
conflicted yet promising experience of second generation Muslims in Madrid, and how in a 
post-multicultural discourse, citizen engagement as well as institutional responsibility are 
necessary for societal cohesion and success in today’s globalized world. 
Essentially, the patterns manifested in the empirical data were largely positive for 
Spanish societal outcomes. Firstly, the majority of 1.5 and second generation identified with 
the community of residence in some way, and thus express a sense of belonging. At the same 
time, they often combined this attachment with another or several self-identifications, which 
marked a notable pattern of hybridity in identification. A trend of hybrid identity in the 
participants’ identification can serve as a way to measure integration, in that perhaps 
exclusive attachment to Spain is unnecessary, but rather partial attachment is hopeful and 
also realistic in the current, diverse social climate. Secondly, as a religious minority with this 
hybrid identity, they express a spirituality that is largely either individualized and thus less 
visible, or mobilize more noticeably with religious identity, using it as a claims-making 
method of civic engagement. As such, religiosity is also a significant variable; while it does not 
indicate lack of integration, it is a vehicle for communicating participants’ expectations for 
societal inclusion. Moreover, as the participants individualize and combine their religious 
identity as necessary to meet the competing demands of multiple attachments, it 
demonstrates a skillful capacity for adaptation. Again, these combined observations signal 
promising trajectories for the future of this cohort, and consequently Spanish society. 
It seems fitting to expound upon these broad observations and embark on a final 
exploration of the major insights and theoretical takeaways resulting from this study. This 




along with several implications that merit caution, in a series of policy recommendations and 
suggestions for future research. 
Sense of belonging 
As noted in the empirical section, the albeit small sample of first generation 
participants provided a useful comparison to the 1.5 and second generation’s expressions of 
belonging. Of the five first generation youth, all preferred to speak in another language apart 
from Spanish, four did not express an attachment to the community or Spain, and four did not 
want to remain in Spain in the future. By contrast, while not everyone in the 1.5 or second 
generation cohorts made reference to Madrid or Spain when self-identifying, 63% and 84% 
respectively did include this in their identification. This comparative difference in 
identification between the 1.5 and second generation could be explained by how generation 
1.5 faces further disadvantages that immigrants might confront and the second generation 
hopefully does not, given that they arrived at some point during school age and did not 
benefit from being raised from birth in the community of residence. These can include legal 
obstacles, or challenges such as language. The progressive increasing levels of attachment, 
from the first generation to generation 1.5 to second generation, indicate that presumably, 
the second generation is not as besought with the same challenges migrants face, as should 
be the case if society is accommodating them as the full citizens they are.  
Moreover, participants demonstrated attachment to their community of residence in 
other ways, including feeling at home in Spain or hoping to stay in Spain in the future. These 
levels of attachment reflect a 2017 survey of self-identifying Muslim immigrants and their 
descendants by the 2017 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), that found average level 
of attachment to Spain at a 4.1 on a 0 to 5 scale.  
Again, sense of belonging is at the crux of this study. In an increasingly pluralist and 
globalized social fabric, that still operates in a significant way at the local level, the notions of 




modern era. In efforts towards societal integration and cohesion, communities must balance 
the process of incorporation and shared sense of belonging with a realistic approach and 
respect for multiple attachments and identities.  Sense of belonging to the community as part 
of self-identity on the part of these youth indicates they are oriented towards participating in 
a welcoming community. As such, they are positioned to contribute to the community in a 
mutually beneficial relationship for both parties.  
Alienation or marginalization by the receiving society can cause the opposite effect: a 
sense of rejection, disempowerment and disaffection, which may cause withdrawal and all of 
its accompanying consequences. In self-identifying in this investigation, the participants 
demonstrated levels of attachment to the community in combination with other facets of 
identity. Nurturing and maintaining this attachment, for the benefit of collective societal 
success as much as for the benefit of this minority group, means consideration of the whole 
confluence of self-identity, accounting for its fluidity, reflexivity, and most importantly, its 
external as much as its internal influences. In this case, such consideration involves the 
following observations regarding religiosity, hybridity and expectations of participation, as 
well as an underlying, influencing factor of discrimination.  
Religiosity  
The youth self-identified as Muslim and expressed or practiced their faith or 
religiosity to varying degrees. This religiosity sometimes included an individualized or 
personalized spirituality that was marked in its difference from traditional religious practice. 
One might look to how second generation youth are juggling two different cultures, 
sometimes two languages, and two sets of expectations or ethical underpinnings. These 
demands may force them to prioritize what merits their time, as they must make certain 
choices about how to strike this balance. Perhaps while belief may remain a priority, practice 
may need to be customized so as to coalesce with the many other moving parts that shape 




As previously mentioned, the target population of this study is often the subject of 
heated debate, in political, academic and societal rhetoric. There are those who frame the 
discussion in terms of “the other,” arguing there is a Muslim frontier in Europe, and those 
identifying as Muslim are inherently unable to acculturate to Western society. However, 
sense of belonging did not seem to correlate with a varying degree of religiosity in this study. 
Those who demonstrated more traditional practice did not express significantly less 
attachment to Spain, Madrid or their community than those who articulated an individualized 
faith. Indeed, religious identification did not necessarily entail a conflict between 
attachments; multiple ethnic identities, alongside or including religious identity, could 
instead provide more societal linkages and facilitate solidarity among various groups. These 
findings mirror that of Fleischmann’s 2011 study of Turkish and Moroccan second generation 
immigrants in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, although her study noted that 
dual identity among minority groups proved less prevalent if perceived levels of 
discrimination were high. While discrimination was often encountered in this investigation, 
although sometimes not described as particularly concerning, the population nonetheless 
balanced hybrid identities, or harmoniously combined multiple attachments.  
The empirical data also demonstrated that in the case of young Muslims in Madrid, 
self-identified religious youth can maintain an egalitarian approach to gender roles and 
support a secular, democratic state. This observation challenges claims that religiosity would 
correlate to conservative social views, or that adherents of Islam support gender inequality, 
theocracies and dictatorships. In regard to gender roles, Röder similarly concludes, using 
findings from the European Social Survey (of 27 European countries) that a link between 
practice of Islam or religiosity and gender inequality is neither “intrinsic nor fixed” (2014). 
Again, religious identity may have influenced this population’s worldview, but not to the 
extent that it significantly alienated them from mainstream societal views or participation. As 
discussed throughout this work, the fact that religious civil society organizations cooperate 




supported and connected to the community, as some of the participants in this study drew 
from such organizations. The reality of associations and civic participation at the local level 
may be an imporant aspect of how these youth gained support from their local networks. 
Indeed, religiosity provided another form of attachment or belonging upon which to draw 
from, as well as motivated claims for societal participation. 
Hybridity  
And so, in examination of religious identity as a variable in this study, it ultimately 
served to illustrate how hybrid identities could operate alongside societal cohesion, and how 
a sole identification to the nationality of the country of residence was not the only form of 
demonstrating attachment and acculturation. Youth could religiously identify, demonstrate a 
sense of belonging to the local community, and even simultaneously identify as citizens of the 
world. Recognizing the value in multiple identifications and the perils of an exclusive 
mindset, some participants emphasized the importance of an inclusive and broad-minded 
approach to societal participation and interaction. The potential of syncretism to beget 
change and progress was not lost on them.  Of course, a tension remains between 
differentiation and integration; between a modernized approach to a politics of difference, 
versus current calls for a homogenized cultural project. More specifically, the latter finds its 
most extreme form in the rise of xenophobic, right-wing populist parties in Europe and 
throughout the world that prey upon a threefold fear of the dilution of national identity, 
socioeconomic decline and security concerns (Arango et al. 2017). Thus, the second 
generation, as they balance multiple identities. not only have to determine where they 
themselves stand in the dichotomy between a politics of difference versus a national project. 
They also might have to contend with the current wave of extremist nationalist sentiment 
that unequivocally rejects pluralist approaches.  
And in the case of the study’s generation 1.5 and second generation participants, the 




worldview, which enabled them to engage with a universal conception of human rights and 
citizenship. This was significant, as the conception of active citizenship that they espoused 
aligns with theories advocating for a participatory citizenship in order to pursue societal 
cohesion. Legitimacy in the public sphere is based upon communication between the various 
parties that compose it (individuals, state, society), and as such, the agency of individuals 
remains important to ensuring functioning rights systems and citizenship at all levels, from 
the local to the transnational (Fraser 2007).  
Portes, Vickstrom and Aparicio similarly stressed in their Spanish study of immigrant 
children that selective acculturation, rather than homogeneous identity, led to more positive 
outcomes in terms of aspirations (2011). In short, this study makes a comparable 
observation, in discovering expectations of societal participation and rights alongside hybrid 
identities. It harkens back to the notion that in terms of integration, agency may indeed prove 
more vital than notions of static culture.  
Rights claims and expectations of recognition 
It bears repeating, of course, that in any discussion of integration, the responsibility of 
the receiving society or community is an important aspect of a two-way process (Joppke 
2007). Moreover, at some point, in the of developing legislating and implementing 
integration, society may simultaneously arrive at new meanings of citizenship and state. This 
could be applicable to Spain’s case, as it continues to go about providing for a pluralist 
society. Immigration beginning in the 1980s has presented new challenges and questions, 
alongside the pluralist realities and issues that Spain has encountered among its autonomous 
communities in recent history (Arango 2012). As a result and as discussed, many institutional 
safeguards are in place to protect rights, and diversity management is underway. 
Within this context, the majority of the participants addressed rights claims in some 
manner. They may have asserted these claims due to experiences of discrimination, or thanks 




their individual agency, as children of immigrants negotiating their place in society. Any of 
these motivations, however, link back in some form to a broader human rights agenda, one 
that was presumably learned of in Spanish society. Some addressed rights claims directly; 
they argued that there was a need for more activism, especially on the part of Muslims or 
Muslim youth. These claims were directed in response to Spanish societal and institutional 
obstacles or shortcomings in managing religious pluralism or ensuring religious equality and 
freedom. Others noted a deprivation of rights, whether or not they sought to rectify it. Finally, 
still others expressed a frustration with Spanish democracy. This may have been caused by 
frustration on the part of their entire generation in Spain (including children of natives), 
given the recent recession and its perceived causes, or also due to disappointment in Spanish 
institutional protection of minority rights.  
Findings in the context of other European studies 
As discrimination was a pervasive factor linked to rights claims and identity, it merits 
some final attention in this work. The recent 2017 EU FRA survey of self-identifying Muslim 
immigrants and their descendants noted that likelihood of discrimination was low in Spain in 
comparison with other countries. Indeed, some participants in this study did report no 
personal discrimination, and still others explained that the discrimination they did face was 
surmountable and unremarkable. Exposure to discrimination was often trivialized in their 
accounts. However, the vast majority of the youth had at least some experience of 
discrimination to report, both among the first, 1.5 and second generations. The youth in this 
study hypothesized various reasons for the discrimination they faced, including ignorance, 
racism or xenophobia. 
In the empirical portion, accounts that dealt with labor market discrimination and 
discrimination in education held a certain significance when contemplating future 
trajectories. Of course, these signify barriers to social mobility, and could cause increased 




society. The workplace is especially problematic, because it introduces a new set of factors 
and dynamics that could be viewed as less easily regulated by the state than say, education. 
Indeed, these youth are at risk as they face disadvantages due to discrimination either based 
on origin, race, skin color or religion, or some combination of these. Moreover, a recent, 
small-scale study by Gebhardt, Zapata and Bria confirmed that in Barcelona as well, second 
generation youth (not solely Muslim) were highly exposed to discrimination, especially in 
school and public spaces (2017).  
Moseen remained hopeful that time would translate into increased opportunity, 
rather than a stagnated future trajectory:  
“I think it’s a question of time. We could also say that Spain is most behind in terms of 
countries with foreigners in relation to generations…The first generation when they 
came, well, the poor people, my father, they only wanted to survive, to work and 
whatever, and their kids you could say, we are going further in our studies, so I think 
it’s a question of time and we will rise to the top until we are integrated into the most 
important positions and can open the mind of people, open their eyes, so they see us 
as equal. I think it’s a question of time and this will get better, we hope.”  
Again, in order for the Spanish second generation to remain upwardly mobile, and to achieve 
empowered positions and equality of opportunity in Spanish society, the rights challenges 
previously addressed remain a key concern. 
This is especially evident in the cases mentioned earlier in this work, in studies of 
other children of migrant origin in Europe. Research in countries like France and the United 
Kingdom, with third and fourth generations, has demonstrated that entrenched societal 
disparity and obstacles can isolate children of migrants and stunt social mobility. This can 
incite reactive identity that causes societal cleavages, as well as can aggravate socioeconomic 
disparities. Essentially, acculturation does not necessarily entail a linear process. Still, Spain 
is relatively new to immigration in its modern history, and has consequently only very 
recently been addressing the needs of both the second generation and the response of society 
and institutions. There is an opportunity to learn from any negative trajectories in other 




account examples of positive trajectories. In fact, the study participants’ expectations of 
inclusion and societal participation were very hopeful for future Spanish societal cohesion. As 
noted in other European studies, societal mobility may also be enabled by welfare state 
support and increasingly diverse metropolises where minorities can increasingly stake their 
presence (Crul, Schneider and Lelie 2012). However, one again, these youth cannot be the 
only ones that bear the responsibility of seeking such cohesion.  
Theoretical takeaways: checks and balances and agency versus static values and 
culture 
In this discussion of cohesion, diversity management and welcoming pluralism 
remains key on the part of the receiving society’s responsibility. Again, identities can be 
formulated according to nation, religion, gender class, culture, language, or simple daily life 
practices (Toğuşlu and Sezgin 2014). In addressing identity, recognizing individual and group 
agency, as well as the fluidity of identity, is crucial when studying the relations between 
groups and people in an increasingly mobile and diverse social reality.  Identities can be 
plural and de-territorialized, as was demonstrated in the case of young 1.5 and second 
generation Muslim youth in Madrid. Their hybrid identity has been an important finding in 
this study: it indicated the degree of their sense of belonging in Spanish society, and 
disproved misconceptions that a high level of religiosity (essentially affiliation with Islam) 
precludes identification with European society, Spain or local communities within Spain.  
These observations and surrounding misconceptions point to the recognition of a 
tension in modern society: there are efforts to balance cohesive integration on the one hand, 
while simultaneously protecting individualization and diversity on the other. The empirical 
portion addressed how some laws or rights are prioritized more than others. As such, what 
may be problematic is a prioritization of values, or a focus on a system of values. Of course, 
theory and political systems are inevitably based in values, and in this case liberal democratic 
values. Moreover, a systematic protection of rights does indeed necessitate some selection 




this study demonstrate that culture is not static, and while societal roles and rules have 
always experienced continual transformation, their reformulation and interchange in modern 
society is a prevalent and timely topic in the literature. As such, in order to maintain societal 
cohesion while concurrently respecting individual rights, both academic theory and the 
practical policy it informs should perhaps turn its concentration to improving a system of 
checks and balances that protects autonomy and governs difference to the fairest extent 
possible.  
Given the patterns and data in this study, in addition to directing efforts towards a 
reexamined and renewed system of checks and balances, the importance of emphasizing 
agency over static culture arises. In keeping with this principle, the conclusions reached 
affirm what some theoretical literature has previously and increasingly advocated for: 
engaging active citizenship as a manner of facilitating societal cohesion. Of course, this active 
citizenship incorporates previous ideas regarding belonging, and a sense of attachment is 
necessary in order to encourage levels of participation. Indeed, perhaps the two concepts 
work in tandem. For this reason, no doubt, the 2010 EU Zaragoza meeting recommended 
addressing hard integration indicators like access to education and the labor market, but 
nodded to soft indicators as well (Huddleston et al. 2013). These less obvious indicators 
addressed the importance of societal welcome, active citizenship participation and 
discrimination monitoring; these factors are integral in ensuring social mobility and 
accommodating the next generation of citizens, albeit perhaps are less perceptible and take 
effect over a longer period of time. 
Policy recommendations alongside civil advocacy and activism 
Various recommendations for future policy and action surface, to be undertaken by 
policymakers, civil society, or both, follow from the previous analysis. Spain has several 
equality initiatives under the jurisdiction of other ministries that conduct work protecting the 




under the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security), the Council for the 
Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination (under the Ministry of Health Social Services 
and Equality), both referenced previously in Chapter Four, as well as Spain’s Observatory for 
Religious Pluralism, an initiative of the Ministry of Justice, treated of in Chapter Eight. They 
have made some promising strides in terms of institutional steps towards identifying and 
combatting discrimination.  
i. Improved awareness and reporting 
However, there is undoubtedly room for improvement in awareness and reporting. 
For example, in the last Ministry of the Interior report on recorded racist incidents, that of 
2016, only 47 such incidents were counted in the category of reports of discrimination 
against religions and other beliefs that do not fall into antisemitism (OSCE, Ministerio del 
Interior). This indeed seems low, given that of the qualitative sample in this study, almost all 
of the 32 participants had experienced some form of discrimination, several of which could 
clearly merit an official police report. Of course, in our population’s case, incidents may also 
be falling into the category of racism and xenophobia, which totaled 416 cases throughout 
Spain in 2016 (OSCE, Ministerio del Interior). Still, these numbers also seem remarkably few, 
especially in comparison with other European countries, and when considering recent 
qualitative and quantitative studies of discrimination experiences in Spain. It is of course a 
baseline imperative to ensure that the listed institutions’ efforts remain prioritized and 
funded. However, in order to encourage increased rights claims and ensure protective 
measures as needed, it would be useful to create awareness of mechanisms among the 
affected population.  
ii. Creating accessible tool for Spanish Muslim youth 
As previously discussed, data on reported discrimination (of all kinds) is available via 
OBERAXE. Moreover, the Spanish Observatory for Religious Pluralism publishes information 




useful for religious minorities as they navigate their rights to belief and practice in Spain. The 
information provided by both bodies is extensive, but sometimes not specific to Spanish 
Muslim youth, and may be difficult to digest. It would thus be useful to compile information in 
a targeted way. Institutional policies and mechanisms, data about those civil society 
organizations that help advise in instances of discrimination, and the information available 
on religious pluralism, could all be incorporated into a tool. This tool should be designed so as 
to be easily distributed among Muslim youth, in order to inform them of their rights and 
options. The proposed targeted tool would of course draw on the wealth of information 
already available, but particularly aggregate the information that is applicable to youth of 
migrant origin who ascribe to the Muslim faith, as their case is a specific and complex one 
involving multiple challenges, not limited to considerations of religious freedom.  
The most obvious format might be twofold: a pamphlet for easy distribution that 
provides preliminary information, and then a more in-depth, user-friendly internet 
application that would allow the individual to indicate the query or problem. Based on the 
nature of the query and the level at which it needs to be addressed (local, national, 
international) the appropriate information and resources, and most importantly the most 
relevant advocacy organization, could be provided in palatable form.  Again, this tool would 
go hand in hand with continued and increased efforts on the part of the state and civil society 
to improve mechanisms and protections for non-discrimination and equality (in areas 
including, but not limited to, racism, xenophobia and religious discrimination, depending on 
how it pertains to the Muslim youth in question). 
iii. Enforcing equality and non-discrimination safeguards 
Developing a concrete and comprehensive tool that will better reach out to and advise 
this particular target population may aid in increasing awareness. But simultaneously, 
awareness of rights mechanisms must be complemented by a strengthening in the 




Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination, and Spain’s Observatory for Religious 
Pluralism is indeed useful for local authorities, institutions and civil society organizations, 
and affected citizens, as they provide good practice guides, reporting mechanisms and 
resources. However, as alluded to in Chapter Eight, and as a previously referenced 2018 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance report notes, an equality body as such 
remains lacking.  While these various initiatives monitor and report in order to combat 
discrimination, none are a completely autonomous public body. What is more, they lack the 
power of implementation that, for example, the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission 
exercises.  
Spain would benefit from a similar, autonomous body that provides publicly funded 
legal support to those victims of discrimination. While civil society organizations do provide 
some support to victims of discrimination, a state-funded body that enforced the laws already 
in place in Spain would go a long way towards safeguarding citizen rights. It might perhaps 
encourage more incident records, if there was a promise of action and resolution when such 
incidents were reported. It would remain key in assisting victims of rights violations; e.g. 
those who do want to contest their right to wear the veil in the workplace. This institutional 
social commitment would allow for the most vulnerable to have access to legal aid, and would 
serve as a truly concrete implementation of institutionally espoused ideals.  
iv. Correcting institutional biases  
On a separate note, but in a similar vein (in that it treats of pursuing institutional 
equality), specifically addressing preferential treatment for religious collectives could be 
useful, although a bit more grandiose of a legislative project and thus only briefly discussed 
here. Despite the 1992 agreements with religious minorities, institutional bias in favor of 
Catholicism in Spain noted earlier in this work continues, and can perhaps create cleavages. 
Rather than seeking to eliminate preferential treatment, which might be a laborious and 




advantages for minority religious groups. Thus, instead of alienating or aggravating a 
dominant group, leveling the playing field with similar advantages for minority populations 
can ameliorate concerns and provide a sense of fairness.  
v. Institutional protections during formative years 
Finally, a more obvious recommendation includes measures to fight stereotypes and 
bullying at a young age, perhaps via the educational system. Of course, this proves difficult to 
identify, monitor, and implement. Hopefully, the changing societal fabric will help increase 
exposure to pluralism and correct for ignorance and stereotypes in a kind of automatic, self-
correcting way. In addition, as noted earlier in this work, Islamophobia is increasingly 
identified by society as an issue to rectify. In the discrimination outlined earlier, Ibrahim 
draws attention to the frustrating misconceptions his cohort constantly faces when making a 
new acquaintance:  
“…at some point they ask about terrorism. And the fact that they are asking about 
terrorism means they are linking me to terrorism...we have been in this situation 
having to justify ourselves, that we have nothing to do with it… with a white person, 
you don’t ask them about Hitler, making a connection with Hitler because Hitler was a 
white person…they also ask a lot about dictatorships, which I have nothing to do with, 
they ask me about Saudi Arabia and all, and they relate it with me, with us, which is 
racist.”  
Leveraging the information and advocacy organizations already focusing on 
Islamophobia in Spain, in order to conduct preventative or educational measures within the 
school system, could be one way to go about addressing discrimination and bullying in 
impressionable and formative years. Special programs directed at youth of migrant origin, 
aimed at retention in the educational system, could also double as a feedback system for any 
discrimination these youth face.  
Essentially, in brief, there have been promising steps forward in raising awareness 
and documenting problems with discrimination and equality in Spain. However, there is still 
ample room for enhancement. Continued unawareness of rights puts this population at a 




rights mechanisms, organizations and bodies already in place, should be compiled. Once 
assembled into an easily accessible and specific form, it should be distributed as necessary 
among this particular group of affected youth. This can help to increase reporting and 
improve awareness. Finally, there is a necessity to create, fund and strengthen mechanisms 
that enforce and implement the institutional safeguards already in existence. This includes 
the strengthening of ongoing projects, and a need to renovate those projects that have 
reached the end of their funding.  Such mechanisms should be available at both the level of 
civil society and institutionally, with specific examples including: a true equality body, 
correction of institutional biases, and providing assistance and recourse via the educational 
system.  
Future academic research 
Moreover, it would perhaps be useful to conduct future studies inquiring whether 
Muslim youth in Spain have reported the discrimination they face. Several studies suggest 
that experiences of discrimination vary widely in Spain. The proposed investigation might 
also assess Muslim youth’s rights awareness, and their knowledge of rights organizations and 
mechanisms to ensure these rights. The FRA’s survey reported that only 5% of the Muslims 
they surveyed knew of an equality organization in Spain (2017).  In our analysis of the cohort 
in Madrid, while our participants faced actionable incidents, they seemed to shy from 
rectification. Only a few addressed whether they were aware of the recourses they had.  
However, the topic of whether the youth reported experiences of discrimination was 
not addressed directly in this study, and as such would be a useful inquiry to include in future 
study, perhaps investigated via a broader comparative survey, throughout Spain. Such 
research would help provide insight as to whether there are deficiencies in reporting and to 
what extent this is problematic. This could encourage a conscious reflection that overturns 




reporting levels or lack thereof contribute to a reproductive effect in cycles of discrimination, 
with embedded inequalities becoming entrenched rather than brought to light.  
In addition to this specific line of questioning, of course, studies of a larger scale 
throughout Spain, examining the same variables identified in this study, would be useful to 
provide more comparative perspective. There is still ample room for data collection and 
analysis, especially given the relevance of this population set, and ongoing societal change.  
In conclusion  
While seeking to understand identity and religious attachment among second 
generation Muslim youth in Madrid, as well as Spanish societal and institutional influence on 
these processes, patterns of hybrid identity, experiences of discrimination and expectations 
of rights recognition emerged. These hybrid identities could include ethnic and religious 
identification that did not necessarily clash with a sense of belonging to the community of 
residence; rather, one aspect of their identity could even buttress and nourish another facet. 
While the cohort did not communicate grave distress about their experiences of 
discrimination, such incidences were prevalent, and inspired articulation of rights claims. 
Indeed, both individual and collective religious identification seemed to drive these youth 
towards Spanish civic participation. Many called for rights protections as a minority group, 
whether religious or of migrant origin.  
While advocacy for cultural pluralism and the incorporation of various groups 
facilitates social interaction and dialogue, obstacles and institutional failures in protecting 
rights and ensuring societal inclusion remain a threat. These youth’s justified reaction and 
rights claims can serve as a promising indication of integration, as they clearly command 
enough confidence in their position in society to engage in claims-making in the first instance. 
However, going forward, anti-discrimination measures must remain a high priority if Spain is 
to avoid examples of negative trajectories witnessed in other European countries. A 




dissatisfaction and perceptions of disenfranchisement; the sense of belonging articulated as 
part of these hybrid identities could be jeopardized by the receiving environment.  
The issues emphasized in relation to this particular group underlined broader 
themes, ones that have incurred renewed debate in the current discourse, although are 
certainly not unprecedented in the study of social interaction. In this case, religious practice 
does not seem to be as visible or detached as purported to be by its critics. Moreover, as 
secularist ideology asserts its own set of values and principles, for secular systems to truly 
provide the fairness the ideology promises, they should ensure that religious minorities have 
a voice. Religious identity, both at the individual and collective level, calls attention to 
repeated efforts throughout social science to pinpoint how people define the collective good. 
This search for the collective good is not limited to religious or spiritual individuals or 
groups, but underlies the very theory and policy behind integration efforts.  
At this point, given the pluralism and overlap between groups and societies, scholars 
must focus their efforts on the agency and elasticity behind individual identity and the 
processes behind social relations at the most basic level, in order to better understand and 
account for larger collectives and greater transnational social phenomena. At this point, social 
life can be understood as an intermeshing of dynamic identities, rather than a series of 
separate groups pieced together alongside one another. Change and adaptation has always 
promised progress and improvement in all life processes, including the social, and they 
provide an inspiring pathway toward an enhanced coexistence. Madrid communities, Spain, 
and Europe should capitalize on and protect the diversity, dynamism and civic energy that 
Muslim youth of migrant origin in Madrid have to offer, recognizing and indeed benefiting 





Appendix A: Outline/text of interview 
No tiene que poner sus datos personales si no quiere. Estoy cursando un 
doctorado en la Universidad Complutense de Madrid y mi tesis trata sobre los retos 
que afrontan los jóvenes musulmanes en Madrid. Quiero explorar si España es un país 
abierto o si los jóvenes aquí se sienten discriminados de algún modo. También estudio 
la relación entre cómo los hijos de inmigrantes musulmanes se identifican y cómo 
expresan las diferentes formas de identidad.  
Se puede contactarme a cboland@ucm.es o 629817790. 
Muchas gracias por su tiempo. 
Colleen Boland 
 
Datos de la entrevista 
1. Fecha y hora de la entrevista  
2. Lugar de la entrevista  
 
Datos del participante 
1. ¿Cómo te llamas? (puede ser solo nombre, o anónimo) 
2. ¿Dónde vives en Madrid? 
3. ¿Cuál es tu correo o número de teléfono? 
4. ¿Hombre o Mujer? _____________ 
5. Edad:  
 
Identidad como segunda generación 
1. ¿Dónde vive tu padre biológico? 
2. ¿En qué país nació tu padre biológico? 
3. ¿Tu padre es ciudadano español? Si/No 
a. ¿Si no, que ciudadanía tiene? 
4. ¿Dónde vive tu madre biológica?  
5. ¿En qué país nació tu madre biológica?  
6. ¿Tu madre es ciudadana española? Si/No 
a. ¿Si no, que ciudadanía tiene? 
7. ¿En qué ciudad y país naciste?  
8. ¿Cuánto tiempo has vivido en España?  
9. ¿Eres ciudadano/a español/a? 
a. Si no, ¿vas a intentar a obtener la ciudadanía español/a? 
i. Si no lo quieres intentar, ¿a que se debe?  
b. En el caso afirmativo, ¿eres ciudadano/a español/a de nacimiento? 





1. ¿Te identificas con una religión? ¿Cual?  
Por favor, contesta lo siguiente con la respuesta “De acuerdo”/“Parcialmente de 
acuerdo”/“Neutro”/“Parcialmente de desacuerdo”/“En desacuerdo,” y explica porque: 
1. La religión debería ser un asunto privado entre un individual y Dios. 
2. La religión debería estar representada en la política y la sociedad, junto con otros 
puntos de vista religiosos o políticos. 
3. La religión debe ser practicada de manera abierta y pública. 
Los roles y el género 
4. ¿Crees que las mujeres deben permanecer en casa si la familia tiene niños? 
5. ¿Crees que las mujeres y los hombres deben compartir las tareas domésticas por 
igual? 
6. ¿Crees que la educación superior es menos importante para las mujeres que para los 
hombres? 
7. ¿Piensas que es importante que se trate a los hombres y a las mujeres por igual in en 
la vida profesional?  
Religión y política 
8. ¿Crees que los líderes religiosos deberían influir en la política civil? 
9. ¿Crees en los partidos políticos religiosos? 
10. ¿Crees que la ley religiosa debe ser una parte de la ley civil? 
11. ¿Crees que un país debería consagrar la libertad religiosa en sus leyes? 
12. ¿Qué piensas sobre la democracia como sistema político? 
 
Identidad musulmana (si el participante está auto-identificándose como así) 
1. ¿Con qué frecuencia asistes a la mezquita (no incluyendo bodas, funerales y eventos 
sociales)? 
a. Nunca/casi nunca/a veces/con frecuencia 
2. ¿Durante el Ramadán pasado, con qué frecuencia ayunabas? 
a. Nunca/casi nunca/a veces/con frecuencia 
3. ¿Comes halal? 
a. Nunca/casi nunca/a veces/con frecuencia  
4. ¿Con qué frecuencia rezas las oraciones diarias? 
a. Nunca/casi nunca/a veces/con frecuencia 
5. ¿Tratas de seguir las leyes de dieta islámicas? 
a. Nunca/casi nunca/a veces/con frecuencia 
b. Si a veces/con frecuencia, ¿cuáles?  
6. ¿Has recibido algún tipo de educación formal en Islam?  
7. Las mujeres musulmanas deben usar pañuelos en la cabeza o deben cubrirse la 
cabeza fuera de la casa:  
a. Porque es una elección libre y personal 
b. Porque es una obligación religiosa 
c. Porque es parte de su/mi identidad 
d. Porque quiero/quieren evitar falta de respeto o persecución 
e. No debo/deben llevar un pañuelo  




g. Otra razón: Explica, por favor.  
Por favor, contesta lo siguiente con la respuesta “De acuerdo”/“Parcialmente de 
acuerdo”/“Neutro”/“Parcialmente de desacuerdo”/“En desacuerdo,” y explica porque:  
8. Soy musulmán/a, pero no practico mi fe abiertamente. 
9. No creo necesariamente en todos los principios del Islam, pero aun así, diría que soy 
musulmán/a.  
10. No soy religioso/a, pero aun así, diría que soy musulmán/a.  
 
Familiares y amigos  
1. (Si tu padre nació en un país extranjero) ¿Cuando vino tu padre a España? 
2. (Si tu madre nació en un país extranjero) ¿Cuando vino tu madre a España?  
3. ¿Cuál es la ocupación de tu padre? 
4. ¿Cuál es la ocupación de tu madre? 
5. ¿Cuál es la titulación más alta de tu padre?  
6. ¿Cuál es la titulación más alta de tu madre?  
7. ¿Cómo clasificarías la situación económica de tu familia?  
a. (muy pobre/clase obrera/media baja/media alta/rico) 
8. ¿Vives con tu familia? Si/no  
a. ¿Si es así, con que familiares vives? 
b. ¿Si no, con quién vives?  
9. ¿Qué idioma hablas con tus padres?  
10. ¿En qué idioma prefieres hablar normalmente?  
11. ¿Cuantos de tus amigos cercanos tienen padres que no fueron nacidos en España?  
a. Ninguno/algunos/muchos 
b. Si algunos/muchos, ¿de dónde son los padres de estos amigos?  
12. ¿Hablas español con tus amigos cercanos?  
a. ¿Con ninguno de ellos/con algunos de ellos/con la mayoría de ellos?  
13. ¿Hablas otro idioma, aparte del español, con tus amigos cercanos?  
a. ¿Con ninguno de ellos/con algunos de ellos/con la mayoría de ellos?  
14. ¿Si hablas otro idioma con algunos/la mayoría de ellos, cuál idioma?  
15. ¿Tienes pareja? 
a. ¿Cómo has conocido a tu pareja? 
b. ¿En qué país nació tu pareja?  
c. ¿En qué país nacieron los padres de tu pareja?  
d. ¿Qué idioma hablas con tu pareja?  
 
Mano de obra/empleo  
1. ¿Tienes trabajo en este momento? Si no, por favor, continua a “Educación” 
2. ¿Es a tiempo completo o a tiempo parcial? 
3. ¿Cuál es tu trabajo?  
4. ¿Qué trabajo te gustaría tener?  
5. ¿Cómo has encontrado tu trabajo?  
Por favor, contesta lo siguiente con la respuesta “De acuerdo”/“Parcialmente de 
acuerdo”/“Neutro”/“Parcialmente de desacuerdo”/“En desacuerdo,” y explica porque:  




7. Has percibido discriminación en tu búsqueda de empleo.  
8. Personas con padres nativos españoles tienen más oportunidades de empleo.  
 
Educación 
1. ¿Cuál es la titulación más alta que tienes?  
2. ¿Te has sentido alguna vez discriminado por parte de tus profesores o compañeros?  
3. ¿Estás satisfecho con el nivel de educación que has recibido?  
Por favor, contesta lo siguiente con la respuesta “De acuerdo”/“Parcialmente de 
acuerdo”/“Neutro”/“Parcialmente de desacuerdo”/“En desacuerdo,” y explica porque:   
4. El sistema de educación español ofrece oportunidades de igual a todos.  
Identidad/Sentido de pertenencia  
1. ¿Cómo te identificas? 
● Español/a 
● Musulmán/a 
● Musulmán/a Madrileño/a  
● Musulmán/a Español/a 
● Madrileño/a 
● Con el país de origen de mis padres  
● Otra respuesta: _______________ 
2. ¿Cómo te identifica tu familia?  
● Español/a 
● Musulmán/a 
● Musulmán/a Madrileño/a 
● Musulmán/a Español/a 
● Madrileño/a 
● Con el país de origen de mis padres  
● Otra respuesta: _______________ 
3. ¿Cómo te identifican tus amigos? 
● Español/a 
● Musulmán/a  
● Musulmán/a Madrileño/a  
● Musulmán/a Español/a 
● Madrileño/a  
● Con el país de origen de mis padres  
● Otra respuesta: _______________ 
4. ¿Cómo te identifica la sociedad en general?  
● Español/a 
● Musulmán/a  
● Musulmán/a Madrileño/a  
● Musulmán/a Español/a 
● Madrileño/a  
● Con el país de origen de mis padres  
● Otra respuesta: _______________ 
5. ¿Qué país sientes más como tú “casa”: España, o el país de origen de tus padres? 
6. ¿Tienes derecho a votar? 
a. ¿En caso afirmativo, has votado alguna vez? 




Popular/Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español/Podemos/Ciudadanos/Izquierda Unida/Otra 
7. ¿Quieres permanecer en España en el futuro? 
8. ¿Quieres permanecer en Madrid en el futuro?  
9. ¿Quieres permanecer en tu barrio en el futuro?  
10. ¿Cómo describirías el barrio?  
a. muy pobre/clase obrera/media baja/media alta/rico 
11. ¿Participas en actividades y organizaciones?   
a. ¿En caso afirmativo, cuáles?  
12. En los últimos cinco años, ¿has solicitado ayuda en cualquiera de las siguientes áreas? 
Educación/Empleo/Vivienda/Salud 
a. ¿En caso afirmativo, dónde has buscado ayuda? 
● La familia 
● Tus amigos  
● Recursos/sitio web de Ayuntamiento de Madrid  
● Recursos/sitio del barrio/distrito  
● Comunidad religioso  
● Comunidad del barrio  
● Otra respuesta: ____________ 
Por favor, contesta lo siguiente con la respuesta “De acuerdo”/“Parcialmente de 
acuerdo”/“Neutro”/“Parcialmente de desacuerdo”/“En desacuerdo,” y explica porque:  
13. Me siento diferente de otros españoles.  
14. No hay mejor país para vivir que España.  
15. No hay mejor ciudad para vivir que Madrid.  
 
La experiencia de la discriminación 
1. ¿Te has sentido discriminado? Si/No 
En el caso afirmativo: 
2. ¿Con que frecuencia te sientes discriminado/a?  
3. ¿Dónde y con quien te sientes discriminado/a? Por favor, explica. 
a. Por ejemplo, en la escuela/en el trabajo/buscando trabajo/ocio/en el 
barrio/con la policía/otra respuesta _________ 
4. ¿Cuál piensas que fue la razón principal por la discriminación?  
Por favor, contesta lo siguiente con la respuesta “De acuerdo”/“Parcialmente de 
acuerdo”/“Neutro”/“Parcialmente de desacuerdo”/“En desacuerdo,” y explica porque:  
5. Hay discriminación en la sociedad española. 
a. ¿Si “de acuerdo” o “parcialmente de acuerdo,” contra quién? 
6. Hay discriminación religiosa en las oportunidades económicas de España.  
7. Me siento rechazado/a por mis creencias religiosas.  
8. En general, la sociedad española discrimina a los musulmanes.    
9. No importa el nivel de mi educación o mi empleo, la gente todavía me discrimina. 
10. La sociedad española da la bienvenida a las diferentes creencias. 
11. La sociedad española da la bienvenida a las religiones. 
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